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ABSTRACT 
 
RICHARD E. THORSTEN II:  Predicting Sustainable Performance and Household 
Satisfaction of Community-Oriented Rural Water Supply Projects:  A Quantitative 
Evaluation of Evidence from Ghana and Peru 
(Under the direction of Dr. Dale Whittington) 
 
 
This dissertation assesses what project, community, and external household and 
village-level factors are associated with household-level sustainability indicators for 
community-managed rural water schemes in Peru and Ghana.  Methodological 
contributions include the use of multi-level random effects and structural equation models 
to analyze data collected from large samples of households and villages in the two 
countries.  Descriptive results indicate that the participatory, demand-driven model of 
rural water service provision has generally delivered well-designed, functioning systems 
which many beneficiaries are using and remain satisfied with.  Most households are 
paying something for the water they receive, although cost recovery remains an elusive 
goal for many villages.  Regression results suggest that certain household and village 
factors directly and/or indirectly impact outcomes.  Household knowledge of committee 
activities is associated with current satisfaction and confidence in future performance, 
while other household factors (such as income and social capital) demonstrate mixed 
results.  Project factors such as direct election of water committees, training, and the 
presence of a non-governmental organization as the planning agency (in Peru) positively 
influenced sustainability indicators, while committee experience was negatively 
associated with outcomes.  This dissertation also augments research on the role of post-
iii 
construction assistance by finding that visited households participate more often and are 
more engaged in a water committee’s financial dealings.  Finally, the study sheds new 
light on household preferences for scaling up service by indicating that households are 
more likely to favor scaling up if they are currently aware of and participate in the current 
governing process and understand how the committee collects and spends its money.  
Other important village factors include elected committee structures, distance to the 
nearest area mechanic, and village size.   
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I. Introduction 
 
1.1. Problem Statement 
The provision of potable water to the estimated one billion people who lack 
access to it remains one of the foremost challenges of human development today.  For 
nearly fifty years, donors and leaders in developing countries have devoted public 
resources and leveraged private funds to construct improved water systems in urban 
and rural areas.  While coverage rates have improved over time (World Health 
Organization, 2000), growth in rural service has lagged in comparison to the higher 
percentages of urban residents in developing countries who have gained access to 
better service. 
 In the early 1990s, the development community began to reach a new consensus 
on a water sector delivery strategy.  This was embodied in this restatement of the 
principles outlined at the 1992 “Dublin” water conference:  1) the essential and finite 
nature of water resources, 2) the importance of a participatory approach to sector and 
project planning, 3) the central role of women in providing and managing water 
resources, and 4) the economic dimension of water (ICWE 1992).   This strategy 
places importance on community-driven development, women’s participation, 
elicitation of household demand for technologies and levels of service, and users’ 
financial contribution toward the costs of construction and routine operation and 
maintenance (Sara et. al 1997, Whittington et. al 1998).  Water sector practitioners 
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have since incorporated some or all of these principles into many country programs 
and regional water projects. 
 The last ten years has witnessed some notable evaluations of these types of 
“community-oriented” rural water supply projects.  Many of these have focused on 
the determinants and effects of community participation (Narayan 1995, Isham and 
Kahkonen 1999, Dayal et al. 2000, Kleemeier 2000, WSP 2000, Prokopy 2002).   
Others (Kleemeier 2000, OED 2000, WSP 2001, Engel et. al 2003, Rawlings et al 
2004) have examined household contributions to projects and responses to tariff 
structures.  These studies have focused on a variety of project outcomes, including 
physical operation, consumer use, water quality, management schemes, financial cost 
recovery, and user satisfaction.  Some studies have attempted to define and evaluate 
dimensions of “sustainability” and their associated factors (Sara et al. 1998, Dayal et 
al 2000, WSP 2001, Prokopy 2002, Rawlings et. al 2004).  While all of these studies 
use quantitative methods to explore relationships, few studies (Kwahja 2002, 
Rawlings et. al 2004) are capable of demonstrating causal relationships and 
asymptotically estimating both village and household factors that explain household-
level performance.  Most studies do not simultaneously evaluate the effects of project 
and community factors on multiple indicators of household performance, nor allow 
for causal relationships among household-level factors. 
 One of the more recent development paradigms of donor organizations and some 
governments in developing countries is a shift toward decentralization and alternative 
service delivery strategies.  Some central government authorities view this as a 
mechanism for shifting responsibility away from their agencies.  Others believe that 
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devolving service delivery and empowering other organizations can enhance user 
participation and improve long-term effectiveness.  Social funds – financial 
mechanisms that operate semi-independently from central governments and 
encourage local leaders and community organizations to identify and implement 
projects - have become one popular alternative to “top-down” water service planning, 
particularly in Latin America.  Donors have also invested greater resources in non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that assist and provide local villages with water 
and sanitation infrastructure, sometimes at a regional or country-wide scale.   
 Studies on the effectiveness and long-term impacts of social funds (Tendler 2000, 
van Domelen 2002, Rao and Ibanez 2003, Rawlings 2004) and non-governmental 
organizations (Narayan 1995, Riddell 1995, Isham and Kahkonen 1999, Kwahja 
2002) demonstrate mixed results.  These studies usually evaluate the performance of 
an institution, occasionally comparing it to a central government program.  A recent 
review of community-based development studies from Mansuri and Rao (2003) 
indicates there are many unanswered questions concerning the development impacts 
of social funds and NGOs.  Moreover, there has not been a serious attempt to 
compare two alternative service delivery mechanisms – specifically social funds and 
large-scale NGO programs – within the water sector. 
 Coverage rates and many of the recent studies cited above indicate some evidence 
that governments and other institutions of the rural water sector are making progress 
in delivering potable water to rural communities around the world.   Some sector 
practitioners are now focusing on how to “scale up” investments in successful 
communities.  This may include increasing levels of service (e.g. public taps to 
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private connections), expanding the service area within or outside a target community, 
increasing the amount of water provided, and improving the reliability and/or quality 
of water.  Other efforts in development practice concern the ability to leverage 
success in one form of community infrastructure (e.g. water) to other community 
development objectives (e.g. sanitation, health, etc.).  The joint effectiveness of 
improved water, sanitation, and health services are well known both in practice and in 
the literature (Esrey et. al 1990, 1991).  Some have argued that the long-term 
institutional and social capital impacts of these projects are as important as the 
original project intent (Kleemeier 2000, Schouten & Moriarity 2003). 
 A few case studies have detailed the successes and failures of attempts to expand 
water projects and export success into related environmental services.  And there is 
some anecdotal evidence (e.g. Schouten et al 2003) on the potential for “scaling up” 
rural water programs.  Yet there has been little systematic empirical investigation into 
local support for enhanced water service and the expansion into other categories of 
environmental services, such as solid waste, sanitation, and health practice.  
Specifically, what project and community factors are associated with a household’s 
support for improving water and other environmental services in villages?  Does 
project success encourage respondents to demand improvements or expansions to 
their service?  Does this success translate into requests for other environmental and 
health services?  As the demand-oriented service model expands in use and scope, 
these issues deserve greater attention.    
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 1.2. Dissertation Setting 
These questions are evaluated in this dissertation in the context of two different 
geographical, cultural and programmatic settings.  The World Bank’s Water and 
Sanitation Program, with funding from the Bank of the Netherlands Water 
Partnership, initiated a three-country study to evaluate the impact of post-construction 
support on the sustainability of rural water systems.  The countries studied for this 
project were Peru, Ghana, and Bolivia.  Rural water schemes have served villages in 
these countries between three to twelve years.  Although programs operated 
differently, all were implemented under the demand-oriented community 
development model.   
The Peru and Ghana studies form the basis for this investigation.  The Peru study 
was conducted in 2004-05 in the Cuzco region, which lies in the mountainous area of 
the country.  High rates of poverty and limited access to potable water and other 
infrastructure characterize many rural areas.  The study evaluated two water service 
programs – the national FONCODES social investment fund and the SANBASUR 
program, funded by the Swiss government and operating as an NGO.  Both programs 
were designed to involve community participation, train system operators and water 
committee members, elicit household demand and require household contribution for 
construction, and transfer operation to the community upon completion.  The 
SANBASUR program offered the prospect of additional, limited post-construction 
support while the FONCODES program did not during the years in which the projects 
are evaluated (1993-2001).   
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The Ghana study was also conducted in 2005.  Two regions were selected for the 
study – the Brong Ahafo region in central Ghana and the Volta region in the eastern 
part of the country.  This study examined the sustainability of village water systems 
built under Phase I of the central government’s Community Water and Sanitation 
Program.  The key (observed) difference between the two regions was the presence of 
a routine post-construction monitoring and assistance program (MOM), funded by the 
Danish government agency DANIDA.  Villages in both schemes did have varying 
degrees of access to post-construction assistance through the creation of District 
Water and Sanitation Teams (DWSTs).  Villages in the Volta region, however, 
obtained additional support via the MOM program.  As in Peru, Ghana’s CWSP I 
program featured community participation and selection, household contributions 
(usually at 5% of capital costs), and a build-transfer scheme that placed ownership, 
operational, and maintenance responsibilities in the hands of community water and 
sanitation (watsan) committees. 
 
 1.3. Research Methodology 
The World Bank study was an ex-post evaluation involving treatment and control 
groups in each country.  The study purported to evaluate performance beyond an 
initial operating stage (at least three years) among rural villages.   
The Peru study sample consisted of FONCODES and SANBASUR villages with 
the following characteristics: 1) they contained populations between 350-2000 
people, 2) they had received a project during the period 1991-2000, and 3) they were 
located in the Department of Cuzco.  All SANBASUR projects were located in the 
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mountainous areas of the Cuzco region.  We excluded FONCODES projects in the La 
Convencion district of Cuzco, since it features lower elevations and tropical 
rainforests.  This enabled controlling for topography, hydrology, and technology (all 
projects employed gravity-fed water schemes).  A total of 56 FONCODES and 43 
SANBASUR projects qualified for the sample.   
The Ghana study sample was divided into the Volta and Brong Ahafo regions.  
Approximately one-hundred villages built under the CWSP I program from each 
region were selected.  Both regions’ beneficiary communities:  1) contained 
populations between 250 – 2500 people, 2) began operating their projects between the 
years 1993-2001, and 3) received one or two boreholes as the basis of their project.  
Villages in the Volta region were also selected based on whether they had received 
regular, quarterly assistance from the MOM program for at least three years.   
Researchers in both country settings developed household questionnaires, focus 
group surveys with water committee, village leaders, and village women, and system 
operator/caretaker interviews.  Enumerator teams consisted of a team leader, who was 
generally responsible for executing the field work and conducting focus group 
surveys, and enumerators who handled the household surveys.  Female team 
members administered the village women’s focus group survey where possible.  The 
studies also relied on technical expertise.  Engineers visited Cuzco villages to 
administer the system operator’s survey and conduct a technical assessment of the 
system.  In Ghana, team leaders worked with DWST officials to estimate the number 
of consumers and liters drawn upon a village’s main borehole for one day and 
tabulated payments obtained for the service.   
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Initial data for both of these studies was obtained in fall 2005.  The research team 
completed final reports to the World Bank in 2006.  This dissertation uses descriptive 
statistics, principal components analysis, and multi-level random effects and 
structural equation models for the data analysis.  Dependent variables are measured at 
the household level, while factor effects occur at both the household and village level.  
Table 1 overviews the dependent variables featured in this dissertation. 
Table 1:  Household-level Indicators of Sustainability 
MEASURE COUNTRY TYPE 
# Breakdowns last 6 months Peru Physical 
# Days to repair last problem Peru Physical 
Household pays for water Ghana, Peru Financial 
Amount HH pays for water Ghana, Peru Financial 
Satisfaction – water pressure Ghana, Peru Satisfaction – water 
Satisfaction – water safety Peru Satisfaction – water 
Satisfaction – water taste Ghana Satisfaction – water 
Satisfaction – operation & maintenance Ghana, Peru Satisfaction – service 
Satisfaction – water committee Ghana, Peru Satisfaction – service 
Trust – water committee Ghana, Peru Satisfaction – service 
Satisfaction – water system Peru Satisfaction – overall 
Five-year confidence in water system Ghana, Peru Future sustainability 
Ten-year confidence in water system Peru Future sustainability 
Committee should scale up water service Ghana, Peru Scaling up 
Committee should handle related needs Peru Leveraging 
   
 1.4. Research Questions 
Chapter 3 will present the theoretical constructs and specific hypotheses tested in 
this dissertation.  Three broad areas of inquiry form the basis of this study.   
1.4.1. What village-level (project, community, institutional) and household factors 
(project and non-project) directly and indirectly influence current household 
performance, financial payments, satisfaction with water and service attributes, 
and perception of a water project’s future performance? 
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1.4.2. How do alternative service delivery models – specifically social investment 
funds and NGO programs – perform as vehicles for delivering sustainable rural 
water service and recovering costs in gravity-fed water schemes? 
1.4.3. What village and household factors predict support among households 
for “scaling up” water services and “leveraging” water investments toward 
other forms of environmental health infrastructure? 
1.4.3.1. What project, community, and household factors can lead to support 
for upgrading water service?   
1.4.3.2. Do successful water projects lead to household support for related 
community services, such as sanitation, solid waste, and primary health care?   
 1.5. Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation contains eight chapters.  Chapter Two reviews the principal 
theoretical and methodological approaches in the literature on evaluating project 
performance, sustainability, scaling up, and leveraging in the water and sanitation 
sector of developing countries.  Chapter Three presents theoretical constructs, specific 
hypotheses, data analysis techniques, general and country-specific research designs, 
and threats to validity.  Chapter Four overviews the study areas and includes details 
on national water sector strategies and regional programs.  Chapter Five describes 
field activities conducted as part of the study.  Chapter Six presents descriptive and 
model results. Chapter Seven compares the results and discusses the implications of 
the findings.  Chapter Eight reviews these findings in light of contributions to the 
literature, addresses limitations, and suggests avenues for further research.  Additional 
Appendix materials and references appear at the end.
  
 
II. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This dissertation focuses on what project and non-project factors are associated 
with sustainable household water service in community-based, demand-oriented 
programs, what village and household-level factors influence user payments, 
satisfaction, and perceptions about sustainability, and what factors predict the 
willingness of villagers to favor improvements to potable water and other 
environmental health services.   
The next section will review concepts of sustainability and their application to 
evaluating water project performance in developing countries.  The section will also 
discuss some theoretical project, community, and external factors that may influence 
elements of sustainability.  Methodological approaches and findings from key studies 
at the village level are examined in Section 2.3.  Section 2.4 will review qualitative 
and quantitative studies which have evaluated factors associated with increased 
household water use, satisfaction, and perceptions of improved household water 
supply.  These include single and multi-construct approaches, single and multi-
country studies, household-level models of behavior, and village-level impacts.   
Section 2.5 briefly overviews theories and prospects for “scaling up” successful 
water projects and “leveraging” investments to accommodate other environmental 
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and health services.  Finally, Section 2.6 identifies gaps in existing literature and 
addresses what “grey areas” this dissertation will address.  
 
2.2. Evaluating Sustainability and Performance of Village Water Systems 
2.2.1. Theories of Sustainability and Application to Rural Water Provision 
Sustainable development was introduced to the global community through the 
efforts of the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (named 
after its chair, Gro Brundtland).  It was the first large-scale attempt to link 
environmental and development issues together.  The Brundtland Commission 
defined sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
needs’ (WCED 1987).  The Commission attempted to bring together economic 
development, social equity, and environmental protection objectives into a more 
holistic perspective on development (Berke 2000).   
The application of sustainable development differs among theoreticians.  
Barbier (1987) adopted a “maximization” approach, similar to that in traditional 
economics, in which the goal is to maximize a set of objectives under biological, 
economic, and social constraints.  Sustainability enters into a “blueprint” 
framework, in which techniques such as cost-benefit and environmental impact 
analysis attempt to quantify objectives and constraints and allow decision-makers 
to make tradeoffs among policy alternatives (Tacconi and Tisdell 1992, Angelsen 
and Sumalia 1997).   For example, in the water sector, freshwater could be 
introduced as a non-declining capital stock constraint (Pearce, Markandya, and 
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Barbier 1989).  Goodland and Daly (1996) suggested a hierarchy of methods in 
which natural capital can be considered – from perfect substitution among sets of 
capital (weak sustainability) to no depletion or use of non-renewable resources 
(absurd-strong).  Others have argued for a “participatory” approach; placing 
individual decision-makers at the center of sustainable development (Chambers 
1983, 1994a, Therkildsen 1988).  Individual self-esteem and empowerment 
become important measures of project success and sustainability.  Tradeoffs 
among goals are more limited, and there is a greater emphasis on a flexible 
learning process between donors and beneficiaries (Korten 1980, Kottak 1985).   
In the water sector evaluation literature, there has been an emphasis on 
sustainability as maintaining program outcomes over time.  The USDA (1987, 
from Bohm et al 1993) defined sustainability as “the collective ability to continue 
a flow of valued benefits or outcomes beyond a given investment period at an 
acceptable cost.”   WASH (1994) provided a similar definition of a sustainable 
project as one that “maintains or expands a flow of benefits at a specified level for 
a long period after external funding has been withdrawn.”  The World Health 
Organization’s handbook on financial management for water supply and 
sanitation understands sustainability as the “creation and maintenance of 
conditions that ensure the technical, social, and financial success of projects, 
subject to availability and adequate sharing of responsibilities between the 
community and the agency” (WHO 1994). 
    Sustainability enters the realm of rural water sector planning in different 
capacities.  The environmental dimension of sustainability (arguably the initial 
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motivating force behind the concept) translates into a need to identify water 
sources that are not constrained for other social purposes or fraught with 
ecological stresses.  This may include a greater emphasis on using marginal 
extraction and opportunity cost as a benchmark for water pricing (Warford 1994).  
A related environmental problem also arises in providing new water services to 
villages without adequate sanitation.  The introduction of more water can 
sometimes exacerbate sanitation problems by creating negative health 
externalities for members of a village.   
Other practitioners have attached a different meaning to sustainability.  Their 
concern is rooted in the lack of public resources available to tackle the problem of 
covering increasing populations with improved water services.  The capital 
provided for rural water schemes has often not been sufficient to meet 
development targets.  Moreover, many water schemes have enjoyed short life 
spans and frequently failed (Therkildsen 1988).   One often-cited problem has 
been that many beneficiaries were never involved in the water planning process 
and never contributed to the capital or operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of 
the water systems.  Many development practitioners had believed that “the poor” 
were incapable of contributing, although studies (MacRae and Whittington 1986, 
Briscoe and de Ferrenti 1988) had shown that low-income households sometimes 
paid sizable amounts of their income for water in the absence of improved 
infrastructure.  It appeared that water and sanitation schemes needed to become 
financially more self-sufficient.  This would involve asking beneficiaries to 
financially contribute – at least toward routine maintenance and operation (Black 
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1998).  Economic assessments, in turn, would be able to compare willingness to 
pay with the costs of maintaining a project over its designed life span 
(Whittington and Swarna 1994). 
Some evaluations of rural water schemes have incorporated sustainability 
criteria in their methodologies.  WASH (1994) developed one of the first sets of 
published criteria to evaluate sustainability in the water sector.  A reprinted list of 
questions suggested in designing evaluations appears below (the authors 
considered the first two questions as primary criteria): 
? Are most people covered by the project using the facilities?  (50% level 
usage considered acceptable).   
? Are the facilities in operational order (75% of systems should be operational 
in any given time)?  Requires support of qualified repair person, supplier of 
spare parts, and adequate funds.   
? Are management committees functioning?  (75% of committees should meet 
periodically and implement tasks).  Should maintain community support and 
ensure that O&M funds are adequate. 
? Are extension agents meeting with committees regularly to facilitate ongoing 
activities?  
? Are trained repair persons and supplies of parts easily available? 
? Is a specific government agency effectively managing the sector? 
? Is there an importer or manufacturer of spare parts? 
? Does each institution have adequate financial resources?   
 
Other researchers used some of these criteria in developing sustainability and 
performance benchmarks to evaluate programs.  A later section will address their 
use in key evaluation studies.   
2.2.2. Factors Hypothesized to Influence Sustainability and Performance 
2.2.2.1. Project Factors - Technology 
Technology choice is often determined by geographic and hydrological 
factors.  For example, villages in the Cuzco region rely on gravity-fed schemes 
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from surface or spring water sources above the community.  In contrast, many 
Ghanaian villages depend on boreholes and pumps which bring water from 
underground.  Technology scale and complexity have received scrutiny in the 
water sector since the beginning of donor-assisted rural water projects in 
developing countries.  Early development programs often followed an 
engineering-style model, with a heavy emphasis on large-scale capital systems 
that were often expensive and delivered water to a small set of wealthy consumers 
(Black 1998).  These systems were rarely feasible or cost-effective in rural areas, 
and frequently failed when attempted.  The 1970s witnessed the advent of 
appropriate technology (Schumacher 1973), which tended to feature smaller-scale 
systems.  These systems often cost less to build and sometimes included a degree 
of citizen participation.  Yet some critics (Feacham 1980, Schouten et al 2003) 
allege that these systems were not so “appropriate” because they were often 
planned in absence of demand forecasts and were not designed for expansion.  
2.2.2.2. Project Factors – Community Participation and Management 
One of the hallmarks of the community management model is its emphasis on 
greater participation among beneficiaries.  Early instances of participation can be 
found beginning in the late 1960s (van Wijk 1979, 1981), but the community 
involvement paradigm gained greater momentum after the 1977 Mar de Plata 
water conference in Argentina (Black 1998).   
Early theoreticians such as Hirschmann (1970) and Chambers (1983) 
demonstrated the potential viability of community management models.  Both 
advocated “bottom up” approaches to development and developed early 
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participatory models.  Ostrom (1990) showed how communities were capable 
under certain circumstances of managing common pool resources.   
Oakley (1991) lists some key arguments in favor of the effectiveness of the 
community participation model.  These include 1) participation empowers rural 
people to make decisions and take actions that represent their development 
interests, 2) empowerment can lead to improved community capital which can 
translate into other beneficial projects, 3) participatory projects can be more cost-
effective (in terms of supply potable water per capita) than other projects.  
Narayan (1995) has also highlighted the importance of participation as a means of 
improving water supply service along effectiveness, efficiency, empowerment, 
equity, and coverage objectives (see Prokopy 2002 for a discussion).   
Others theoreticians have suggested that the CM model faces difficulties in 
organizing for collective action and providing for public goods.  Olson (1971) 
argued that large groups will have difficulty in organizing to pursue common 
interests because they face higher organizational costs and the prospect that 
individuals will “free ride” on the work of other community members.  Hardin 
(1982) argued that the nature of common pool resources allowed for individual 
plundering at the expense of collaborative interest (i.e. the “tragedy of the 
commons”).     
Likewise, not all have been sold on the merits of community management in 
the water sector.  Feacham (1980) argued that community participation models are 
no more effective than other methods if they fail to account for basic water 
planning requirements such as water sources and demand.  Mansuri and Rao’s 
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(2004) assessment of community management models has criticized project 
planners for injecting a formulaic approach to community participation in 
infrastructure projects.  Some early attempts at participation, for example, 
emphasized “requirement” checklists (WASH 1993) as opposed to soliciting 
citizen interest for project planning and design.  This “requirement” role of 
participation may conflict with another potential factor of sustainability – 
responsiveness to local demand.   
2.2.2.3. Project factors – Demand Responsiveness  
Demand responsiveness stands alongside community involvement as one of 
the pillars of rural water programs over the last ten years.  The demand-oriented 
approach marks a fundamental paradigm shift in development thought and 
practice.  Many water projects over the first four decades of development 
assistance focused on a supply-oriented drive to maximize coverage.  
Justifications included basing investments on “objective” health criteria, basic 
needs assessments, or the “rights” of groups to water sources.  While these 
aspects of water supply may be important in planning new systems, by the 1990s 
it became clear that the performance of low-cost rural water systems depended on 
healthy consumer demand (World Bank Water Demand Research Team 1993, 
Black 1998).  Weak consumer demand indicated that villagers would not 
contribute toward the operation and maintenance of the system, would not use the 
system on a regular basis, and/or would not be satisfied with the system once it 
was built.   
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Neglecting demand has often placed new systems in a “low-level equilibrium 
trap” (Serageldin 1994, Tamayo et al 1999).  When project planning, particularly 
for low-cost systems, ignores anticipated demand over time, users are not willing 
to pay for the improved service because it does not reflect their demand for a 
higher level of service; even though they might be willing to pay for a better 
system.  As a result, the community cannot generate enough resources to sustain 
and expand the system upon completion, and it falls into disrepair.  Many systems 
that the U.S. Water and Sanitation Program for Health evaluated in the 1980s and 
early 1990s fell into this category (WASH 1993).   
Demand can also depend on the payment mechanisms used to collect funds.  
Questions of how to pay for water services are faced by communities of all sizes 
throughout the world.  In addition to its revenue implications, payment vehicles 
can also affect the demand for levels of service.  The financial viability, 
efficiency, and equity of tariffs have been discussed extensively in the literature 
(Therkildsen 1988, Munasinghe 1992, Whittington and Swarna 1994). Generally, 
one of the main obstacles in many rural areas is the notion that water is a free gift 
and should not be priced for any purpose.  The significance of financial payments 
and payment schemes has not been studied in great detail in the rural water sector. 
2.2.2.4. Project Factors – Non-Governmental Organizations and Social Funds 
While churches and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have 
assisted in constructing rural water projects since before World War II, the rise of 
the NGO as an important actor in the sector began in earnest during the 1980s 
with the growth of the community participation movement (Schouten 2003).  
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Initially a small-scale enterprise, NGO development has increased both in size 
and scale over the last two decades; spending by the early 1990s an estimated 
U.S. $6 billion worldwide on development assistance (Riddell et al. 1995).   
NGO-led development has been viewed by some as an important strategy.  
Some practitioners have argued that NGOs are better equipped than the state to 
reach the poor, improve community participation, and enhance local capacity for 
community management.  Others have suggested that NGOs are more efficient in 
delivering a level of service to customers at a lower unit cost due to their more 
flexible structure and less wasteful use of resources.   
The evolving literature on the role of information in public economics (Dixit 
2002, Besley and Ghattak 2003) suggests a more theoretical reason why NGOs 
can be more successful purveyors of public goods.  In contrast to private goods, 
public goods often lack a market structure that allows suppliers and customers to 
place their respective values on goods and services and complete transactions.  
One of the aims of public goods theory is to recommend alternatives to simulate 
market conditions.  Under contracted conditions organized by the state, civil 
parties (e.g. NGOs) will reveal how much they value the production of a specific 
public good to a targeted population.  Unlike profit-seeking private actors or rent-
seeking state actors, NGOs lack incentives to underestimate the value they place 
on producing a certain good.  Their interest (in theory) lies more with the delivery 
of the service.  Thus, they have incentive to reveal their true willingness to pay for 
implementing a contract.    
20 
Social funds have become another popular vehicle for delivering a variety of 
public goods and social services over the last ten years.  Originating in response 
to national emergencies, social funds have diversified and become more 
permanent investments in development portfolios across the developing world.  
Social funds are developed by countries and usually are designed to reach people 
living in poverty.  Many share a set of common characteristics formulated by 
Wietzke (2000) and Jorgensen and van Domelen (2000). 
• Social funds are second tier agencies that finance investments, rather than 
implement programs carried out by line ministries, NGOs, or communities. 
• Social funds offer a menu of investment options.  Depending on the 
country, these can be limited to a few choices or a variety of social and 
infrastructure programs. 
• Investments are driven by demand, reflecting a bottom-up approach in 
which communities, NGOs, and other ministries apply for funds to the 
executing agency. 
• Social funds operate independently from line ministries, although in 
theory their investments complement macro-economic and macro-sector 
policies.   
 
Social funds are considered to have some potential advantages in providing 
public services versus traditional line ministries.  Their operational autonomy 
potentially allows staff to bypass traditional bottlenecks in ministries.  In theory 
they provide a range of investment options and allow communities to select what 
type and level of service they want.  The model also claims to be more 
participatory, often by requiring community organization in soliciting, planning, 
and implementing projects.  However, some have argued that social funds are no 
more effective than line ministries in providing infrastructure.  Reasons include 1) 
their position as another bureaucratic agency without the resources or clout of line 
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ministries, 2) a limited set of alternatives available for community selection, 3) a 
lack of projects that can provide for genuine participation (Tendler 2000). 
2.2.2.5. Community Factors – Village Size  
Village size can be an important community factor in predicting whether a 
system will function sustainably over time.  At the village level, systems serving a 
small population often require higher per household capital and operating costs.  
Economies of scale can thus favor larger systems from a cost recovery standpoint.  
Others also suggest that smaller villages are poorer than larger ones and do not 
have as many resources – financial or human capital – to maintain systems 
(particularly schemes which require complicated repairs and spare parts).  On the 
other hand, since the 1970s some have argued that small scale systems are a more 
appropriate technology for many villagers in terms of project success and user 
participation in the process.   
2.2.2.6. Community Factors – Distance and Location 
Distance to water sources has been mentioned as an important possible factor 
in the sustainability of water systems.  Large distances to water sources can 
increase the initial cost of supplying water.  For gravity-fed systems, the expanded 
network can lead to a greater possibility that one or more of its parts will break 
down – increasing operating and/or replacement costs.  Among borehole systems, 
a borehole located far from a village can also decrease the likelihood that people 
will use it.   
A slightly different but related issue is the location of a village relative to 
other cities and towns.  Cairncross et al (1980) has argued that villages in more 
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remote, less accessible locations are less likely to receive funding for improved 
water infrastructure.  Sharma (2001) found this relationship to be true in 
comparing service provision in a valley community versus a hill town in Nepal.  
In addition, more remote communities may find it more difficult to obtain forms 
of external post-construction assistance, as discussed below. 
2.2.2.7. Community Factors - Social Capital 
The literature on social capital and its effects on social services, including 
water supply, has grown considerably over the last decade since Putnam’s (1995) 
seminal work on the subject.  One of the key hypotheses is that communities with 
higher social capital are better equipped to work together as a community in the 
planning, implementation, and management of a rural water system.  Putnam and 
others have argued that communities with shared norms, high degrees of 
community trust, and civic institutions that foster a community ethos are more 
likely to organize more effectively than heterogeneous communities that lack this 
communal spirit.  Advocates of improving social capital believe that communities, 
particularly smaller ones like villages, can overcome some of the pitfalls of 
collective action earlier referenced by Olson (1971).   
2.2.2.8. External Factors –Post-Construction Support 
Post-construction support refers to various forms of assistance which villages 
may receive from donor agencies, levels of government, non-governmental 
organizations, churches, etc to keep the system operating.  This can take several 
different forms.  Communities may receive additional technical, financial, health, 
or administrative training for specific tasks.  Villages may receive financial 
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support, either in the form of cash or in-kind assistance.  Local mechanics may 
visit sets of villages to assist with major repairs.  They may also assist in 
procuring spare parts.  Villagers may receive manuals or other written materials to 
educate the public or assist technicians.  Moreover, users may receive more direct 
assistance in the forms of health education, basic maintenance training, visits to 
encourage participation, and/or monitoring household or yard taps to ensure they 
are functioning.  Sometimes these forms of support are requested by the leaders or 
persons responsible for operating the system.  In other cases, support may 
originate by program design – in effect becoming a supply-driven process.   
 
2.3. Village-level Evaluations  
 This section overviews qualitative and quantitative methods that researchers have 
adopted in evaluating factors and elements of sustainability at a village level.  Some 
studies incorporated mixed methods; where significant, this section will reference 
those studies in both sub-sections.   
2.3.1. Qualitative Approaches 
Case studies and qualitative analysis trace a long history in village-level 
evaluations of rural water system performance.  Therkildsen’s (1988) study of donor-
assisted projects in East Africa denoted an important contribution to the field.  His 
interest laid in understanding why so many water projects funded by European donors 
and the World Bank failed.  He focused on the planning and implementation process 
of five donor agencies working in Tanzania over a fifteen year period.  Therkildsen 
argued that these agencies had adopted a control-oriented approach to project 
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planning that centralized decision-making in their hands (including the extent of 
beneficiary participation).  His case studies found that this donor activity was 
unsustainable and not suited for water sector planning in Tanzania.  Reasons included 
1) a lack of agreement among donors, recipients, and beneficiaries on a common set 
of objectives for plans, 2) a decentralized institutional structure that inhibited this 
donor strategy, 3) a lack of predictability in the water sector, and 4) the high resource 
cost needed to maintain control over decision-making in the absence of building post-
project domestic capacity.  Instead, he advocated an adaptive approach to planning 
which would feature more emphasis on participation and institutional capacity.  He 
also called for a more active emphasis on organizational learning (from Korten 1980) 
that would improve the quality of village-level institutions necessary for community 
management.  Therkildsen’s work critiqued the failures and some of the important 
problems inherent in centralized planning.  He was one of the first researchers to call 
for greater participation in the planning process by studying its implementation at a 
donor level.  His research, however, did not examine the dynamics of participation at 
a local level. 
Other researchers would study the effectiveness of village-level participation and 
community management.  Smith (1993) conducted case study research in Indonesia.  
Two NGOs – CARE and Dian Desa of Indonesia – had built water systems in her 
study area.  She examined the determinants of participation and suggested that the 
emphasis on participation (in this case for gravity-fed water schemes) improved 
system performance.  Her study also identified conditions that led to successful 
community management.  These included: 1) strong local understanding of the 
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technology, 2) active community fundraising for project capital, 3) projects that 
sustained operation and maintenance through local resources.  Finally, she compared 
villages in her study with similar communities in the region which had received 
government water systems.  The systems she evaluated were in good condition, and 
communities had collected some funds for capital and O&M.  Smith’s research was 
helpful in understanding community dynamics of successful participation.  The non-
random sample of communities she studied and her comparison with other “typical” 
villages, however, limited the external validity of her results. 
 Narayan (1995) combined quantitative and qualitative analysis of 121 rural water 
projects in 49 African, Asian, and Latin American countries.  Via quantitative 
analysis, she selected the most effective projects for in-depth case study.  Narayan 
examined the effects of participation, gender, ownership, project management, and 
socio-economic factors on water system coverage, function, and village economic and 
environmental benefits.  Her review of project documents and field interviews 
suggested that while effective participation came in many forms, it manifested itself 
only when donor agencies relinquished control over the project.  This confirmed 
Therkildsen’s notions on the importance of participatory planning.  Generally she 
found that communities practicing effective participation had successfully addressed 
physical and technological constraints in their projects.  Adaptive social institutions, 
however, remained an elusive goal.  Finally, she found that NGO projects, while 
representing only 15% of his cases, accounting for ½ of the successful projects.  In 
particular, local NGOs held the most trust among village leaders and beneficiaries 
interviewed for the study.  Narayan’s case studies presented examples of best 
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practices among successful communities, yet they are less useful in demonstrating 
cases where participation alone failed to overcome other constraints in meeting 
project objectives.   
The role of non-governmental organizations featured prominently in two other 
sets of case studies.  Riddell et al (1995) examined whether NGOs were more capable 
of and cost effective than state institutions in alleviating poverty in developing 
countries.  They reviewed sixteen cases in four countries (Bangladesh, India, Uganda, 
and Zimbabwe) and found that 75% had achieved most of its stated goals and reduced 
poverty rates.  However, they did note that these NGOs encountered important 
problems, including 1) an inability to reach the “poorest of the poor”, 2) failing to 
provide the level of cost reductions which some had touted in the development sector, 
and 3) the need for additional external resources to maintain the benefits of projects 
over time.  While they found that a major expansion of the number of NGOs would 
not have a major impact on world poverty, NGOs had generally outperformed state-
sponsored social programs.  Their work represented a more comprehensive approach 
to evaluating the effectiveness of NGOs across different sectors and country settings.  
Yet they did not concentrate heavily on water supply and sanitation issues. 
In contrast, the Social Policy and Development Center (1996) evaluated NGO 
water projects in the Punjab region of Pakistan.  Their work reviewed three previous 
reports which had evaluated rural water schemes in the region and also conducted 
interviews with leaders at seven villages.  Overall, they found that most NGOs were 
not equipped to mobilize, educate, and train communities to undertake system 
management.  The Center’s review also criticized the lack of field experience, 
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personnel, and financial resources to assist villages in taking over new schemes.  
They found that NGOs were not representative and did not embrace projects unless 
the objectives meshed with their organizational goals.  The report indicated that in 
some cases, the community organization crumbled soon after the NGO lost interest in 
sustaining the project.  The Center’s study calls attention to the possible lack of 
resources among NGOs and the likelihood that they also have interests that may 
conflict with long-term sustainability.  However, many of their results hinged on 
previous reports from non-random samples of villages and they acquired little 
original data to substantiate their claims. 
An important sustainability study in the context of a large-scale, participatory 
rural water program was conducted by Kleemeier (2000).  Her team assessed 
sustainability by evaluating the physical condition of water systems in seven 
Malawian communities.  A political scientist returned to four villages and spent four 
to six days interviewing water committees, repair teams and monitoring assistants to 
learn about operation and management structures.  Generally she found that the 
smallest and newest projects performed well, supplying water approximately 80% of 
the time.  Less than half of the taps worked at four other sites, however, and the 
systems were completely non-functional at one-third of the communities.  Kleemeier 
noted that scale was an important consideration in the operation of projects, even 
within a participatory planning regime.  Larger systems required external forms of 
technical support to help monitor the system for breaks and leakages and carry out 
repairs.  She also suggested that the early introduction of cash (as opposed to in-kind) 
contributions from users may have provided a better incentive for committee 
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members and technicians to mobilize the community when problems arose.  
However, she also admitted that her team had not acquired enough information about 
differences in cash vs. in-kind contributions to make judgments about these vehicles 
of demand.  Kleemeier’s study was one of the first to evaluate participatory regimes 
among communities of ranging size.   
One of the most comprehensive set of case studies on community management 
was published by the International Research Centre’s Participatory Action project 
(Schouten et. al 2003).  The IRC wanted to know if the community management 
model has proven both sustainable and capable of expanding potable water coverage 
in rural areas.  Over a four year period, the institute assessed participatory water 
schemes across 22 villages in six countries.  Essentially, the IRC concluded that 
communities alone were not capable of fully maintaining their improved systems.  
They required additional post-construction support and a supporting country-level 
institutional structure.   The authors adopted a broad definition of sustainability, 
including 1) a physical system that functions over time, 2) a sustaining water resource 
base over time, 3) an assumption of service equity, 4) capital replacement, and 5) a 
potential for system expansion.  All of the systems surveyed contained operation, 
management, cost-recovery, and/or other problems.  In some cases, the authors blame 
a blueprint approach to participation which homogenizes the beneficiary communities 
and fails to mobilize support.  In other cases, however, the assumption that 
participation would lead to better outcomes was not tenable due to sources of tension 
within the target communities.  The authors encouraged water practitioners to focus 
more heavily on planning for external forms of support, which they argue is the single 
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most overlooked aspect of rural service provision.  The IRC’s review marks one of 
the largest set of case studies on participatory rural water supply, and its results 
convey a great deal of experiences and anecdotal information.  However, the authors 
did not apply a research-based methodological approach to compare and contrast 
villages, country experiences, etc.  IRC’s approach was based more in learning from 
their experiences than with testing elements of the participation model in practice. 
Two examples of recent literature reviews provide some final insights into 
community management and post-construction support.  Perhaps the largest overview 
on community management in the development field was conducted by Mansuri and 
Rao (2004).  This review included impact evaluations and case studies from over one-
hundred sources conducted by independent researchers and/or peer reviewed by 
others.  A summary of several main conclusions appears below: 
• Community projects have not often successfully reached their intended 
beneficiary population, especially the poor. 
• These projects have generally improved infrastructure and welfare, although it is 
unclear whether the participatory aspects led to these gains. 
• Empirical work on socially heterogeneous communities shows a complex 
relationship.  Many cases indicate a U-shape curve between project inequality and 
outcomes. 
• There is considerable evidence of elites capturing the benefits of these projects, 
although study designs have not permitted researchers to evaluate the impact of 
this occurrence on disadvantaged village residents. 
• An enabling, receptive institutional environment is critical to program success.  
The danger is that a CM model in practice will become “supply driven demand 
driven development”. 
• While CM models can empower local residents, they do not necessarily do so in 
practice.  The authors call for more analysis of their implementation in practice. 
 
Finally, Lockwood (2003) provides the most comprehensive review to date on the 
significance of post-construction support to village sustainability.  Lockwood finds 
limited evidence on the effectiveness of post-construction support.  His major reasons 
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for these gaps are that: 1) there are few operational programs with post construction 
support, 2) quantitative studies measuring sustainability have focused more on pre-
construction factors, 3) models for post-construction support are relatively new, and 
systematic post-construction support has not been in place long enough to evaluate, 4) 
the limited evidence largely stems from ‘abnormal’ cases such as China and Honduras 
which both featured substantial donor investment, and 5) case studies of support 
models all have problems which limit extension of their results.   
2.3.2. Quantitative Approaches 
Some studies, including a few mentioned above, have employed quantitative 
techniques for measuring factors of sustainability.  Narayan (1995) was one of the 
first to do this.  Examining project reports, she and fellow researchers developed a 
time series analysis to measure the impact of participation on project outcomes, as 
well as a number of non-project determinants.  Her list of project outcomes included 
1) project effectiveness, 2) the percentage of the system in acceptable functioning 
condition, 3) the economic value of benefits, 4) the percentage of the target 
population reached, 5) equality of access in the community, and 6) environmental 
impacts.  Narayan found that only 21% of projects contained significant degrees of 
village participation and only 17% substantially involved women.  However, 
community participation was a significant factor in determining what percentage of 
the water system remained in good condition, the economic benefits generated by the 
project, and the percentage of the target population reached.  Villages with higher 
participation represented a higher percentage of systems which were in good 
condition and had improved consumer access (coefficients ranged from 0.29-0.30 and 
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0.17-0.25, respectively) and also attained higher economic benefits (0.26-0.27).  
Moreover, Narayan argued that the only other significant factors - the availability of 
spare parts and repair technicians – also require some degree of community 
participation and mobilization.  Women’s participation, by contrast, did not play an 
important role in increased water use or expansion of coverage.  While innovative, 
Narayan’s study suffered from important drawbacks.  The study relied on information 
from project evaluations which varied in terms of quality and access to village 
participatory dynamics.  The authors also acknowledged that they relied on coding 
schemes to rate participation and other attributes.  The study did not attempt to show 
causal relationships, only associations.  Finally, Prokopy (2002) has noted that the 
relationship between participation and project outcomes may be considered 
endogenous, since improvements in project performance may also improve 
participation.  Endogeneity potentially biases multivariate regression models 
(Verbeek 2002). 
One of the few large-sample quantitative analyses of sustainability in the rural 
water sector was performed by Sara and Katz (1998) on behalf of the World Bank.  
Sara and Katz examined both stand-alone water and sanitation projects and those 
listed as part of an investment portfolio (social funds would fall under this category).  
The authors conducted a total of 1875 household surveys and collected other data 
from 125 communities in six countries.  Their particular interests centered on the 
importance of participation and demand responsiveness as contributing factors to 
sustainability.  Their indicators of sustainability included physical condition of the 
systems, consumer satisfaction, operation and maintenance capacity, financial 
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management, and the stated willingness to sustain system.  Demand responsiveness 
was measured in terms of 1) implementation, 2) community involvement in initiation, 
3) degree of informed community choice on project, and 4) levels and quality of 
household and water committee training.  They also identified 75 potential socio-
economic variables which could affect project performance.   
The researchers used multivariate regression techniques and developed indices for 
their measurements.  The following model posits that village-level sustainability (S) 
is influenced by the following factors: 
S = β0 + β1 [DR] + β2 [PR] +  β3 [EX] + u where: 
 
S:  measure of sustainability (dependent variable) 
DR:  level of demand-responsiveness (independent variable) 
PR:  project-related factors (rules not related to demand) 
EX:  external factors 
β0, , β3: intercept and slope terms 
u:  stochastic [random] error term. 
 
*  Note:  External factors in this model refer to community factors, such as 
population size and density, distance to cities and water sources, educational level, 
and system age. 
 
Their study found that demand responsiveness, especially when based on 
household input, significantly contributed to sustainability.  Training, community 
organization, construction quality, and the scale of technology also improved 
sustainability.  Per capita costs were lower with higher community contributions, 
strict cost control measures, defined per capita subsidy ceilings, and when NGOs 
managed projects versus government entities.  However, Sara and Katz noted that 
most villages did not link service levels to costs.   
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Sara and Katz’s study operationalized sustainability indicators for quantitative 
analysis.  Their study was the first to rely on extensive primary field data collection 
from both household surveys and village focus groups.  They considered project and 
community factors across villages, projects, and countries.  Their results provided 
evidence that participation and demand are important factors associated with 
sustainability and assessed the determinants of cost and cost-recovery goals.  The 
authors also cross-checked their results with qualitative assessments to verify their 
findings. 
There are some important limitations to their study.  First, the study design 
presents challenges in demonstrating causal relationships, primarily because village 
and household sample sizes were limited.  Data were collected from 125 villages over 
six countries and multiple projects.  Additionally, the study only obtained data from 
fifteen households per villages and aggregated household values to the village level.  
This potentially limits the representation and distribution of household values within 
a particular village setting.  The study relied heavily on an additive approach for 
factors and indicators of sustainability using ordinal scoring.  While this method 
reduces the problem of interpreting coefficients of variables with different scales, it 
weighs heavily on the side of subjective measurement and may unduly limit the 
extent of variation present among different variables.  Finally, the researchers elected 
to estimate each of the indicators of sustainability in separate regression models.  This 
method ignores the potential relationship among the indicators.  Conceptually, it also 
implies that “sustainability” is determined according to the sum of its parts. 
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In 2000, two reports further investigated the sustainability of rural water systems.  
The Operations Evaluation Division of the World Bank published an evaluation of 
fifteen free-standing water projects which they had supported in seven countries.  The 
OED measured performance, sustainability, and institutional development.  They 
found that 67% of water schemes achieved satisfactory performance.  “Performance” 
was defined in three dimensions – relevance, efficaciousness, and efficiency.  The 
relevance of projects focused on whether the project’s intent met the World Bank’s 
goal of improving the lives of the poor, particularly women, via clean water.  Efficacy 
measures centered on benefit impacts, such as time savings calculations, distance 
reductions, increases in consumption, and changes in health status (though the authors 
noted that this last impact was impossible to ascertain due to other programs and 
other health-related conditions).  The efficiency gains were constructed by comparing 
per capita costs across sites.  The report’s discussion on sustainability featured the 
ability of local entities to manage their projects and the availability of external 
support for these efforts.  This was strongly related to institutional development, an 
area where researchers found that only 43% of projects had attained substantial 
institutional impacts in the community.  The lack of institutional development 
troubled evaluators who suggested that the lack of demonstrated organizational 
capacity jeopardized long-term sustainability.  OED noted that most villages required 
some degree of external support to maintain an acceptable level of operation and 
maintenance.  While these findings provided solid details on project performance 
across countries, the authors made no attempt to consider what factors explained 
project success. 
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The Water and Sanitation Partnership (Dayal et al 2000) also commissioned a 
study to examine the relationship between demand, gender, poverty, and 
sustainability.  This initiative assessed eighteen projects in fifteen countries.  
“Sustained” service measured the level of operation and maintenance implemented 
and contributed from the community.  Overall they found that participation was 
positively correlated with sustained water use, which was measured as the degree of 
operation and management carried out and contributed by the community.  With 
respect to gender, programs that were more gender sensitive did not improve 
technical or financial performance of the systems.   Additionally, “good governance” 
– defined as the extent to which a local organization monitors construction and deals 
with defaults, women’s participation in monitoring and control, the degree of training 
for males and females, and the transparency of accounts – was positively associated 
with sustained water service.  Unfortunately, this study depended on a non-random 
sample of projects recommended by the NGOs that implemented the projects, so 
selection bias is likely.  Moreover, the study only assesses correlations and does not 
attempt to demonstrate causality. 
Isham and Kahkonen (1999) interviewed 1088 households in India about their 
water supply.  Their interest focused on how social capital, NGO provision, and 
community factors (household size, wealth, and hygiene) affect service rules and 
practices, which in turn were hypothesized to influence system performance and 
ultimately health impacts.  They were among the first to develop a social capital index 
for communities, which takes into account household membership in a variety of 
groups and the function of these groups in a community.  They found that this index 
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was significantly correlated with village participation in the design of new service 
(0.28) and also affected the impact of piped water on household health (although this 
magnitude, at 0.02, was quite small).  Isham and Kahkonen also noted that NGOs had 
been more successful in improving water project performance (although it is 
important to consider that these organizations selected the villages in which they 
worked).  Their model controlled for a limited number of other project and 
community factors.  Service rules and practices were determined to impact the quality 
of construction and satisfaction with service design, yet other factors (such as the 
extent of community participation in planning or construction) were not considered.  
Finally, the authors measured impacts in terms of responses to questions concerning 
perceptions of health outcomes and reported incidence rates of diarrhea.  Yet they 
failed to obtain information on access to health care or other determinants of health 
outcomes. 
Prokopy (2002) followed up this study by examining the importance of social 
capital and participation.  Her study adopted some of the ideas about social capital 
from the Isham & Kahkonen study, hypotheses about participation and demand 
responsiveness from the literature, and sustainability measures from the Narayan and 
Sara & Katz studies.  She collected village and household level data from 45 villages 
in two Indian states.  Her village models tested the following hypotheses on 
participation and sustainability: 
? Smaller villages and those with higher social capital have more participation 
and transparency. 
? Villages with greater needs will have higher participation and transparency in 
operations. 
? Smaller villages will report enhanced project outcomes. 
? Villages with higher transparency have better outcomes. 
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? Villages with greater overall levels of participation will have better outcomes. 
? Higher participation among women will yield better village outcomes. 
 
She used quantitative methods, such as principal components analysis, biprobit 
and multivariate regression with household and village level data, and village case 
studies.  Generally she found that villages with higher social capital demonstrated 
more effective water committees with higher degrees of participation and 
transparency.  Communities with higher degrees of overall participation did attain 
better project outcomes on satisfaction (coefficient = 0.2), improved access (0.39), 
and time saving (0.44), yet women’s participation did not improve project 
effectiveness.  Prokopy found mixed results on the nature of demand-driven practices 
and sustainability.  She found that village satisfaction increased as village 
contribution (measured as the percentage of households contributing to initial capital 
costs) rose.  Nevertheless, this factor did not statistically influence water service 
improvements.  Villages with functioning, transparent water committees featured 
higher levels of satisfaction and higher payments from tariffs.  There was no 
relationship between village size and project effectiveness or user satisfaction. 
Prokopy’s work advanced the understanding of the determinants of participation 
and social capital and their effects on project performance.  Her study successfully 
controlled for a number of community and project factors.  Other factors, such as the 
program management and degrees of external support, were not focal points of her 
work.  Moreover, her study contained a relatively small sample size (45) of villages 
from two different Indian states. 
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Khawja (2002) reviewed the determinants of success in public infrastructure 
projects in 132 Pakistani villages.  His team collected household and village-level 
data and created performance measures for physical condition (the percentage of the 
project functioning as in the beginning), functionality (the percentage of the original 
purpose satisfied), and maintenance work (the percentage of maintenance needs 
attended).  He was interested in the importance of social capital, community 
leadership, community inequality, and participation.  He found that community 
inequality and project maintenance exhibit a U-shaped relationship.  Initial increases 
in inequality lower project maintenance, as households that benefit do not compensate 
for the loss in contributions from households with declining benefits.  As inequality 
increases further, however, beneficiaries can afford to hire labor outside the 
household, effectively compensating households which have not gained or lost as a 
result of the project.  Khawja also finds that, while projects succeed more often in 
socially homogenous communities with strong project leaders, well-designed projects 
can “overcome” the constraints of lower social capital.  In addition, he found 
evidence that community participation was beneficial in non-technical decisions but 
not helpful in making engineering decisions.  Finally, infrastructure projects initiated 
by NGOs were better maintained than projects implemented by local governments.   
Other quantitative studies have focused more specifically on the impacts of social 
funds.  Early reviews (Batley 1999, Jorgensen and van Domelen 1999) were mixed.  
Generally, efficiency improved, while the long-term performance varied widely 
across programs.  Health and environmental investments performed better than other 
governmental programs, while economic programs showed little difference in benefit.  
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The record on sustainability was questionable, and limited by a lack of household 
data and comparisons to other programs.  Van Domelen (2002) conducted later impact 
evaluations of social funds.  She found that social funds had improved their focus on 
the poor over time, had largely reflected community priorities, and successfully 
increased access, quality, and use of social services.  However, she also concluded 
that most water projects, despite operational facilities, were likely not sustainable 
given the lack of cost-recovery policies.   
Others have been more critical on the promise of social investment funds.  
Tendler (2000) raised several key problems with the design and performance of social 
investment funds.  Her review of World Bank and other donor reviews provided 
evidence that social funds did not perform poorly, but also were not outperforming 
government projects.  She argued that this comes as no surprise, given the nature of 
social funds.  Social funds do not devolve authority to local governments because 
they are normally operated by another central government agency.  Moreover, social 
funds were designed to meet certain objectives, not to serve as vehicles for 
community contribution nor long-term sustainable development.  Cost-recovery has 
not occurred, since most depend on outside donor agencies.  Finally, she mentions 
that, according to the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank reports, 
sustainability was even less likely in the water sector.   
Rawlings et al (2004) produced the most comprehensive cross-country evaluation 
of social funds in the literature.  Unlike other studies, this evaluation used a variety of 
techniques to measure the effect of social investment funds against counterfactuals.  
The authors used different research design methods, including randomized control 
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designs, propensity score matching, and comparisons with “pipeline” communities 
located near project villages that would be eligible for future project lending.   The 
research collected primary data from over 21,000 households, national household 
surveys covering 42,000 households, and generated facilities surveys from more than 
1,200 schools, health centers, and water and sanitation projects.  The authors sought 
to answer the following questions: 
• Do social funds reach poor areas and poor households? 
• Do social funds deliver high-quality, sustainable investments? 
• Do social funds affect living standards? 
• How cost-efficient are social funds and the investments they finance, 
compared with other delivery mechanisms? 
 
Generally, the evaluation found that social funds were reaching poorer geographic 
areas.  Most facilities were working and delivering high quality services at levels of 
maintenance at least as high as those in comparison groups.  Participation was 
substantial in the planning and implementation phases, and only fell slightly during 
the management phase.  However, complementary inputs were lacking in some cases 
(particularly for health clinics), and many (including water projects) did not meet 
cost-recovery objectives in their operation.   
The evaluation included a separate chapter on water supply and sanitation 
evaluations conducted in Armenia, Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru.  The 
authors’ objectives of this sub-section of the study were the following: 
• Are the infrastructure investments in water, sewerage, and latrines leading to 
improvements in the quality and availability of services? 
• Have household access and utilization improved as a result of the social fund 
intervention? 
• What is the final impact on social welfare of social fund water and sanitation 
investments, as measured by time and distance to water sources and by health 
impacts? 
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• Are these water, sewerage, and latrine investments sustainable? 
  
The Peruvian case study found that most systems were operating and providing 
water for nearly 90% of village residents.  Over 90% of operators reported routine 
cleaning of the systems, and 68% reported general repairs.  About 50% of villages 
reported paying for water, although in many cases these were nominal in comparison 
to costs.  Peruvian families gained an average of 34 minutes per day in reduced wait 
time.  Finally, after controlling for household and environmental factors, incidence 
rates for diarrhea declined by 3% in children under 10 while dysentery rates fell by 
1.7% in children ages 2–8.    
Finally, Prokopy and Thorsten (2005) evaluated village-level sustainability of 
water projects built under the FONCODES and SANBASUR programs in the Cuzco 
region of Peru.  They analyzed the role of post-construction support as well as other 
project and community factors in the physical operation, financial management, 
consumer use and satisfaction (defined in this study as the aggregate percentage of 
households using the system and the percentages of households satisfied with various 
water, service, and management attributes).  They found that post-construction 
support was not an important determinant of sustainability – most systems functioned 
well in absence of concerted post-construction assistance.  However, a sub-sample of 
villages operating at the margins could benefit from a systematic influx of additional 
assistance.   
2.4. Household-level Evaluations 
Household-level studies focus on those which use the household as the principal 
unit of analysis.  Unlike the previous section, few investigations have adopted a 
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qualitative approach to understanding household behavior.  Instead, most have 
surveyed a sample of households, often within a relatively small number of villages.   
White et al (1972) published one of the initial studies of household water use and 
behavior.  A team of researchers visited villages in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania to 
learn about water practices, health and economic effects, and the social costs of 
disease in East Africa.  This study used household surveys, excreta and urine 
specimens, clinical exams and existing records.  The researchers discovered that size, 
family composition, and wealth were generally significant indicators of water use.  As 
household size increased, per capita use declined in villages with and without piped 
water.  Consumption rose with the level of household wealth.  Additionally, water use 
was lower in rural locations for users not connected to local water systems.  Finally, 
rural household use did not vary initially with distance for up to one mile, yet beyond 
this distance per capita water use declined.  The White study was an important first 
contribution to studying household behavior in different villages across countries.   
Briscoe et al (1981, 1989) followed White’s work with a more complex, discrete 
choice analysis of household water use in South Asia and Brazil.  The 1981 study 
found that per capita water consumption rose among households with larger incomes 
and asset bases.  In particular, Briscoe noted that wealthier households chose water 
sources based on water quality and not on the likelihood for conflict (as poor 
households did).  The 1989 study found that wealthier, more educated, and formally 
employed households were more likely to connect to a piped water system.  Distance 
in these studies did not seem to be an important factor for water source choice – many 
villagers were willing to travel several kilometers to obtain better quality water.  
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Some of these results have been confirmed in later studies.  For example, Asante 
(2002) applied a discrete choice model for Ghanaian villages and found that the 
probability of choosing an improved versus unimproved water sources rose rapidly as 
incomes increased.  These studies focused more on household-level determinants of 
behavior rather than village-level or external effects. 
Willingness to pay measures play important roles in identifying the strength and 
significance of demand.  Bohm et al (1993) devised a study that would compare ex 
ante consumer demand for new service with the costs of building and operating new 
gravity-fed water schemes in the Philippines.  Sustainability was measured in terms 
of financial cost recovery.  As expected, willingness to pay was correlated with 
income.  They found that aggregate willingness to pay was too low to recover capital 
and operating costs in all but the richest areas with the lowest unit costs.  Subsidies 
would be necessary to move forward with these projects, at least in order to meet 
capital costs.  This study contributed to the literature on using household demand as a 
mechanism for comparing projects in terms of financial cost recovery.  However, it 
did not consider other sustainability objectives or their relationship to cost recovery. 
Dayal et al (2000) examined household impacts of improved water services.  
Their team estimated “effective use”, which incorporated three measures: 1) whether 
a household had “easy” access to improved water supply, 2) whether households 
always use the improved source, and 3) environmental indicators, such as the 
presence of drainage and absence of nearby stagnant water.  They discovered that 
increased household demand responsiveness – as indicated by the priority households 
placed on the initial project - was statistically associated with effective water use.  
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However, higher ex ante demand for service – as expressed by initial cash and in-kind 
contributions – was negatively associated with their indicators of sustained water use.  
This suggests that higher demand is positively related to use and access to water 
service, but negatively related to its physical and technical functioning of the system.  
Again, these relationships were developed only as statistical correlations, and village-
level factors did not play a role in estimation.   
Prokopy (2002) examined household level models in the context of understanding 
participation and its relationship to project effectiveness.  She used fixed and random 
effects model to account both for village and household-level impacts.  She tested the 
following hypotheses: 
? Households in smaller villages and in those villages with less wealth inequality 
are more likely to contribute to capital costs, attend meetings, and contribute 
toward making decisions. 
? Households are more likely to participate if they are wealthier, more literate, and 
larger.  Poorer households and those with female household heads are less likely 
to participate. 
? Higher distances, reliability, and quality of previous scheme yield increased 
participation. 
? Participation improves household satisfaction, increases the chances that a 
household will pay a tariff, and improves the likelihood that a family will 
connect to the system.   
? Higher level of overall participation in a village make it more likely that 
individuals are satisfied and pay tariff. 
? More transparent committee operations are correlated with increased household 
satisfaction and an increased likelihood to pay a tariff. 
 
She found that 1) an increase in the percentage of contributing households was 
associated with greater household satisfaction, yet not related to the level of water 
improvements, 2) greater household participation translated into higher degrees of 
household satisfaction, and 3) enhanced levels of committee transparency improved 
the likelihood that households would pay tariffs. Additionally, larger households 
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tended to participate more often than small households in designing and 
implementing the new water projects in India.  This result complemented previous 
findings from Isham and Kahkonen (1999), who found that larger households tended 
to benefit more from the introduction of public taps in Indian villages.  She also found 
that households that regularly attended meetings and were involved in key decisions 
were more satisfied with the results of the water projects. 
Prokopy’s results showed that a (fixed effects) multi-level modeling framework 
could detect both household and village-level determinants of household participation 
and satisfaction with the water projects.  Her sets of questions revolved around 
participation and aspects of performance and less on providing an analysis of 
sustainability, including the relationships among indicators of performance. 
Finally, Rawlings et al (2004) study of social investment funds showed that in all 
six countries, social funds were more likely to reach poorer households vs. wealthier 
ones.  Low income persons were well represented as beneficiaries in the projects – 
the poorest 20% of households accounting for between 23-27% of beneficiaries in all 
countries except Armenia.  FONCODES investments in Peru were considered the 
most “pro-poor” by the authors.  Access to potable water expanded in all countries, 
although rates escalated higher in urban areas.  There were positive health impacts in 
all but one nation, and household collection times for water declined on average in 
four of the six country settings.  The comprehensive nature of this study (across 
project and country settings), the use of pipeline communities to make comparisons 
across households in treatment and control villages, and the large samples of 
households and villages in the study created a robust research design.  Yet unlike 
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Prokopy, the authors did not examine how village-level influences can mediate 
household outcomes.  
2.5. Rural Water Systems - Prospects for “Scaling up” and “Leveraging” 
This dissertation addresses questions concerning the ability of and interest in 
villages to “scale up” and leverage their investments.  These terms require brief 
definition and discussion.   
Scaling up here refers to the ability of a community to either expand services to 
areas not served by a recent water project or improve the quality of service offered by 
a project.  An example is provided in WASH’s (1994) classification of benefits. 
o Class I:  Benefits exceed end of project levels due to replication or 
expansion of WS&S systems to beneficiaries beyond target population.   
o Class II:  Benefits continue for original target group at near end of project 
levels.  Lack of funds or other resources prevents expansion 
o Class III:  Benefits drop to stable level after project.  Least skilled of 
communities are marginal, some fail.  Sustainable if benefits continue at 
acceptable level. 
o Class IV:  Benefits drop below acceptable level, continue decline.  Project 
considered a failure. 
 
This definition would encompass benefits listed under Class I, although it also 
includes enhancing the level of benefit; for example, due to improvements in water 
quality, number of operating hours/days, and increased level of service (e.g. from a 
public tap to household connections). 
Davis and Iyer (2002) reviewed the limited literature available on scaling up from 
fields as diverse as agriculture, education, HIV prevention/treatment, nutrition and 
population, irrigation, and urban slum upgrading.  Overall they found that there has 
been no published work on systematically investigating determinants of scaling up in 
any sector, including rural water supply.  Their discussion paper addresses factors that 
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enhance and limit the ability of agencies and organizations to expand rural water 
supply coverage in a sustainable manner.  They note that expanding service may 
sometimes conflict with sustainability features, including meaningful community 
participation and management, education, and demand responsiveness.  In interviews 
with fifty practitioners in various infrastructure sectors of six countries, Davis and 
Iyer identified four major obstacles: 1) resource constraints, 2) lack of knowledge or 
shared understanding, 3) resistance among key stakeholders, and 4) untested 
implementation conditions resulting from the movement of pilot projects to new 
areas.  This discussion paper mirrors early works on participation and sustainability in 
that it reviews existing literature and interviews practitioners from other sectors to 
learn about best practices.  The IRC study (2003) also contains a section on scaling 
up, although the discussion focuses more on lessons from community management 
than avenues for future practice.  The limited amount of systematic research, 
particularly at the household and village levels, makes this a compelling arena for 
further study. 
There are a few more references on the issue of leveraging.   Leveraging here 
refers to the ability of and interest in villages with successful water projects to 
participate and implement additional investments in related environmental 
infrastructure.  Sanitation, solid waste, and health services are possible examples 
because, like water, they each have the potential to improve health status.  Previous 
studies (Shuval 1981, Esrey 1991, Dayal 2000) indicate the importance of 
complementary investments to increase the impact of improved water service on 
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health outcomes.  Serageldin (1994) perhaps illustrates this perspective most candidly 
in reference to water and sanitation. 
In this nexus of service and environmental issues, it is instructive to 
consider the sequence in which people demand water supply and sanitation 
services. Consider, for instance, a family that migrates to a shantytown. 
Their first environmental priority is to secure an adequate water supply at 
reasonable cost. This is followed shortly by the need to secure a private, 
convenient, and sanitary place for defecation. Families show a high willingness to 
pay for these household or private services, in part because the alternatives are 
so unsatisfactory and so costly. They put substantial pressure on local and 
national governments to provide such services, and it is natural and appropriate 
that the bulk of external assistance in the early stages of development goes 
to meeting this strong demand. The very success in meeting these primary 
needs, however, gives rise to a second generation of demands for removal of 
wastewater from the household, then from the neighborhood, and finally from the 
city. And success in this important endeavor gives rise to another problem: the 
protection of the environment from the degrading effects of large amounts of 
waterborne waste. 
 
A couple of evaluations mention some evidence for this nexus.  Abraha (1991) 
looked at factors that led individuals in Swaziland to adopt sanitation practices and 
participate in development.  Abraha identified the following determinants: 1) 
respondents’ resettlement status, 2) level of education, 3) economic status, and 4) 
exposure to extension agents.  However, the dissertation did not explicitly consider 
villages with previously successful water projects. 
Smith’s case studies in Indonesia (1993) and the WSP review of cases in East 
Africa (2000) suggest anecdotal evidence that successful project communities had 
begun to shift resources toward other development priorities.  If this has begun to 
occur, it would fulfill one of the promises of the community management model – the 
empowerment of communities and individuals to shape and take on other 
development priorities.  Again, though, leveraging was not the focal point of these 
studies.  It is also very important to mention the real possibility that some 
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communities with successful projects and high demand for water do not share the 
same demand for other forms of environmental infrastructure.  Previous studies have 
noted that the demand for sanitation and prospects for other infrastructure may be less 
than water (WASH 1993, OED 2000, WSP 2000).   
 
2.6. Gaps in Existing Literature  
The evaluation literature on rural water supply in developing countries has an 
extensive history.  It has evolved as the debates and frameworks have shifted over 
time.  The last ten years has witnessed greater interest in community participation, 
demand-responsiveness, sustainability, and institutional development objectives.   
There are several possible definitions and interpretations of sustainability in the 
literature, and more recent attempts to apply sustainability criteria to evaluate rural 
water projects.  An important distinction that studies have often confounded rests 
between the indicators of sustainability and the conditions of sustainability.  An 
indicator here refers to an outcome of a sustainable water system, such as the 
production of clean water at a tap.  A condition, in contrast, represents an element of 
the water supply system that allows an indicator to occur.  One example might be a 
trained technician, who maintains and occasionally repairs the water tap.  In some 
studies, conditions are distinguished from factors of performance and sustainability, 
such as community participation.  Unlike some studies which include indicators and 
conditions of sustainability (and occasionally factors) in the same category, this study 
will operationalize certain variables previously considered conditions of sustainability 
and treat them as factors which predict sustainability outcomes. 
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Some village-level studies that attempt to measure the associative or causal 
factors of sustainable rural water schemes have examined different indicators of 
sustainability, such as cost recovery, physical performance, use, and user satisfaction.   
Only a few studies have collected data from a large sample of villages in a few key 
regions.  Larger-village studies allow researchers to control for the variety of project, 
community, and external factors which can predict sustainability and examine their 
relative contributions at the village level.  For example, prior studies have covered 
effects on physical performance measures in some detail, yet there remain some 
questions concerning the impacts of participation and demand responsiveness on 
financial performance.  An interesting institutional comparison also arises in Peru 
between the NGO and the social investment fund models of development.  Which 
model has performed better in meeting the indicators of sustainability, after 
controlling for other project and community factors?   
 The literature revealed a number of studies dedicated to understanding household 
water behavior and satisfaction.  There have also been a few attempts to augment 
village-level data with household surveys.  Yet there has been little systematic effort 
into placing questions of household water use, satisfaction, and perceptions of future 
performance into a multi-level framework.  Nor have there been important attempts to 
examine the effect of household attitudes toward social capital.  Past approaches have 
frequently either not considered the relevance of village-level factors on household 
responses and/or have potentially mis-specified models which failed to account for 
clustering of household units within villages.  These approaches also fail to estimate 
project effects within villages.  In part, a lack of interest or a limited sample of 
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villages to detect effects may explain this situation.  Regardless, an evaluation of 
sustainability from the user’s perspective – do they use the system, are they satisfied 
with the water and management, do they pay for their water, and do they believe the 
system will continue functioning over time – requires a better understanding of how 
users’ responses differ both across villages and within a particular village.     
 Researchers investigating sustainability in this sector usually assign the concept a 
set of characteristics and then modeled impacts separately for the indicator(s).  There 
has not been an attempt to define sustainability as a concept – indicated by a set of 
measures – and then estimate the village and household-level effects on these 
measures simultaneously.  This approach recognizes that 1) sustainability itself can be 
considered a concept with some degree of “latentness”; i.e. measurement error and 2) 
indicators of sustainability are likely correlated among one another.   
Finally, while some have anticipated that sustainable water investments would 
lead people to demand better levels of service and access to other forms of 
environmental infrastructure, few studies have investigated this in practice.  One 
major reason may lie in the limited number of highly successful projects.  As 
targeting and performance have improved, the time is ripe for asking questions about 
the viability of scaling up and leveraging investments.  The limited literature available 
often assumes a sense of hopefulness that people will demand improved water or 
related environmental health infrastructure once the barriers are removed.  This 
dissertation will empirically test support for this belief, by estimating what household, 
community, and project factors (and sustainability indicators) can predict household 
support for scaling up and leveraging.
  
 
III. Research Design and Data Analysis Techniques 
 
3.1. Theoretical Framework and Constructs for Inquiry 
The main focus of this dissertation rests in identifying and predicting what factors 
promote or inhibit sustainable service, user payments and satisfaction, and household 
support for future endeavors in community-managed, demand-oriented rural water 
supply projects.  This section will develop the theoretical basis for and the constructs 
of sustainability, the factors which are hypothesized to influence sustainability, and 
the nature of the predicted relationships.   
3.1.1. Sustainability 
3.1.1.1. Constructing and Measuring “Sustainability” Indicators 
This investigation begins from the premise that the concept of sustainability in 
the water sector refers to the maintenance of a set of benefits over the life of the 
improved water project.  The life of a project generally means the number of years 
that a project is designed to deliver water, depending on source and technical 
constraints – although it is possible to extend this life through major capital 
replacements or improvements.   
The direct benefit of a project refers to the water provided by the system.  This 
benefit can be categorized into project outcomes, which serve as indicators of 
sustainable performance.  These categories appear below: 
53 
1) Physical Delivery:  Generally, does the water system supply potable water 
to users when it should be available?  The latter part of this definition is 
important.  A system may technically function, yet may only deliver 
water at certain times of the day or certain seasons during the year.  The 
focus here is on providing water on a consistent basis to users. .   
Since the unit of analysis for this dissertation rests at the household 
level, only the Peru study tests this category.  The Peru study focuses on 
evaluating the physical performance of household taps from gravity-fed 
schemes which mostly draw water from mountain lakes and 
underground springs.  A set of water mains, storage and break-pressure 
tanks, and distribution lines bring the water to private taps located in 
households or their yards.  In contrast, users draw water from 
community boreholes in Ghana.  Household factors are not expected to 
affect physical performance of these handpumps. 
2) Consumer Use:  A water system may consistently deliver potable water.  
Yet consumers may not use it.  They may not trust some aspect of the 
water source, dislike the quantity and quality of water, prefer other water 
sources for primary or secondary uses, live too far away from the taps, 
or have other reasons.  Regardless, if consumers are not using an 
improved water source, the project has failed to reach some portion of its 
intended population.  As with physical delivery, some elements will be 
more likely than others - depending on technology, location, cultural 
practices, and other attributes.  In Peru, household distance to the tap is 
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not likely to be an important measurement since nearly all households 
have either in-house or yard taps.  The Peru and Ghana studies both 
contain measures for whether consumers use the improved service as the 
primary source.   
3) User Satisfaction:   The benefits of improved water may be diminished 
(literally and figuratively) if consumers are unhappy with some aspects 
of the water they receive.  This category can include several possibilities 
involving the quantity, availability, and quality of water.  It is possible to 
construct “objective” measures related to these characteristics, such as 
testing the water pressure or water quality.  Our studies did not have 
such instruments at their disposal, so this dissertation focuses instead on 
perceptions of user satisfaction with both the water and institutional 
services (in the forms of operation and maintenance and administration). 
3.1.1.2.  Introducing Cost and Time 
The first three indicators reflect benefits to beneficiaries with a set of 
values that denote its worth to users.  In return, many users are asked to pay 
for water service.   
There are two forms of financial (as opposed to economic) costs.  The first 
represents the cost of capital.  Villages in both project areas were required to 
contribute to the cost of infrastructure.  In Ghana, households were supposed 
to contribute a total of 5% of the financial cost of capital.  In Peru, 
FONCODES and SANBASUR programs differed in application, yet in both 
cases villages were supposed to collect contributions for the project (often 
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these came in the form of “in-kind” contributions such as labor and materials).  
Household contributions toward these capital costs are not considered in 
constructing an indicator for sustainability since they occurred before the 
project began delivering water to residents.  However, they are used in 
providing a proxy for one hypothesized factor of sustainability - pre-project 
demand.  The second stream of payments represents the amount that villages 
pay toward operating and maintaining the water service.  This flow of 
revenues can originate from the users (levied either when they obtain water or 
as a periodic fee for service) or from the community in the form of voluntary 
or imposed village collections.   
In both country settings, the programs were not designed for communities 
to contribute to the cost of capital recovery.  This suggests that the systems are 
not financially sustainable in the fullest sense of the term.  In a limited sense, 
however, communities are financially self-sustaining to the extent that 
households pay for water service and, furthermore, pay amounts that enable 
communities to cover their operating costs.   
Sustainability implies a temporal dimension.  Benefits and financial 
payments are not expected to stop tomorrow – they are expected to occur over 
the project life cycle.  Ideally, the best method to measure sustainability is 
through the use of multiple measurements over time.  However, this study is 
limited to cross-sectional data obtained at a time T years from the completion 
of the improved system, where T depends on each village and the programs 
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studied.  Therefore, this study does not attempt to truly explore the temporal 
nature of sustainability.   
Rather, this investigation generally handles time in two ways.  The first 
approach is to measure what has occurred from the initial supply of potable 
water until the present.  The projects in both countries have operated for a 
minimum of three years and a maximum of fifteen years.  Age of water taps 
(in Peru) is considered as a factor influencing physical performance.  The 
second method addresses the confidence of household respondents in each 
community regarding the future performance of the water system.  This 
technique gauges community opinions regarding the likelihood that a village 
water system will continue to function over the next five and ten year periods.  
This measure shows how confident villagers perceive that their system will 
continue to deliver benefits over periods of time.  Thus, it reflects users’ 
perception of sustainability over time. 
3.1.1.3.  Correlations Among Indicators 
Naturally these indicators are related a priori to one another.  Consumers 
cannot use a tap if it does not deliver water, nor can they be satisfied with the 
service if they do not use it (although their decision not to use a service may 
indicate a low degree of satisfaction).  Consumers will not pay a tariff if they 
do not use the improved source, and likewise less satisfied customers may 
delay their payments.  In addition, villagers in places with failing systems or a 
lack of funds to make basic repairs are more likely to believe their systems 
will not function over time.   
57 
These inter-relationships suggest models which can either expressly 
estimate the statistical correlations among the indicators or ignore them for the 
sake of emphasizing causal relationships.  The models make different 
specification assumptions about these relationships.   
3.1.2. Factors of Sustainability 
This dissertation conceptualizes that sustainability, as indicated by a set of 
outcomes, is influenced by a set of community, project, and external factors 
measured at household and village levels.  These categories are described below. 
3.1.2.1. Community and Demographic Factors 
Studies have shown that community and demographic factors influence 
some of the conditions and indicators of sustainability.  These factors may 
include measurements at either a household or village level.  Community 
factors measured at a village level include village size (population and 
geographic size) and, in Ghana, the regional location of the villages. 
Household-level factors represent those variables taken from household 
surveys.  The household-level variables include: 
o Household size (the number of people living in the home). 
o House size (measured by the number of rooms in a house). 
o Respondent’s age 
o Annual income, measured as a categorical variable in the Peru study.   
o Monthly expenditures (in the Ghana household survey) – measured as 
the log of a continuous variable. 
o Asset index, including the number of non-farm assets and the number 
of animals owned by households.  Filmer and Pritchett (2001) have 
developed a technique for developing an asset index which this 
dissertation employs.     
o Household perception of social capital:  Unlike village size and 
location, social capital is not readily observed.  Rather, it must be 
constructed.  This dissertation adopts the index construction approach 
to identifying social capital found in other studies (Putnam 1995, 
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Isham and Kahkonen 1999, Prokopy 2002).  The focus here rests on 
household attitudes concerning social capital.  Sets of questions in the 
household survey are transformed into a social capital index, which 
includes the following topics:   
? Degree of trust among community members 
? Degree of trust relative to other communities  
? Degree of trust in comparison to trusting other communities 
? Degree of trust for different actors (local leadership, local 
government officials, central government officials) 
? Confidence in borrowing money 
? Number of groups found in the community. 
 
3.1.2.2. Project Factors 
Project-related factors are often considered important determinants of 
sustainability.  Project variables incorporate decisions involving the choice of 
water source, the degree of community participation involved in the project, 
the contribution which households made to the project, the quality of 
construction, and the local management and technical support structure in 
place to operate and maintain the system.  Village-level measurements 
include: 
• Water Source and System Characteristics.  An ideal description of a water 
source will include objective measurements concerning the quantity and 
quality of water provided year-round over the life of the project.  These 
data sources were not available for these studies.  Field teams instead 
gathered information from system operators concerning the quantity and 
availability of source water in rainy and dry seasons and the distance of 
the water source to the village (in Peru).  Field team engineers in Peru also 
conducted system assessments to determine whether there were leaks in 
the storage tanks and visible distribution lines.   
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• Local Management and Technical Capacity:  This sub-category gauges 
the capacity of local system operators and water committees to maintain 
the system.  It incorporates several elements: 
o Training received by operators and water committee members before 
the project began operating. 
o The years of experience reported by current water committees and 
system operators and the number of village caretakers (in Ghana). 
o The management structure for the project; specifically whether the 
local village elected committee members.  In Peru, some local 
governments have taken over the operation of systems, while in Ghana 
some NGOs have essentially adopted communities and met their 
requests on demand. 
o In Ghana, enumerators also learned the distance to the nearest area 
mechanic.  Mechanics often are called to resolve problems which 
village caretakers are unable to handle.   
 
• Tariff System and Cost Recovery Practices:  In both countries, field teams 
learned what tariff structures water committees had put in place to collect 
operating revenue from households.  Nearly all Peruvian villages used flat 
fees; however there were different structures in place in Ghana.  
Committee members also presented information to compare annual 
operating costs and household revenues.   
• Role of Program Institutions:  The implementing agencies have shaped 
some of the project factors via their influence over selecting water sources, 
designating roles for community participation and fostering demand, and 
selecting training villagers to take over the water systems.  In addition, 
program officials are partly responsible for identifying villages to conduct 
projects.  These decisions affect the sample of communities selected (and 
thus the values for community factors for the studies).  This study, 
however, focuses on program effects after controlling for project and 
60 
community effects.  This is particularly relevant in Peru, where the study 
compares performance of a social investment fund to an NGO-based 
program.  This factor is not explored in the Ghana study, since local and 
regional governments were responsible for the projects. 
 
Household-level project factors also are hypothesized to influence 
sustainability.  Household surveys contain information on the degree of 
household participation, specifically the number of project decisions in which 
households participated.  Surveys also contain proxies for the level of pre-
project household contribution.  While this is an imperfect measure of ex ante 
demand, other studies have used similar measures as proxies.  The study 
further controls for the confidence of users in the construction of their water 
system and considers two current measures of household involvement: 1) 
meeting awareness and participation, and 2) knowledge of how committees 
spend financial resources. 
Some factors, such as water source, pre-project participation and 
contributions, system age, and attitudes toward system construction involve 
decisions taken before the present day.  Others, including current meeting 
attendance, awareness of finances, operator and committee attributes, and 
tariff and cost recovery decisions encompass present-day activities.  This 
distinction is important to remember when evaluating the results of the study.   
3.1.2.3. External Factors 
External factors fall outside of the characteristics of projects and the 
communities that receive improved water service.  The main factor identified 
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in this study is post-construction support (PCS).  PCS refers to support 
received from external government agencies, charities, or other parties to 
maintain existing levels of service.  This study does not consider village-level 
PCS effects (these are treated in other studies emerging from this research), 
but rather focuses on whether households receiving external visits have 
benefited additionally from the project in terms of outcomes.  In Peru, 
households may have been visited for observation, assistance with 
maintenance, hygiene education, and/or other purposes.  Environmental health 
assistants (EHAs) and District Water and Sanitation Team representatives 
made periodic visits to households and villages in Ghana.  Possible reasons 
for visits may have included maintenance training, user education, hygiene 
education, or other purposes.   
Table 2 summarizes the set of all dependent and independent variables 
considered in this study. 
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Table 2:  Summary of Sustainability Indicators and Factors 
VARIABLE INDICATOR 
/ FACTOR 
MEASURED 
LEVEL 
TYPE COUNTRY SCALE 
# Tap breakdowns 
last 6 months 
Indicator Household Physical Peru Continuous 
# Days to repair 
last breakdown 
Indicator Household Physical Peru Continuous 
Household pays for 
water 
Indicator Household Financial Ghana, Peru Binary 
Amount household 
pays for water 
Indicator Household Financial Ghana, Peru Continuous 
Satisfaction – 
water pressure 
Indicator Household Satisfaction – water Ghana, Peru Ordinal 
Satisfaction – 
safety 
Indicator Household Satisfaction – water Peru Ordinal 
Satisfaction – taste Indicator Household Satisfaction – water 
 
Ghana Multinomial 
Satisfaction – 
operation & 
maintenance 
Indicator Household Satisfaction – service Ghana, Peru Ordinal 
Satisfaction – 
committee 
Indicator Household Satisfaction – service Ghana, Peru Ordinal 
Trust in committee Indicator Household Satisfaction – service Ghana, Peru Ordinal 
Satisfaction – 
water system 
Indicator Household Satisfaction – overall Peru Ordinal 
Five-year 
confidence 
Indicator Household Future sustainability Ghana, Peru Binary 
Ten-year 
confidence 
Indicator Household Future sustainability Peru Binary 
Committee should 
scale up service 
Indicator Household Scaling up Ghana, Peru Binary 
Committee should 
handle related 
needs 
Indicator Household Leveraging Peru Binary 
Years connect (tap 
age) 
Factor Household Project Peru Continuous 
Participation –  
# decisions 
Factor Household Project Ghana, Peru Continuous 
Household 
contributed pre-
operation 
Factor Household Project Ghana Binary 
Household 
contribution –  
labor days 
Factor Household Project Peru Continuous 
Attendance at 
current meetings 
Factor Household Project Ghana, Peru Ordinal 
Attitudes re: 
construction 
Factor Household Project Ghana, Peru Continuous 
Knowledge how 
committee spends 
funds 
Factor Household Project Ghana, Peru Ordinal 
Received post-
construction visit 
Factor Household External Ghana, Peru Binary 
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Age of respondent Factor Household Community Ghana, Peru Continuous 
# Household 
members 
Factor Household Community Ghana, Peru Continuous 
# Household rooms Factor Household Community Ghana, Peru Continuous 
Annual income Factor Household Community Peru Ordinal 
Monthly expenses Factor Household Community Ghana Continuous 
Asset index Factor Household Community Ghana, Peru Continuous 
Attitudes regarding 
social capital 
Factor Household Community Ghana, Peru Continuous 
Household treats 
water 
Factor Household Community Ghana, Peru Binary 
SANBASUR 
village 
Factor Village Project Peru Binary 
Volta Region Factor Village Project Ghana Binary 
Years operator 
served in village 
Factor Village Project Peru Continuous 
Operator trained Factor Village Project Peru Binary 
# Operators Factor Village Project Ghana Continuous 
Source - # Dry 
months/year 
Factor Village Project Ghana, Peru Continuous 
Source – Km from 
village 
Factor Village Project Peru Continuous 
System – degree of 
storage cracks 
Factor Village Project Peru Ordinal 
System – leaks in 
distribution lines 
Factor Village Project Peru Ordinal 
Tariff system type Factor Village Project Ghana Binary 
(multiple) 
Recovers operating 
cost with tariffs 
Factor Village Project Ghana, Peru Binary 
Committee elected Factor Village Project Ghana, Peru Binary 
Distance to area 
mechanic 
Factor Village Project (location) Ghana Continuous 
Committee – years 
of existence 
Factor Village Project Ghana, Peru Continuous 
Committee trained Factor Village Project Ghana, Peru Binary 
Village population Factor Village Community Ghana, Peru Continuous 
Village size 
(minutes to travel 
end-to-end) 
Factor Village Community Ghana, Peru Continuous 
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3.2. Avenues of Inquiry 
3.2.1. Relationship between Sustainability and Hypothesized Determinants in 
Community-Driven Development Models of Rural Water Supply 
3.2.1.1. Note on Programs Selected for Study 
Both the Peru and the Ghana country studies in this investigation resulted 
from a collaborative selection process among members of the research team, 
local consultants, and World Bank staff members to examine the impact of 
post-construction support on sustainability in community-driven rural water 
supply projects.  This mechanism of program selection is critical to framing 
this investigation.  This dissertation is not designed to compare the 
performance of community-based, demand-oriented water projects with 
centrally-planned, supply-driven water supply projects.  Projects in both 
regions of Ghana and in both programs of Peru were built under the intentions 
of 1) soliciting community participation, 2) responding to local demand, and 
3) expanding coverage to areas and populations without improved water 
sources.  Under programs in both countries, communities were responsible for 
generating proposals, working with program staff, and taking over the projects 
upon completion of the project.  In essence, communities have to some degree 
self-selected themselves into the programs relative to other villages.  One 
might expect that these projects ought to perform better than traditional 
projects and that these communities would feature more social capital since 
they theoretically have come together to advocate and organize for an 
improved water project.   
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Instead, this dissertation addresses the relative importance of community, 
project, and external factors as they determine household-level physical 
performance, financial payments, use, and satisfaction of rural water projects 
under an assumed framework of participatory input, demand responsiveness, 
and community management.  In practice there may be variation in the degree 
of community participation, demand responsiveness, and community 
management.  Measuring this variation is an important part of the study. 
Moreover, there should be variation in the post-construction support 
indicators, since the original World Bank study methodology selected 
programs (in Peru) and regions (in Ghana) with differences in post-
construction support.  In Peru, the FONCODES program under study (during 
the period 1993-2000) was not designed to provide any post-construction 
support (although some villages may have received it), while SANBASUR 
offered a mechanism for obtaining short-term PCS (either at the household or 
village levels).  In Ghana, both regions offered post-construction support. Yet 
one region (Volta) provided regular, ongoing assistance through district 
environmental health assistants (EHAs) while in the other region (Brong 
Ahafo), villages needed to request support. 
Other community factors (e.g. village size, location, and socio-economic 
status) and project factors (e.g. water source characteristics, local management 
and technical capacity) are expected to vary, although it was impossible to 
predict ex-ante the extent of variation among the sampled villages. 
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3.2.1.2. Overview of Hypothesized Effects 
Table 3 below overviews the categorical hypotheses for this study. 
Table 3:  Hypothesized Effects of Categories of Determinants on Sustainability  
INDICATOR COMMMUNITY 
FACTORS (direction) 
PROJECT FACTORS 
(direction) 
EXTERNAL FACTORS 
(direction) 
Physical Function 
(Peru only) 
1) Number of 
     breakdowns in 
     last six months 
2) Number of days 
     to repair last 
     problem 
Village Size, Pop. (?)  
HH Size (+) 
HH Econ. status (-) 
HH Respondent age (?) 
HH Social capital (?) 
Village Region (?) 
 
Agency (Peru) – NGO or 
social fund (?) 
System age (+) 
Source quality (-) 
System quality (-) 
HH Pre-Participation (-) 
HH Pre-Contribution (-) 
HH Participates/Knowledge(?) 
Operator capacity (-) 
Management capacity (-) 
Management elected (-) 
Tariff structure (?) 
HH PCS (+) 
 
Financial Payment 
1) Household pays 
for water 
2) Amount paid for 
water 
Village Size, Pop. (?) 
HH Size (?) 
HH Econ. status (+) 
Respondent age (?) 
HH Social capital (+) 
Village Region (?) 
Village Distance (?) 
Agency (?) 
System age (-) 
Source quality (+) 
System quality (+) 
HH Pre-Participation (+) 
HH Pre-Contribution (+) 
HH Part./Knowledge (?) 
Operator capacity (+) 
Management capacity (+) 
Management elected (?) 
Tariff Structure (+) 
HH PCS (+) 
 
Consumer 
Satisfaction 
1) water attributes 
2) repair service 
3) management 
Village Size, Pop. (?)  
HH Size (?) 
HH Econ. status (+) 
Respondent age (?) 
HH Social capital (+) 
Village Region (?) 
Village Distance (-) 
Agency (?) 
System age (-) 
Source quality (+) 
System quality (+) 
HH Pre-Participation (+) 
HH Pre-Contribution (+) 
HH Part./Knowledge (+) 
Operator capacity (+) 
Management capacity (+) 
Management elected (?) 
Tariff structure (-) 
HH PCS (+) 
 
Future Performance 
1) Five year period 
2) Ten year period 
Village Size, Pop. (?)  
HH Size (?) 
HH Econ. status (+) 
Respondent age (-) 
HH Social capital (+) 
Village Region (?) 
Village Distance (-) 
Agency (?) 
System age (-) 
Source quality (+) 
System quality (+) 
HH Pre-Participation (+) 
HH Pre-Contribution (+) 
HH Part./Knowledge (?) 
Operator capacity (+) 
Management capacity (+) 
Management elected (?) 
Tariff structure (?) 
HH PCS (+) 
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Physical performance centers on the number of breakdowns households 
experience and the number of days it takes to restore service when they occur.  
Community factor hypotheses suggest that higher-income, wealthier 
households are less likely to break down and more likely to have service more 
quickly restored.  Larger households are more likely to break down (due to 
use), but equally likely to receive repairs.  No discernable relationships are 
proscribed between physical performance and village size.  Economies of 
scale may improve performance, yet larger villages (in population and size) 
may lower household-level performance.  Neither age, social capital attitudes, 
nor village region (in Ghana) are expected to be related to physical 
performance.  In contrast, households in villages with longer dry seasons, 
further water sources, and systems judged of lower quality are more likely to 
face problems.  Villages with greater household pre-project participation and 
contributions are more likely to maintain their taps, yet probably no more 
likely to obtain better service.  The effect of current participation and 
knowledge is uncertain; households that participate in current meetings may 
do so because they do not receive good service, or they may participate 
because they are pleased with the results.  Households which understand 
financial dealings are no more likely to experience breakdowns or wait longer 
than others.  Villages with more experienced, better trained, and elected 
committees are more likely to contain households with improved service.  
Tariff structures are not anticipated to affect household yard tap performance.  
However, post-construction household visits may improve physical 
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performance functioning if they encouraged household members to better 
maintain their taps. 
Financial indicators focus on whether households pay for service and the 
monthly amounts they pay.  Community factors that are hypothesized to 
influence these indicators include household income, wealth, and social 
capital (households with more positive attitudes regarding social capital are 
more likely to pay for services).  Household size and respondent age are 
indeterminable household factors, while village size, distance, population, 
agency type, and region are also difficult to predict.  Regarding project 
factors, households with older taps are less likely to be willing to pay for 
water service.  Source and system quality are believed to influence the 
likelihood and amount of payment.  The degrees of pre-project participation 
and contributions conceivably influence the extent to which people will pay 
for water service.  It is difficult to predict whether current participation and 
knowledge about committee affairs are expected to influence the likelihood 
and amount of payment, since it depends on whether their participation and 
knowledge reveals that their committees are doing a good or poor job.  
Greater technical and management capacity is believed to improve the 
chances that people will pay for water and the amounts paid.  Post-
construction support may improve financial payments if households believe 
their water systems are better supported by external agencies.  The presence of 
tariff structures should influence financial performance because they require 
users to pay for the water they receive.   
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The consumer satisfaction category features questions regarding water 
attributes, operation and maintenance service, and administrative satisfaction 
and trust.  The effects of village size, population, and region, as well as 
household size and respondent’s age, are indeterminable.  Households with 
more income, wealth, and higher social capital scores are expected to be more 
satisfied with the project.  In Ghana, households in villages located farther 
away from mechanics and spare parts are more likely to be less satisfied with 
water and services.  Project-related household factors hypothesized to 
influence household satisfaction include tap age (-), previous participation and 
contributions to the project (+), and current meeting participation and 
knowledge of financial activities (+).  This dissertation also predicts that 
households in villages with more reliable and closer water sources, fewer 
system problems, and more technical and management capacity are more 
likely to be satisfied.   Households in communities with tariffs are less likely 
to be satisfied after controlling for other factors since they must pay for 
service.  Households receiving external support are also more likely to buy 
into the water project and thus more satisfied with water and services.  Finally, 
future performance is expected to be a function of most project, community, 
and external categories (and hence partially a function of the present 
performance of the water projects along with unobservable measurement 
error).   
70 
3.2.1.3. Summary of Prior Village-Level Findings – Peru 
Prokopy and Thorsten’s study in Peru examined five measures of physical 
performance: 1) the percentage of yard taps working in the village, 2) the 
number of hours per day the system provided water, 3) the number of 
breakdowns reported over the last six months, 4) the repair time needed to 
restore service after the last breakdown, and 5) an engineer’s assessment of 
the technical condition of the system.   
Table 4, reprinted from that study, overviews basic descriptive statistics on 
physical performance. 
Table 4: Physical Performance of Water Systems - Peru 
 
MEASURE 
 
SOURCE 
FONCODES 
Average (N=56) 
SANBASUR 
Average (N=43) 
ANOVA  
p-value 
System Age Committee 7.57 years 6.13 years 0.007*** 
Taps working Operator 95% 93% 0.489 
Hours of operation (per day) Household avg. 18.8 19.9 0.249 
Major unplanned interruptions 
in water supply service for at 
least one day in past 6 months Operator 89% 59% 0.129 
Major unplanned interruptions 
in water supply service for at 
least one day in past 6 months Leaders 70% 55% 0.117 
Number of days to fix problems Operator 4.53 1.06 0.047** 
Number of days to fix problems Leaders 2.08 2.58 0.755 
Leaks on main pipe to village in 
past month Household avg. 23% 21% 0.464 
Leaks on main pipe to village in 
past 6 months Household avg. 50% 43% 0.253 
Distribution line breakages in 
past month Household avg. 28% 20% 0.054* 
Distribution line breakages in 
past 6 months Household avg. 24% 39% 0.003*** 
*** difference between villages is significant at less than .01 level; ** difference is significant at less than .05 
level; * difference is significant at less than .1 level. 
 
Generally the water taps were working and providing water throughout the 
day in most villages.  A majority of villages reported experiencing 
breakdowns.  Average repair times for system problems, however, averaged 
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less than three days.  Engineers reported that many systems were well-
maintained, although there were some cases of storage tank and main line 
breakages and water lines crossing river streams (increasing the likelihood of 
ruptures).  SANBASUR households on average contained taps that were over 
one year younger and reported lower repair times than FONCODES villages. 
Prokopy and Thorsten used factor analysis and multivariate regression to 
estimate the impact of village-level factors on physical performance.  Factor 
analysis did not generate meaningful results but regression models detected 
important effects.  Community factors such as village size, distance from 
water source, and household attitudes toward social capital were significant in 
some models, while project factors such as community participation were 
important as well.  The extent of training and whether a community had 
received post-construction support also figured prominently.  However, the 
models contained a high degree of unexplained variation, in part because 
many systems performed rather well at the village level. 
In contrast to the generally satisfactory working condition of many 
systems, the researchers found that financial performance varied considerably 
by village.  Table 5 highlights basic financial responses to survey questions. 
Table 5:  Summary of Financial Performance Measures - Peru 
 
MEASURE 
 
SOURCE 
FONCODES 
Average 
SANBASUR 
Average 
ANOVA  
p-value 
Amount collected enough to operate 
system Committee 46% 49% 0.841 
Amount collected enough to make 
minor repairs Committee 61% 92% 0.001*** 
Amount collected enough to make 
major repairs Committee 7% 16% 0.225 
Users currently pay for water Household avg 69.5% 83.5% 0.037** 
*** difference between villages is significant at less than .01 level; ** difference is significant at less than 
.05 level; * difference is significant at less than .1 level. 
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Although many villages charged households for water use, less than one-
half collected enough to routinely operate the water system.  Minor repairs 
posed less of a problem, yet household collections rarely covered major 
repairs or expansions.  SANBASUR households on average were more likely 
to pay for service, yet paid less than FONCODES households for water. 
The researchers used the same techniques as above to explain financial 
performance in terms of the sign of net revenues (calculated as the difference 
between annual household collections and operating costs) and survey 
responses to cost recovery questions.  Regression models showed that 
community factors (village size and social capital), project factors 
(participation), and external factors (water committee training and household 
visits by external agencies) were positively associated with cost recovery.  
Women’s pre-project participation and household contributions (defined in 
terms of labor days), by contrast, negatively affected these measures.  These 
models explained a higher percentage of total variation across villages than 
the physical performance measures. 
3.2.1.4. Summary of Prior Village-Level Findings – Ghana 
Table 6, reprinted from the cited study, presents information concerning 
the physical performance of borehole systems in Ghana.   
   Table 6:  Physical Indicators of Sustainability – Ghana 
MEASURE SOURCE VALUE 
Average hours operating per day Women’s group 21 hours 
Percent villages reporting breakdowns last six months Leaders’ group 57% 
Median number of breakdowns last six months Leaders’ group 1.6 
Percent villages reporting fewer or equal breakdowns in the last three 
years, compared to initial operation 
Leaders’ group 63% 
Average number of days to repair technical problems Leaders’ group 18 days 
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As in Peru, most systems were delivering water consistently throughout 
the day.  Breakdowns occur less frequently in Ghanaian villages, but repair 
times are longer than in Peru.   
The multivariate analysis focused on whether project boreholes were 
working and the length of time necessary to repair breakdowns.  Boreholes 
were more likely to operate in communities with smaller populations, higher 
average household expenditures, larger shares of households paying for water 
service, more caretakers, and greater trust of leadership.  Repair times were 
lower in communities with more boreholes and greater confidence in leaders 
and higher in places where no one was responsible for maintenance, where 
area mechanics were further away, and where users paid for water service. 
Table 7 concerns financial performance measures in Ghana. 
Table 7:  Financial Indicators of Sustainability – Ghana 
MEASURE SOURCE VALUE 
Percent of villages collecting user payments Committee 77% 
Percent reporting that collections fund operations Committee 66% 
Percent reporting that collections fund minor repairs Committee 80% 
Percent reporting that collections fund major repairs Committee 37% 
Percent reporting that collections fund expansions Committee 3% 
Percent of villages that recover average operating costs Committee 53% 
 
Many water committees report that they collect regular tariffs or 
household contributions and that these often fund operations and minor 
repairs.  However, less than half of committees covered monthly operating 
costs or collected enough tariff payments to handle major breakdowns.    
3.2.1.5. Multi-level Sustainable Water Service Models 
Village-level models are important to estimate indicators of sustainability 
which are measured at a village level, such as financial cost recovery and 
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overall system operation.  Multi-level models, however, are more 
conceptually attractive when measuring household-level variables, since they 
incorporate variation from data collected from both village and household-
level instruments. 
Understanding sustainability from the household perspective is important 
in evaluating the performance of these projects.  These projects were built 
under a participatory, demand-oriented framework which involved citizen 
input and contributions toward the project.  Measuring household-level 
outcomes enables researchers to recognize how well the new systems are 
satisfying their needs.  Multi-level models suggest that their responses can 
vary according to characteristics of the household and of the village.  
Moreover, these models can detect differences in distributional impacts within 
a particular village.   
A common, simpler alternative to a multi-level model would obtain 
household level data, estimate medians (for binary and categorical variables) 
and averages (for continuous variables), and use these values to estimate 
village-level models.  However, this practice ignores the distribution and 
variance of household data.  There are important drawbacks in using uni-level 
analysis on multilevel data.  Parameter estimates are usually unbiased but 
inefficient, while standard errors are often negatively biased, resulting in 
spurious “significant” effects (Snijders and Bosker 1999, Hox 2002).    In 
addition, village-level models typically limit the set of factors or indicators 
which could be increased with a multi-level model (Verbeek 2000).  
75 
Moreover, the increased sample size for household-level measurements can 
also improve the accuracy of the estimates.  Peru and Ghana’s larger 
household datasets allow one to estimate more precise confidence intervals for 
household-based estimates and maintain greater confidence in hypothesis 
testing once clustering impacts at the village level have been considered.   
It is important to consider the degrees of variation among villages and 
within villages.  Limited variation within a village would negate the 
significance of using a multi-level model.  As a first step, this dissertation 
analyzes the variance components to partition the variance into village and 
household levels.  Inter-cluster correlations are examined to determine which 
of the proposed variables make appropriate candidates for multi-level 
analysis. 
This dissertation features three types of multi-level models.  The first set 
of models uses a random intercepts framework.  Each specification features a 
single indicator of sustainability and sets of village and household factors 
(represented also as single measurements, indices, or factor scores).  The 
random effects estimator “assumes that the intercepts of individuals 
(households) are different, but that they can be treated as drawings from a 
distribution with mean u and variance σ2 (Verbeek 2002).  Thus: 
yij = Boj + B1jXij +  eij where j represents household j in village i, and 
Boj = γoo + γo1zj + δoj     B1j = γ1o + γ11zj + δ1j   
Combining these terms yields: 
yij = γoo + γo1zj + γ1oxij + γ11zjxij + δoj+ δ1jXij  +  eij 
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The model posits that the household’s response depends on a base constant 
γoo, a vector of village-level covariates γo1zj, a vector of household covariates 
γ11xij, an interaction term γ11zjxij, and a set of three error terms which are all 
normally distributed with means of zero.  
A key assumption is that there is no correlation between households in one 
village and households in another village.  This allows the interaction term 
above to have a mean of zero.  The random effects model assumes that the 
selection of households is independent of the characteristics of the explanatory 
variables in the above equation.  This estimator ignores differences within 
individual households; focusing instead on differences among households 
which are important for making inferences about the population of each 
village in the model.   
The Peru study also additionally features a random slope and intercepts 
framework for cases where the program (SANBASUR) is significant in the 
intercepts-only model.  This will test whether the slope of household factors 
within each village is correlated with their location in a SANBASUR or 
FONCODES community – e.g. do SANBASUR households respond 
differently than FONCODES households with respect to the effects of their 
sets of household characteristics?  This technique allows household factors to 
vary across villages in terms of their effect on the outcome variables. 
The second set of models follows the same premises as the random 
intercept models.   Yet they divide household factors into exogenous and 
endogenous factors for further analysis.  Prior research suggests that some of 
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these factors are related to one another.  In particular, some household factors 
(such as income/wealth, social capital, and other attributes) may influence 
other household factors (e.g. pre-project involvement, current knowledge, 
etc.); which in turn affect outcomes.  These models estimate the direct effects 
of all variables on the outcome (as the previous random intercept 
specifications have done).  In addition, the models allow for indirect effects; 
i.e. those impacts where an exogenous factor affects the outcome variable via 
an endogenous variable.  For example, income may influence the level of 
participation in a project, and the level of project participation in turn may 
increase household satisfaction.  Income therefore may have both a direct 
effect on household satisfaction and an indirect effect via household 
participation if both coefficients are significant.  It is important to note that 
these effects may not necessarily occur in the same direction.  The models 
concentrate on those with significant, endogenous effects in the initial random 
intercept specifications.  All models are estimated simultaneously (as opposed 
to a staged regression approach).   
The random effects model allows researchers to use household and village 
level data in estimating the direct and indirect effects of village and household 
determinants upon indicators of sustainability measured at a household level.  
One drawback of using this estimation procedure is that the models assume 
that each dependent variable represents the construct (or some portion of the 
construct) of “sustainability”.  However, sustainability is neither directly 
observed nor defined.  One can consider sustainability as a “latent” variable – 
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a concept which can be indicated by the set of categories described above, but 
also contains a degree of measurement error.  It is entirely possible that water 
systems may be simultaneously sustainable on one measure while less so on 
other accounts. 
Figure 1 represents a typified model in which sustainability is considered 
as a latent variable, indicated by a set of observed variables and influenced by 
a set of factors.  This model is a recursive (unidirectional) structural equation 
model in which estimates are calculated simultaneously using maximum 
likelihood.  Use of multi-level structural equation models is well established.  
Structural equation models for multilevel data have been formulated in such 
fields as education, psychology, sociology, and the social sciences (see Hox 
and Maas 2004 for a brief review, also see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002 and 
Goldstein 1995 for references).  Their application to the field of development 
and water supply evaluation is one of the novel elements of this dissertation. 
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Figure 1: Sustainability Model with Multiple Observed Factors & Indicators 
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3.2.2. Institutional Framework Comparison 
The models in this dissertation will compare the effect of program 
characteristics of a non-governmental service provider (SANBASUR) and a 
social investment fund (FONCODES) on indicators of sustainable water supply in 
Peru.  These programs operate in the same region over an equivalent time frame.  
Both programs are based on the community development model, which touts 
participation and demand-responsiveness.  Agency effects are considered as 
dummy variables in the multi-level models, which control for other factors 
hypothesized to affect sustainability.  The Ghana study does not permit a similar 
comparison.  In both cases, regional and district government agencies 
implemented the programs, including most of the post-project support.   
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3.2.3. Scaling Up and Leveraging in the Rural Water Sector 
 “Scaling up” water service – making expansions or improvements to the new 
water systems – requires in practice some knowledge of both supply and demand 
schedules.  This dissertation does not consider actual situations in which villages 
and/or households have attempted to scale up services.  Instead, it attempts to 
predict whether village groups and households would be willing to support a local 
water committee’s decision to improve services.  The purpose of this question was 
to gauge the level of support among respondents for water system improvements 
and understand their perception of the ability of the water committee to handle 
these needs.  It represents a form of demand; not in an economic framework with 
costs and/or prices, but nonetheless revealing some degree of preference and 
confidence.  A hallmark of the community participation and management rural 
water service model in Ghana and Peru is that providers decided where to build 
these projects in part according to the ability of communities to voice and 
organize their support.  Therefore, measuring household and village respondents’ 
perceptions is an important method of learning the degree of political support for 
future water infrastructure improvements. 
Leveraging refers to the ability to capitalize on water service improvements to 
garner support for other environmental health services, such as sanitation, garbage 
collection, and primary health clinics.  The main hypothesis that this support can 
be explained by a set of project, community, and external factors is similar in 
theme to predicting water system expansion.  However, there are some important 
differences which are considered below. 
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This dissertation hypothesizes that the decision among village respondents 
and households to support a local committees’ attempt to provide other 
environmental services is partially determined by the performance of the water 
system under their leadership.  Community factors, such as size, proximity to 
other infrastructure and larger areas, socio-economic status, and household-level 
social capital attitudes are hypothesized to positively influence a decision to favor 
other needs.  However, not all project factors are believed to impact this decision.  
Water source characteristics should not directly influence this decision.  Nor 
should pre-project demand for water services – it may be related, but the demand 
for new services can in principle differ substantially.  The hypothesized effect of 
agency type is also unclear.  The models will test the hypothesis that participation 
in one community-based water service can influence respondents’ support for 
other services.  The dissertation anticipates that the technical capacity of a system 
operator should not directly influence respondents’ decisions to favor other needs, 
but a water committee’s management capacity can impact that decision.  Finally, 
household-level visits in the post-construction phase are hypothesized to influence 
the likelihood that people will support leveraging. 
The dissertation uses a random intercepts framework with household and 
village-level covariates to predict households’ decisions to support water system 
improvements and to favor leveraging.  Readers should consider these as strictly 
exploratory findings.  The literature has suggested that communities which have 
succeeded in providing community-managed water service may be capable of 
scaling up and leveraging into other service areas.  However, the relationship 
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between determinants and indicators of success and specific types of services 
marks new territory in the field.   
 
3.3. Study Overview 
3.3.1. Peru Study 
Ninety-nine villages were selected for this study in the Cuzco Department of 
Peru.  Projects were constructed in these villages from two programs – the 
FONCODES social investment fund and the SANBASUR non-government 
organization program funded by the Swiss government.  These water projects 
began operating as early as 1991 and as late as 2001.  All of the systems are 
gravity-fed water systems.  Field teams conducted focus groups with women, 
leaders, and water committee members and interviewed system operators in each 
village.  In addition, they also interviewed 25 households in each village; resulting 
in a total of 2450 household surveys. 
3.3.2. Ghana Study 
The Ghana study sampled 200 villages – 100 from the Brong Ahafo and Volta 
regions of the country, respectively.  Projects were built under the central 
government’s Community Water and Sanitation Agency Phase I program between 
1995-2001 in partnership with local communities and regional and district 
governments.  The projects in this study feature borehole-based systems with 1-2 
handpumps constructed in each village.  Unlike the Peruvian case, which features 
villages that received and did not receive post-construction support, all villages 
were eligible to receive PCS by program design.  The key distinction among 
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regions is that villages in the Volta region received quarterly post-project 
assistance through the MOM program, funded by the Danish government.  
Villages in the Brong Ahafo needed to request assistance from district 
governments.  A total of 200 villages were included in the sample.  Data were 
collected in each village from the following sources:  1) village women, 2) village 
leaders, 3) water committee officials, and 4) system operators.  In addition, 5000 
household surveys were completed by field teams – or 25 surveys per village.   
 
3.4. Validity Issues 
Validity issues confound most studies, and this dissertation is no exception.  
While there have been previous empirical attempts to estimate sustainable 
performance and benefits in the rural water sector, there are few theoretical sources 
that guide most investigations (including this one).  I have noted places where theory 
suggests possible testable hypotheses, but also recognize the dearth of theoretical 
foundation in this study. 
The cross-sectional nature of this study eliminates several internal validity issues, 
such as testing, attrition, and instrumentation effects (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 
2002).  The greatest internal validity problems in the study design are the potential for 
selection bias and history effects.  Selection bias occurs when the comparison groups 
are different in unobservable characteristics that may cause all or part of the treatment 
effect.  Random assignment typically handles this problem, yet in Peru and Ghana the 
villages were not randomly assigned to receive water projects.  The issue of the self-
selected sample under the auspices of community development has already been 
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discussed.  Another concern  is that villages in the FONCODES and SANBASUR 
frames in Peru and the Volta and Brong Ahafo regions of Ghana differ systematically 
from one another in dimensions unaccounted for in this study.  This is particularly 
relevant in evaluating post-construction assistance, since villages were selected by 
program (Peru) and by region (Ghana) based on these differences.  The issue seems to 
have greater importance in the Ghana study, where sampling occurred in two separate 
regions of the country.  Peru likely poses less of a problem, since FONCODES and 
SANBASUR villages were sampled in several of the same districts.  History (in the 
form of other conditions and activities occurring during the period of study) also 
represents a related threat – again particularly in the Ghana sample. 
The use of cross-sectional survey data and multiple constructs, methods, and 
techniques should limit the extent of construct invalidity.  Field studies that involve 
surveys always create the possibility for some degree of biased responses, although 
the training and preparation of field teams emphasized the importance of objectivity 
for enumerators.  Satisfaction is considered a construct that represents project success 
in this dissertation.  While it does represent an important component in measuring 
participatory rural water projects, others have found that satisfaction may be 
considered a function of pre-conceived expectations (Van Ryzin 2004).  Diffuse 
treatments among villages are likely; yet estimating the diffuse effects is one of the 
objectives of the analysis.  Construct validity does arise as an issue when using 
indicators to identify latent variables in the analysis. 
Earlier sections in the chapter discussed how this study would improve statistical 
validity over previous work via the use of larger samples, multi-level modeling, and 
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estimation techniques that would introduce measurement error.  Other sources often 
depend on the individual variables.  One particular source of concern with this study 
is the range of values available among some of the variables.  Limited variation on 
independent variables limits the likelihood that they will influence values of the 
dependent variable due to increased standard errors.  Conversely, a low variance on 
the dependent variables runs the risk of making inappropriate inferences of the 
factors’ causal impacts.   
The comparison of relative impacts in two country settings with two different 
technology types improves the external validity of the study.  The use of multiple 
units and outcomes also enhances more generalized causal inference.  A possible 
shortcoming is that failures or successes within one of the two study areas may 
depend on aspects of the cultural settings which were not considered in the analysis.  
These issues create challenges for interpreting the results.  Overall, however, the 
study design has identified and addressed many potential pitfalls of quasi-
experimental research design.
  
 
IV. Rural Water and Sanitation Service Provision in Study Areas 
 
4.1. Peru 
4.1.1. Overview of Service Provision in Peru 
The Peruvian water sector has undergone some degree of structural reorganization 
in every decade since the 1980s.  Before 1980, the central government administered 
water services through the Ministry of Vivienda (for urban areas) and the Ministry of 
Health (MINSA) for rural areas.  Rural potable water coverage through the 1970s was 
below 20% according to official statistics.  In the 1980s, the central government 
reorganized the urban water sector by creating a new agency (SENAPA) to promote a 
more economic treatment of water services (via pricing) and facilitate more 
investment in the sector.  Rural areas, however, remained under the management of 
MINSA.  Urban coverage rose during the 1980s, yet official rural coverage remained 
low at 22%.   
The central government again reorganized the water sector during the 1990s.  On 
the urban side, SENAPA was deactivated and replaced by two agencies: PRES (which 
handled policy decisions) and SUNASS (which functioned as a national regulator).  
MINSA remained the de facto manager of rural water services in areas where they 
had constructed projects.  However, the government began to funnel much of its 
investment in social and small-scale economic sectors (including potable water) 
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through two new institutions – FONAVI in urban areas and FONCODES in rural 
areas.  FONCODES was one of the first social investment funds in Latin America, 
following on the heels of the Bolivian Social Investment Fund in 1989 (Rawlings et. 
al 2003).  The program soon became the largest source of investment in Peruvian 
rural water projects during the 1990s, and it continues as the major source today.  The 
fund significantly enhanced access to potable water service in rural villages.  By 
1998, official reports estimated that the percentage of communities with improved 
water service had more than doubled, rising to 50.6%. 
In 2002, the government under President Toledo again reoriented the water sector.  
The government vested authority over rural water planning and investment into a 
reorganized Ministry of Vivienda, Construccion, and Saneamiento (VCS). The 
Ministry of VCS is now solely responsible for policymaking for the water sector.  
They work with the Ministry of Economics and Finance to set investment priorities 
and assign resources, with MINSA to establish health standards and norms (though 
MINSA alone is responsible for implementation and monitoring), and with several 
other governmental and non-governmental agencies to execute and evaluate policies 
and programs.  In consultation with the World Bank, the VCS administers the 
PRONASAR (the National Program for Water and Sanitation).  PRONASAR 
includes funding for policymaking and sector reinforcement at the national level as 
well as a new decentralization program for local governments.  The decentralization 
process began in 2003 via the Organic Law of Municipalities, which created regional 
governments.   
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During the first three years of its existence, PRONASAR made investment 
decisions for communities based on indicators such as disease incidence, poverty, and 
availability of current water and sanitation services.  PRONASAR is now responsible 
for funding the FONCODES program in water and sanitation.  However, 
FONCODES remains solely responsible for implementing its own water and 
sanitation projects. 
MINSA constructed approximately 12,000 systems during its tenure as manager 
of the rural water sector.  FONCODES has constructed about 15,000 systems since 
1991 (FONCODES interview 2004).  According to 2002 government statistics, 62% 
of rural communities contained improved water systems.  However, evaluations have 
acknowledged that these statistics do not consider the number of seriously deficient or 
collapsed systems in rural areas.  A May 2003 study of 104 rural communities across 
Peru, funded by the World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, found that 31.7% of 
the communities’ systems were “sustainable”, 44.3% functioned at deteriorating 
levels of efficiency and quality, and 24.1% of the systems had either collapsed or 
were on the brink of doing so (WSP 2003).     
Studies of the Peruvian water sector funded by WSP and other organizations 
found several deficiencies (WSP 2003).  Some of the major criticisms included: 
1) Lack of a sector-wide strategy for investment, coordination, and operation, 
leading to duplication of efforts and institutional disorder. 
2) Lack of a formal legal structure with defined ownership roles and 
responsibilities. 
3) Lack of focus on social factors (organization and demand of community, and 
health and hygiene) in development of systems. 
4) Lack of local government involvement in decisions affecting their district.  
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5) Lack of capacity among district governments to support water service 
provision decisions. 
6) Poor service quality and low coverage rates among the poorest communities. 
7) Lack of organized participation from community members concerning 
planning and construction decisions.   
8) Lack of a culture of payment among users and management entities. 
9) Limited support for training for administration, operation, and maintenance 
during and after construction is complete. 
10)  Overall, a lack of funding to meet all the needs of the rural water sector. 
 
In short, the Peruvian water sector has expanded coverage and improved services 
in rural communities over the last fifteen years, thanks to enhanced external funding 
and a greater commitment to serve these areas.  However, many financial, technical, 
structural, and social problems have limited further expansion and threatened the 
sustainability of many rural systems.  In personal interviews with WSP, PRONASAR, 
and COSUDE officials in May 2004, I found that government and external donor 
organizations seemed aware of these issues and were working to overcome some of 
these problems, particularly the need for decentralization and enhanced local 
community participation and organization. 
 
4.1.2. Selection and Description of Programs of Inquiry 
 
4.1.2.1. FONCODES 
 
FONCODES is a social investment fund that currently receives the majority 
of its funds from the national PRONASAR (66%) and the World Bank and other 
donors (30%) (PRONASAR interview 2004).  The overall objective is to improve 
the quality of life for rural people in the country, particularly those in rural 
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communities (under 2000 people) that fall under the official poverty line.  
FONCODES funds projects in each of the 24 departments of Peru.  It is a multi-
sector fund, promoting work in the following areas:  
1) Social Infrastructure:  Nutrition, health, hygiene, education, and water 
and sanitation.   
2) Economic Infrastructure:  Agriculture, transportation, energy, and 
multi-sector strategies and coordination.   
3) Projects that improve production among smaller-scale businesses.  
4) Other special projects.  
From 1991-99, FONCODES invested a total of $1,453 million.  $361 million, 
or approximately 25%, of these investments went to water and sanitation projects 
(primarily the development of potable water systems).  This investment 
comprised 85% of the central government’s total spending on water and sanitation 
projects in rural areas during the decade (FONCODES interview 2004).   
FONCODES water projects operate under a kind of contracted design-build-
transfer model with communities.  FONCODES staff decides what areas to begin 
work in each region.  In theory, this is supposed to be a demand-driven process, 
but outside interviews and reports suggest that poverty indicators play a more 
important role.  Their staff contacts village leaders about the possibility of 
working in their respective communities.  FONCODES engineers survey the 
water resource situation and design the basic project schemes.   
Communities receive certification from the Ministry of Agriculture to 
guarantee the availability and quality of water and land resources for a project.  
The community is responsible for organizing a “nucleo ejectcutor” (N.E.) – a 
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committee that participates in the planning process, presents a project for 
FONCODES approval, and subsequently enters into a contract with a private 
contractor to orchestrate the construction of the project.  The N.E. assumes 
financial responsibility for administering FONCODES funds and community 
contributions.  It selects Inspector-Residents to work in the village, help execute 
the project, provide technical assistance, and assist the N.E. in administration and 
financial accountability.  FONCODES is supposed to provide training through 
these inspectors on system functions, repairs, maintenance, and administration of 
the new project.  This includes manuals, a few local workshops, sets of 
operational and administrative rules and regulations, and sometimes user 
education.   
Once the project is complete, the N.E. operates the project for a six-month 
period.  During this time, the Inspector-Resident ensures that the population has 
received prior sufficient training and that a new organization elected by the 
community is prepared to assume full responsibility for the project.  FONCODES 
then transfers legal responsibility for the project into the hands of a “JASS” – an 
administrative authority created by the village that replaces the N.E.  
FONCODES’ official role in the project ends with the transfer. 
The scope of FONCODES water projects include building main lines from the 
water source, filtrating and chlorinating the water, and transmitting the water into 
a village distribution network.  FONCODES traditionally has built the 
transmission system and public distribution taps; it does not install private 
connections.  However, a 2000 evaluation of FONCODES water projects noted 
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that 52% of households surveyed did have private connections.  These 
connections were likely financed and built by households or communities after 
the transfer of the project.  Another report indicates that many people were 
dissatisfied with public taps because no one in the communities handled 
maintenance and care of the taps.   
According to FONCODES officials, the program significantly increased its 
training program before and during construction in 1997.  They funded social 
capacitors to make three or four visits to each community to assist with training.  
Once the transfer was complete, the JASS groups and/or the local municipality 
were responsible for additional training.  FONCODES has subsequently 
developed a pilot ex-post construction assistance program.  However, at the time 
of the study, FONCODES had not put this program into operation. 
 In 2000, the Apoyo Institute was paid by FONCODES to evaluate water and 
sanitation projects constructed between 1997 and 1999 (Apoyo 2000).  They 
evaluated 382 projects, of which 70 were in the Sierra Sur region (comprising the 
Departments of Cuzco, Arequipa, and Puno).  Apoyo found that FONCODES 
projects had improved household connection rates (from 50% to 58%, though not 
by design), improved water quality perceptions, and reduced both the number of 
average system failures (from 3.58 to 1.86 over the system lifetime) and 
collection times.  They found that households with private connections had 
experienced reductions in rates of infant diarrhea (3.3%) and infant mortality 
(2.9%).  It should be noted that the authors did not control for a variety of other 
potentially explanatory health care factors.   
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According to the Apoyo report, most systems failed once, and there was an 
even split among those that had never failed and those failing twice.  Another 
13% failed more than three times.  Over 60% of households and operators 
reported that they did not have any problems with major interrupted service.   
With respect to training, 23% of communities featured no training for 
households, 40% featured trainings for up to 30% of households, 24% reported 
trainings for up to 50% of households, and 13% reported trainings for 50-70% of 
households.  78% of households interviewed reported that they had attended at 
least one assembly meeting for the project.  A smaller percentage of women 
reported that they were involved in the project.  Apoyo encouraged FONCODES 
to develop better programs to promote women’s participation. 
Apoyo and others, including the World Bank’s Water and Sanitation Program 
(WSP), have been critical of other aspects of the FONCODES model.  Apoyo 
found that many systems were weakly sustainable, due to the temporal nature of 
the NE’s and the lack of post-construction support.  In a 2001 report, WSP also 
criticized the NE system for not representing the needs of the majority in a 
democratic process.  The WSP also critiqued FONCODES projects on several 
other accounts, including: 1) lack of promotion; 2) limited demand elicitation and 
limited service options; 3) an uncoordinated O&M training strategy, which 
constituted only 2% of investment funds; 4) no training geared toward health and 
hygiene promotion; 5) no local synergies or inter-institutional coordination with 
local district governments; and 6) a lack of post-project support (WSP 2001).  
NGO interlocutors who had worked on SANBASUR and FONCODES projects 
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that were interviewed in Cuzco evoked similar comments about FONCODES 
projects.  They criticized FONCODES for its weak demand responsiveness, lack 
of participation, and post-project training and support.  In an interview with 
FONCODES officials, they acknowledged the lack of participation in some 
projects and post-project intervention.  However, they stressed the lack of funding 
and poverty in communities as main reasons why more projects were not 
sustainable.   
FONCODES projects are an important set of projects to evaluate for this 
study.  FONCODES is the principal investment arm of the Peruvian rural water 
supply sector.  One can attribute much of the growth in official coverage to 
FONCODES.  Moreover, FONCODES is the first major government-sponsored 
program in Peru to adopt a partnership approach with local communities.  In 
theory, their projects are supposed to be more demand-responsive and 
participatory.  FONCODES adopted a deliberate training strategy during the 
construction phase of development.  Finally, their model requires a strict transfer 
of responsibilities, without defined post-project support (during the period on 
which villages were selected).   
4.1.2.2.  SANBASUR 
 
SANBASUR stands for Saneamiento Basico en El Sierra Sur.  Currently the 
project only works in the Cuzco Department.  The project is funded by COSUDE, 
the development agency of the Swiss government.  It works in concert with 
MINSA, CTAR (the transitional regional government of Cuzco), local district 
governments, NGOs (which serve as executing interlocutors for projects), and 
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local communities.   SANBASUR seeks to improve water and sanitation services 
for impoverished rural people in order to improve health outcomes among these 
people.  Specifically, SANBASUR works to:  
1) Provide basic water and sanitation services using a strategy that 
stresses promotion, training for organizations, hygiene education, and 
system construction. 
 
2) Strengthen the institutional capacity of municipal districts, 
organizations, and their counterparts. 
 
3) Disseminate positive experiences and models to other communities.  
 
 
SANBASUR constructed 141 projects over the period 1996-2000 in four 
provinces in the Cuzco Department.  Approximately 50,000 people have benefited 
from those projects.  The agency has since expanded to three other provinces and 
completed a total of 238 projects by 2004 (SANBASUR interview 2004).   
The SANBASUR model works with interlocutor agencies.  SANBASUR 
originally selected provinces with high rates of extreme poverty, then developed 
partnerships with development agencies that had previous experience working in 
rural communities in these areas.  Interlocutors contacted communities, which had 
expressed initial interest in improved water supply and were willing to participate 
in the SANBASUR process.  They scheduled visits to profile these communities 
and the state of their water resources and supplies.  The interlocutors worked with 
the communities to prepare project proposals and budgets, and then they both 
submitted these documents to SANBASUR for their approval.  Upon approval, 
SANBASUR transferred cash funds to the interlocutor for construction.  
Communities were required to form administrative organizations and contribute 
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labor, materials, and/or cash for the projects (on average, approximately 30% of 
direct costs and 1/6 of all costs).  Once the projects were completed, the 
committee became responsible for all aspects of system operation, maintenance, 
and administration.  The entire process usually lasted approximately one year. 
SANBASUR’s work has evolved in different phases of time:   
• Phase I (March 1996 – October 1997) objectives focused on providing 
basic water services in priority communities and involving people, particularly 
women, in decision-making.  Actions also focused on improving health 
behaviors and hygiene education, and increasing exchanges among 
interlocutor organizations. 
 
• Phase II (November 1997 – October 2000) included Phase I objectives and 
added the following:  1) strengthen local health and educational institutions in 
line with SANBASUR goals, 2) consolidate and foment self-management 
among the committees, and 3) unify water and sanitation proposals and 
formulate models of success. 
 
• Phase III (November 2000 – October 2002) objectives were similar to 
those in Phases I and II.  SANBASUR sought to perfect their model and 
expand its program to other provinces during this period.   
 
• Phase IV (November 2002 – Present) objectives include those in other 
phases.  However, the priority in Phase IV has shifted from the micro to the 
meso-level, as SANBASUR attempts to strengthen the capacities of local 
district governments to support communities.  Phase IV projects were not 
considered in our study. 
 
Similarly, SANBASUR’s training and capacity-building programs have also 
evolved.  Early projects in 1996 only trained interlocutors.  In 1997, SANBASUR 
and local interlocutors planned trainings in communities with local health and 
technical personnel and representatives from municipal districts.  They held 2-3 
day workshops in communities, trained technicians and facilitators, and showed 
others how to teach people about their new systems.   They also trained 
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committees in legal and administrative matters, system operations and 
maintenance, care of water resources, and repair of distribution lines and 
household connections.  At the end of Phase II, SANBASUR found they had 
better results when they entrusted trainings to local third parties.  SANBASUR 
also produces O&M and educational manuals for every village. 
Water committees are monitored for a period of six months after completion 
of projects to determine if they are capable of taking on full management 
responsibilities.  Evaluations are based on eighteen indicators.  After the final 
transfer takes place, MINSA employees are responsible for monitoring water 
quality, while local governments are responsible through their contracts with 
SANBASUR to work with the committees on ongoing system needs.  
SANBASUR is also available upon written request to provide additional technical 
support and training for the committees.  However, SANBASUR encourages 
communities to solve their problems independently or with local government 
assistance before contacting them.  After the first six months of standard support, 
only seven communities to date have ever requested this follow up assistance 
directly from SANBASUR.   
Three known evaluations have been published on the SANBASUR program.  
The first two evaluations focused on Phase I and II results.  One evaluation, 
published in 2000, praised SANBASUR’s coverage accomplishments and 
ongoing system operations.  The authors criticized SANBASUR for focusing too 
much on poverty and less on demand elicitation.  The report called for more 
cooperation among government sectors and suggested that more work was 
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necessary at the national level in terms of defining legal responsibilities and 
seeking more complementary arrangements with FONCODES (which sometimes 
had previously worked in the same village).  In addition, committees and local 
government organizations required capacity-building.  Systems were more 
sustainable in places with stronger groups, particularly where new leaders 
received training from original members.  Solid training also played an important 
role in sustainability, according to the report.   
A 2002 evaluation of SANBASUR’s first two phases recognized the important 
role of community participation and pre-project promotion.  Promoters who had 
been more active in assigning roles helped to reinforce responsibilities among 
committee members.  The report lamented that women’s participation in groups 
was limited and that hygiene practices had not improved during the first two 
project phases.  Authors praised the role of post-project intervention in achieving 
better hygiene practices and in promoting more effective organizations.   
COSUDE and the World Bank financed a study that examined SANBASUR 
projects in four districts.  In two districts, SANBASUR installed water 
connections in the district capitals and in nearby villages.  In the other two 
districts, SANBASUR only worked in rural areas.  They found that more than 
90% of households retained in-house connections and about 50% had service 
more than 16 hours each day.  Satisfaction among households was recorded at 
90% in areas where local committees worked.  However, discontent among the 
remote provinces where local governments administered the services was higher.  
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The authors reported that these areas exhibited a culture of paternalism where 
very few people paid their water bill regularly. 
The three NGO interlocutors interviewed before fieldwork commenced all 
reported that they had achieved positive community results in the SANBASUR 
model.  All suggested they would be willing to continue working with 
SANBASUR on future projects if additional resources were available.  Two 
projects that received the greatest interest were latrine construction (which 
SANBASUR begun in 2000) and a system of drainage (a problem which has 
likely grown with the increase in piped water).   
SANBASUR villages provide an interesting counterpart to FONCODES 
villages for our study.  Both programs strive to reduce poverty, respond to local 
demand, encourage community participation, and encourage self-sufficiency 
through active training programs for new village leaders and household members 
alike.  Based on published evaluations, neither program has achieved complete 
success in these objectives.  Both programs have used intermediaries to fund their 
projects, albeit through different mechanisms.  Whereas FONCODES has 
distanced itself from projects after completion, SANBASUR has provided short-
term post-project support in conjunction with local governments.  However, 
SANBASUR (like FONCODES) has also encouraged self-reliance among its 
client communities, urging them to collaborate with local Ministries of Health and 
Education officials and local governments.   
4.1.3. Selection and Description of Study Area 
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Approximately 25.7 million people live in the Republic of Peru.  Peru ranks 82nd 
among the 175 countries listed in the 2002 Human Development Index.  It is 
considered a lower-middle income country according to the World Bank classification 
scheme, with a 2004 per capita gross national product of U.S. $2130.  The average 
life expectancy of a Peruvian is sixty-nine years, and there are a recorded 39 deaths 
per 1,000 births.  The overall literacy rate of the population is 96%.  All of these 
indicators fall in the middle one-third of countries worldwide.  Among Latin 
American and Caribbean (LAC) nations, Peru ranks tenth on the Human 
Development Index among the twenty-three nations in the region.   
Peru is divided into twenty-four political departments.  The Department of Cuzco 
was selected as the target area for the study because SANBASUR and FONCODES 
both have worked extensively in this department since 1993.  The department is 
further sub-divided into thirteen provinces, which together hold 108 districts.  Most of 
these provinces lie in the Sierra Sur region, characterized by high mountains and river 
valleys that range from 2500 – 5000 meters in height.  Due to the mountainous 
terrain, most villages obtain their water from rivers, lakes, and springs set near the 
mountain peaks.  The major exception in the region is the La Convencion province, 
which slopes northwest into the Peruvian rain forest basin of the Amazon River.   
Information from the last national census was only available from 1993.  Table 8 
summarizes some basic information about the rural population in Cuzco during this 
period.  Additionally, the INEI (the National Statistical Office) periodically conducts 
a National Survey of Households.  Table 9 summarizes other useful information from 
this survey about the entire population of the Cuzco Department. 
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Table 8:  Socio-Economic Information from Peru’s National Census (1993) 
CATEGORY VALUES 
Population (Total) 1,066,495 
Population (Rural)  557,038 
Population (Rural Males)  283,991 
Population (Rural Females)  273,047 
Rural Population, % Quechua-speaking (>4 years old) 71.5% 
Rural Population, Literacy Rate (> 4 years old) 53.8% 
Rural Population, % households with any unmet basic needs 95.2% 
 
Table 9:  Socio-economic Data from National Survey of Households (2002) 
CATEGORY VALUES 
Total Number of Households (urban and rural) 289,091 
     % Female Population 53.2% 
     % Population in Extreme poverty 34% 
     % Population in Less-Extreme poverty 26% 
Percentage of Total Population with Household water taps 51.6% 
Percentage of Total Population with Electricity 62.4% 
Percentage of Population with in-house toilets 25.2% 
Estimated Total Population (2005) 1,252,201 
 
 
4.2. Ghana 
 
4.2.1. Overview of Service Provision in Ghana 
 
The Ghana Water and Sewage Cooperation (GWSC), an agency of the central 
government, was originally charged with the task of providing an adequate supply of 
domestic water to the country’s rural and urban population.  Census data from 1990 
indicated that only 28% of rural communities had access to an improved water source 
vs. 76% in urban areas.  The central government alone was not capable of 
significantly increasing access to improved water sources given the size of the 
problem, other competing needs, periodic political instability since independence, and 
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the economy’s wide revenue fluctuations due to its dependence on gold and cash 
crops such as coffee and cocoa.   
In the early 1990s, Ghana was one of the first countries in Africa to introduce 
community water management as a new strategy for improving water supply in rural 
areas.   As part of a general policy of decentralizing the public sector, the Ghanaian 
government began a set of institutional reforms of the domestic water sector that 
continues today.  The government separated the urban and rural domestic water 
sector.  In 1994, the government established the Community Water and Sanitation 
Division to oversee rural and small-town water and sanitation services.  Initially, this 
division was under the auspices of the GWSC.  In 1995, this division became an 
autonomous institution, the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA); 
which is now responsible for implementing the rural portion of the national 
community water and sanitation strategy (Act 564, 1998).  The GWSC retained 
responsibility for urban service provision, and was later converted into the Ghana 
Water Limited Company in 1999.   
The CWSA has been the main coordinating and facilitating body for rural water 
system planning and strategy.  They have set goals for the program.  Two basic 
program goals are 1) to ensure that there is a minimum basic service of water – 20 
liters per capita per day - which is protected all year, within 500 meters from the 
consumers and serving not more than 300 persons per water service point and 2) to 
reach 85% of the rural population with these services by 2009.   
Actual implementation, ownership and management of water facilities rest with 
district assemblies and communities (which are represented by district representatives 
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at assemblies).  District assemblies hold the systems in trust for the communities.  
Each district maintains a District Water and Sanitation Team (DWST) that coordinates 
planning efforts, supervises construction, and assists communities with technical, 
managerial, and financial duties after projects are completed.  The CWSA has 
Regional Offices (RWSTs) that provide technical assistance to the district assemblies 
for some of this work.    
CWSA invests in and ultimately transfers ownership and management of water 
and sanitation systems to rural communities and small towns (the latter generally are 
areas with a population of at least 5,000 persons).  Villages are responsible for 
organizing water and sanitation (watsan) committees, which initially raise the 
community contribution to construction costs and prepare to take over system 
operation when the project is complete.  Under CWSP I (and later CWSP II) 
communities are involved in designing, planning, and operating the new systems.  
These systems are usually point-source systems, featuring drilled boreholes with hand 
pumps attached at the top of the mechanism.  This is a more demand-driven approach 
than the traditional central service provision approach favored by the government 
through the mid 1990s.  Women, who are usually responsible for determining water 
needs and securing water for the household, have been given a more primary role in 
designing and managing these systems.  Villages are responsible for generating 5% of 
the initial capital cost.  They are also expected to fully cover operation and 
maintenance costs, although they often depend on district assemblies for some 
support.  As a result, the communities must decide how to raise money to cover these 
costs via per-container fees, monthly bills, periodic collections, etc.  Finally, private 
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firms and non-governmental organizations are encouraged to work with communities 
during the implementation and ownership phases of the projects.   
4.2.2. Overview of Regional Water Projects 
4.2.2.1. Volta Region  
CWSA receives support from international donor agencies, including the 
World Bank and national development agencies such as the Danish agency 
DANIDA.  DANIDA has focused much of its attention on improving water access 
in the Volta region.  The Volta Region Rural Water and Sanitation Project started 
in 1993 with sponsorship from DANIDA.  The project is in two phases. Phase I 
covered the period 1993-2003.  In Phase I of the project, both point sources and 
pipes systems were constructed.  
DANIDA has worked through the CWSA to expand water services to rural 
communities under the same guidelines mentioned above.  Project rules for the 
programs are essentially the same.  The major differences are that DANIDA 
focuses on the Volta region and the nature of post-construction assistance and 
support offered in Volta is more systematic than in other regions.   
CWSA began providing decentralized technical and managerial assistance to 
communities after CWSP I to assist them with maintaining their new facilities.  
They invested in spare parts outlets in each region, as well as three spare parts 
depots in Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale.  They also worked with regional bodies to 
train watsan committees in each of the villages to take over responsibility.  
District Water and Sanitation Teams monitor progress, refer mechanics on 
demand, educate and train watsan committees, and respond to other issues 
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communities face.  These post-construction programs operate at different levels 
around the country.  Essentially, however, these are demand-driven forms of 
assistance.  In the Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions of central Ghana, for 
example, communities normally must request assistance before DWSTs will send 
representatives to examine the problem. 
In the Volta region, however, DANIDA has instituted a more formal 
monitoring program (MOM).  Here, DWSTs work with Environmental Health 
Assistants (EHAs) who visit communities at least four times per year to educate 
villagers on water, sanitation, and health issues and learn about what problems 
have arisen in communities with respect to the new water systems.  DWSTs, in 
turn, respond to challenges in different ways.  For example, if a community needs 
a spare part, the DWST will work with the area mechanic to locate the nearest 
parts depot.  They will ask other mechanics in a district to travel to villages 
outside their community to consult on technical problems.  DWST agents will 
visit communities to examine financial records and help resolve conflicts within 
the watsan committees or within the broader village.  This is a more supply-driven 
approach, intended to proactively provide post construction support to 
communities.   
4.2.2.2. Brong Ahafo Region 
The office of the regional CWSA was established in 1994 but became active 
in 1995-96. The region has benefited mainly from two project interventions. 
These are the CWSP 1 and the European Union Small Towns Water Scheme. 
CWSP 1 focused on point sources while the EU project supported construction in 
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five small towns in the region.  The regional program operates in much the same 
way as the Volta program, although without the external support from DANIDA. 
4.2.3. Description of Study Area 
 
There are 20.2 million people who live in the Republic of Ghana.  Ghana ranks in 
the bottom one-third of all countries in each of the categories of the 2002 Human 
Development Index.  These include low GNP per capita (US $400 per year), average 
life expectancy (57 years), and literacy rates (72% of the population).  Infant 
mortality rates, at 57 deaths per 1,000 births, also rank in the bottom one-third of all 
countries.  On the whole, Ghana features lower indicators of human development than 
Peru.  However, its composite HDI rank (129) is the highest among all West African 
nations and fourth among all sub-Saharan African countries.    
Table 10 contains population information and Table 11 contains primary sources 
of drinking water used by households in the Brong Ahafo and Volta districts 
according to the latest 2000 national census.   
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Table 10: Population by Region and District – Brong Ahafo and Volta Regions  
(2000 Census) 
REGION DISTRICT POPULATION URBAN RURAL % RURAL % REGION 
Brong Ahafo Asunafo 174,026 49,381 124,645 72% 9.6% 
 Dormaa 150,299 103,304 46,995 31% 8.3% 
 Kintampo 146,770 39,545 107,225 73% 8.1% 
 Tano 123,404 53,321 70,083 57% 6.8% 
 Wenchi 166,641 50,152 116,489 70% 9.2% 
Volta Ho 235,331 80,489 154,842 66% 14.4% 
 Jasikan 111,285 22,241 89,044 80% 6.8% 
 Kadjebi 51,998 8,249 43,749 84% 3.2% 
 Nkwanta 151,276 35,916 115,360 76% 9.2% 
 
Table 11: Primary Sources of Household Drinking  
Water in Brong Ahafo and Volta Regions (2000 Census) 
SOURCE VOLTA BRONG AHAFO 
Piped Inside 5% 5% 
Piped Outside 20% 18% 
Tanker 1% 1% 
Well 23% 16% 
Borehole 9% 25% 
Spring/Rain 6% 6% 
River/Lake 26% 26% 
Dugout 10% 3% 
Other 1% 0% 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Description of Field Activities 
 
5.1. Peru 
5.1.1. Questionnaire Development 
From April until July 2004, team members developed a set of survey instruments 
for the project.  There were five instruments in this study:  1) a household 
questionnaire, 2) a water system operator questionnaire, 3) a focus group 
questionnaire for the village water committee charged with managing the boreholes in 
the community, 4) a focus group questionnaire with informal and formal village 
leaders, and 5) a focus group questionnaire with women from a diverse set of 
backgrounds, ages, ethnic, and income groups.   
The household survey contained seven sections.  Section 1 was developed for 
enumerators to screen prospective interviewees.  The target respondents were 
household heads and/or spouses who had lived in the village and were aware of the 
project when the new system was built.  Enumerators also selected only those 
interviewees who were not current members of the village water committee to avoid 
introducing biased results from the households.  The second section consisted of a 
water use table and a set of questions concerning the use, operation, and attitudes 
concerning the reliability of the current system.  From the water table, enumerators 
asked what water sources households used during the rainy and dry seasons, how 
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these various sources were used, how respondents felt about the quantity, reliability, 
and quality of the water obtained at these different sites, how much time and money 
households spent in collecting water from these sources, and the payment system.  
Enumerators also learned about what changes had taken place in the operation of the 
piped system, the frequency and duration of breakdowns, and attitudes concerning the 
operation, maintenance, and future operation of the system in the village.  Section 3 
revisited the water use table; but the focus of this section was on the previous water 
sources used before the piped system was put into operation.   
The fourth section focused on the planning, construction, and current management 
of the water system.  Enumerators queried respondents about the degree of household 
awareness of and participation in the planning decisions for the project.  Respondents 
revealed their contributions toward the project during the construction phase and gave 
their opinions concerning the planning process and construction quality of the system.  
Enumerators also probed into the degree of household satisfaction with system 
management and respondents’ perceptions on the abilities of the committee to expand 
and/or improve the new system and take on other village infrastructure challenges.  
The research team also learned about the extent and quality of trainings offered and 
accepted by households during all phases of the project.   
In Section 5, enumerators learned what other types of infrastructure households 
were using.  These questions focused on sanitation, telephone, and electricity services 
and the bills household paid (if any) for these services.  Section 6 featured questions 
concerning the extent of social capital found in the community.   Section 7 covered 
the socio-economic status of the household, including the respondent’s age, ethnic 
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origin, and religious affiliation and household measures of income and wealth, 
education, occupational status, and availability of infrastructure.  A final section 
allowed enumerators to assess the quality and veracity of the responses they received 
from household interviewees.    
The system operator survey consisted of an interview with the caretaker, who was 
responsible for operation, maintenance, and basic repairs of the water system and a 
brief technical assessment of the major parts of the system (i.e. source, storage tanks, 
break-line tanks, and distribution lines where possible).  The first section covered the 
basics of the system; e.g. the number of private and public taps, latrines, etc. in the 
village, changes made to the new system since construction was completed, and the 
days and hours of normal operation during the rainy and dry seasons.  Section 2 
queried caretakers concerning their experience, skills, training and payment received 
for their work, their access to spare parts and technical assistance, and the frequency 
and extent of ongoing maintenance and repairs at the sites.  In the third section, 
enumerators asked the caretakers about the use, quantity, quality, and sufficiency of 
the water source.  This section also gave caretakers an opportunity to express their 
opinions concerning system improvements and the capacity of the committee to meet 
other village needs.   
Section 4 focused on the efficacy of the functional aspects of the water system.  
Enumerators learned how often caretakers would check the parts, perform 
maintenance, and respond to breakdowns.  Section 5 centered on the types of support 
(technical, managerial, financial, access to spare parts, etc.) available to caretakers 
and how villages responded to major breakdowns and malfunctions.  The last part of 
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the survey was conducted separately by the team engineer.  This person visited the 
storage tanks and break-pressure tanks to examine their quality.  They also checked 
distribution lines to see where if they were located away from rivers and latrines and 
whether they were fissured.  Finally, we asked engineers to speculate whether the 
system would remain in operation for the next three years, based on their findings. 
Field coordinators conducted the village water committee survey with current 
members and a few persons who served on the committee during project planning and 
construction.  Field team leaders obtained information on the scope, function, and 
responsibilities of the current committee and changes in these categories which may 
have taken place before and after operation of the new water system.  The survey 
elicited information on relations with the community at large since operation and 
training which previous, current, and new members of the committee may have 
received to handle their ongoing duties.  Field coordinators also learned about what 
external sources of technical, administrative, and financial assistance the community 
receives (and would like to receive) to keep the system running, the activities and 
quality of area mechanics, and access to spare parts.  Committee members described 
the tariff structure and the extent to which these and other revenues cover operational 
costs, repairs, and expansions.  They also discussed ownership and future plans for 
the committee’s work.  A final section with previous committee members covered the 
history of the planning and construction of the project.   
The final two focus group surveys – the village leaders and village women’s 
surveys – gained perspective from these different groups along several different topic 
areas, including participation during project planning, the frequency and duration of 
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breakdowns, and attitudes concerning tariff structures, cost recovery, and operation 
and management.  The village leaders’ survey also elicited demographic and location 
information about the village, attitudes concerning the degree of social capital in the 
village, and relations with their district assemblies.  Conversely, the women’s focus 
group provided additional information on water use and satisfaction with the water 
obtained from the new system and the water resource situation in the village, such as 
the effects of seasonal variation and drought and flooding conditions on supply. 
5.1.2. Sampling Frame 
The sampling frame in Peru was developed over two stages of the project.  In 
June 2004, researchers obtained lists of FONCODES and SANBASUR communities 
in the Cuzco Department that had maintained completed water projects for a 
minimum of three years and contained a population of 400-2000 people at the time of 
project implementation.  The following provides an overview of these villages. 
Table 12:  Sampling Overview in Cuzco Region 
PROJECT PROVINCES VILLAGES VILLAGES NOT IN 
SANBASUR 
TOTAL 
FONCODES 13 67 60 60 
SANBASUR 4 46 0 46 
Villages which received assistance from both projects are counted as SANBASUR villages in total.   
All seven FONCODES villages that fell in the La Convencion province of Cuzco 
were excluded.  As mentioned earlier, most of the La Convencion province is located 
in the low altitude Amazon basin of Peru.  This area exhibits vastly different 
geographical and hydrological features than the projects in the other provinces of 
Cuzco – features that pose different technical challenges for communities in 
comparison to other communities that have received program assistance.  Thus, the 
initial sample contained 99 villages – 53 villages with FONCODES projects only and 
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46 villages with SANBASUR projects.  There were a total of eight projects which 
had first received FONCODES assistance and later SANBASUR intervention.  In 
these cases, SANBASUR extended services to include private household connections. 
During the fieldwork, researchers learned that some designated FONCODES 
villages did not actually receive water projects, but had received other forms of 
assistance from the investment fund.  The research team and consultants were able to 
obtain the correct information from the agency and remove some of the deleterious 
villages from the sample.  At the end of the fieldwork, however, there were twenty-
one villages that did not belong in the sample frame.  An inspection of the field notes 
suggested that there were three other communities where field teams could not gather 
data from all of the surveys and where the teams encountered problems locating 
enough credible people to interview.  Thus, the research team decided to remove a 
total of 24 villages from the sample.   
Researchers obtained permission to conduct a second phase of fieldwork with the 
consultant.  The final sample contains 53 FONCODES villages and 46 SANBASUR 
villages for a total of 99 villages in the study. 
Another level of selection occurred at the household level.  Field teams selected 
twenty-five households for interviews in every community, regardless of size.  The 
protocol encouraged the use of random list sampling, but in practice such lists were 
not available.  Field teams employed geographic sampling in proportion to 
community size, dividing each village into geographic areas and sampling households 
based on population estimates.  A copy of the household sampling protocol appears as 
Appendix I. 
114 
 
5.1.3. Fieldwork Procedures 
Initially, the research team gathered information about the FONCODES and 
SANBASUR programs through the agencies, and read previous evaluations at the 
World Bank offices in Lima.  The research team interviewed FONCODES and 
SANBASUR staff members in June 2004 to learn about project rules, the 
communities they worked in, and their opinions on the success and challenges of their 
respective water service provision programs.  The research team also visited 
interlocutor NGOs in Cuzco that had previously worked with SANBASUR to 
understand their role in the process.   
The research team hired the consultant in July 2004.  The consultant was 
responsible for hiring field coordinators, enumerators, and engineers for the teams.  
Training and pre-testing of all survey instruments occurred during two weeks in 
August 2004.  In total, there were four field teams – each containing a field 
coordinator who supervised the team and facilitated most of the focus group 
interviews and four enumerators who conducted the household surveys.  There were 
also four engineers hired to implement the System Operator Survey and conduct the 
technical assessment described above.   
During the first phase of the fieldwork (August – September 2004), the field 
teams visited a total of 99 villages in the region.  Phase I data were available and 
assessed in December 2004 and January 2005.  In the second phase of the fieldwork 
(May – June 2005), a member of the research team and the consultant retrained two 
field teams.  The two teams spent one month visiting the additional villages which 
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comprised the second sample.  The consultant finalized the new datasets in August 
2005, and in September 2005 the research team verified the quality of the data.  
 
5.2. Ghana 
5.2.1. Questionnaire Development 
 In January and February 2005, a different research team worked collaboratively to 
develop a set of survey instruments for use in Ghana.  The Ghana team used the same 
five types of survey instruments that the Peru team had implemented.  However, 
given differences in technology, payment structure, culture, and research interests, the 
Ghana team tailored the instruments to elicit their own set of data.   
 The household survey contained six sections.  The first section was identical to 
the Peru survey.  The second section also consisted of a current water use table 
featuring a similar set of questions as in Peru.  In Peru, researchers focused on asking 
the utilization, quantity, quality, and payment questions for those sources which were 
used at least ½ of the time during the rainy season or the dry season.  The research 
team in Ghana chose to extend this set of questions for all of the sources that existed 
in the village.    Another difference was that the Ghana team chose not to readminister 
the water use table for previous uses (Section 3 of the survey).  As in Peru, 
enumerators learned about what changes had taken place in the operation of the 
handpumps, the frequency and duration of breakdowns, and attitudes concerning the 
operation and maintenance of the handpumps and their future operation in the village.   
The third section of the Ghana survey resembled Section 4 of the Peru survey; it 
focused on the planning, construction, and current management of the water system.  
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Section 4, which featured questions concerning household attitudes toward social 
capital, and Section 6 (the enumerators’ assessment of the interview) mimic the Peru 
survey.  Section 5 (like Section 7 of the Peru survey) covered socio-demographic and 
socio-economic status of the household.  This section also folded in questions 
concerning other household infrastructure.   
 There were two departures of this survey with respect to infrastructure.  The 
research team in Ghana wanted to elicit respondents’ infrastructure preferences more 
closely than in the Peru study.  Section 5 first asked respondents to rank in order of 
priority what types of infrastructure they would like to see under the hypothetical 
situation that government officials would make these different services available to 
the village.  From this point, the section (and the respondents’ portion of the survey) 
concluded with a choice model experiment.  Results from the choice model exercises 
are not considered in this dissertation. 
 The Ghana study also featured a system operator survey.  This survey instrument 
consisted of 1) an interview with the caretaker, who was responsible for operation, 
maintenance, and basic repairs of the boreholes, 2) an interview with the attendant(s), 
who sometimes collected money from customers at the boreholes on a per container 
basis, and 3) a brief technical assessment of the handpumps.  In the first section, 
enumerators asked questions concerning the caretaker’s experience, skills, training 
and payment received for their work, their access to spare parts and technical 
assistance, and the frequency and extent of ongoing maintenance and repair at the 
sites.  If there was no caretaker in the village, a separate section asked similar relevant 
questions to a member of the watsan committee.  The second (and third if there were 
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two attendants in the village) section(s) was aimed at the selection, skills, and 
payment of the attendant.  Respondents answered questions about normal user queue 
times and the amount of money collected from users in the village.  The final part of 
the survey was conducted separately by a technical member of the team.  There were 
two pump tests to determine how much water flowed from all of the handpumps in 
the village and how many strokes were required to obtain water from the pumps after 
rest.  Engineers also assessed the functional quality of the pumps and area around the 
sites and speculated whether they would remain in operation for the next three years.   
 The other three survey instruments (the watsan committee survey, the village 
leaders’ focus group, and the village women’s focus group) were very similar to the 
Peru survey instruments.  One main difference was that the Ghana team did not obtain 
a detailed list of information about the various social groups that existed in the 
villages and the degree of homogeneity that existed within these groups.  This 
information was important for the objectives of the Peru research team. 
 In addition to these five survey instruments, field teams gathered two other 
sources of information in Ghana.  Field coordinators worked with DWSTs to arrange 
a one-day source observation in each village.  During the source observation, a 
representative of the village spent a full day tallying the number of different-sized 
containers filled by people at the main borehole in the village.  They also found out 
from the attendant or designated watsan committee member how much money was 
collected for that day.  This information allowed the research team to estimate daily 
water consumption and fee collections.  Finally, the research team recorded GPS 
location and altitude coordinates for each of the villages in the study.  The data 
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yielded spatial locations of the villages and topographical information to use in 
comparing water source situations among villages and districts. 
5.2.2. Sampling Frame 
 Projects from the CWSP I began in 1993 and completed by 2001; thus, each of 
the villages studied had managed a new water system for at least four years.  The 
research design was based on selecting villages from two different regions; one 
region that received supply-driven post-construction assistance via the MOM 
program and another region that only received post-construction support upon 
request.  Districts in the Volta region had participated to varying degrees in the MOM 
program over the last four years since completion of the first phase of the DANIDA-
funded rural water supply project.  Researchers selected four districts – Ho, Jasikan, 
Kadjebi, and Nkwanta – in the Volta region that had participated in MOM during 
every quarter of the four-year period.  The Ho district was the most urbanized and 
closest to Accra, while the Nkwanta district was the least urbanized and most remote 
of those in the sample. 
 Initially the research team considered villages in the Asante and Brong Ahafo 
regions that had benefited from CWSP I during the same time frame.  Researchers 
conducted a round of informal interviews with District Water and Sanitation Team 
(DWST) leaders and found little difference in the demand-oriented nature of PCS 
offered to their respective communities.  The research team selected the Brong Ahafo 
region for a control group because one PCS variable of interest was the distance of 
villages to spare parts depots, located in three main cities of Ghana.  The Asante 
region contains one of three depots in the country (in Kumasi), whereas the Brong 
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Ahafo and Volta regions are located further away from these facilities.  The distance 
and travel time among Brong Ahafo districts to Kumasi and among Volta districts to 
Accra (home of a second depot) was similar.  Therefore, the team decided to select 
the Brong Ahafo region for the study.   
 There were eight districts that had received water projects under CWSP I in Brong 
Ahafo.  The research team obtained technical information on all of the projects and 
the most recent census data from 2000 for the villages and districts in question.   After 
reviewing the technical and census data and incorporating our combined knowledge 
of the linguistic and cultural aspects of the region, five districts – Asunafo, Dormaa, 
Kintampo, Tano, and Wenchi – were selected.  These districts were similar to those 
selected in the Volta region in terms of economic and demographic indicators.  
Moreover, the team, which featured skilled local researchers with prior experience in 
the region, judged that these districts contained more similar dialects and cultural 
practices to one another than the other districts in the region.  This helped minimize 
the probability of unobserved covariates in the analysis.   
 Projects in CWSP I varied from dug wells to boreholes and piped systems.  
Researchers selected those villages with technologies identical to those in the Volta 
region: the use of deep boreholes and public handpumps.  Beneficiary communities 
received anywhere from one to five project boreholes.  The team decided to limit the 
scope of villages to those that received only one or two boreholes under the respective 
program.  This effectively also limited the size of the villages.  The estimated size of 
the beneficiary areas ranged from 200 to approximately 5000 people.  The application 
of these technical (and population) criteria created a potential sampling frame of 100 
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villages in the Volta region and 120 villages in the Brong Ahafo region.  All 100 
villages for the Volta region were included in the final sample, and the team selected 
100 villages at random from the 120 in the Brong Ahafo region for a total of 200 
villages in the study. 
 Household selection was very similar in design and practice to the experience in 
Peru.  Field teams employed geographic sampling in proportion both to community 
size and according to the number of communities that used a project borehole (since 
there were some cases where more than one village used a single project borehole).  A 
copy of the household sampling protocol appears as Appendix II. 
5.2.3. Fieldwork Procedures 
 The research team began working in the autumn of 2004.  Team members 
gathered and reviewed information on the two programs of interest – the Community 
Water and Sanitation Program (CWSP, phase I) and the Volta Regional Water and 
Sanitation Program.  The Volta program was confined to the Volta region of Ghana, 
which lies mostly east of Lake Volta in the country.  Although CWSP I was 
implemented in several regions of Ghana, the research team concentrated its efforts in 
the central Brong Ahafo region.   
 The research team interviewed District Water and Sanitation Team (DWST) 
members in both regions to learn more about the nature of post-construction project 
support (PCS), which they provided to communities since completion of the water 
projects.  DWSTs and Environmental Health Assistants (EHAs) provide technical 
support, information, assessments, and education to villages in the study areas.  These 
interviews provided perspective on the extent of PCS available “on the ground” and 
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attitudes concerning the performance of this work.  The team also obtained village-
level socio-economic and infrastructure data in each region from the most recent 
National Census taken in 2000.   
 A total of nine field coordinators and forty-five enumerators were assembled and 
trained for the fieldwork.  Researchers spent three weeks training field team members 
and pre-testing and revising the survey instruments.  The fieldwork began in late 
March and concluded in early May 2005.  Each team spent one day conducting the 
field surveys and made separate arrangements for the source observation and for an 
engineer to conduct the system operator survey and take the GPS readings.  Field 
teams visited a total of 200 villages – 100 in the Volta and Brong Ahafo regions, 
respectively.  The consultant entered and processed all of the study data, and sent all 
of the datasets to the research team by September 2005.  The data were cleaned and 
prepared by November 2005.
  
VI. Study Results 
 
6.1. Descriptive Results 
6.1.1. Household-Level Indicators of Sustainability 
Household level measurements of sustainability represent physical performance, 
consumer use, satisfaction, and attitudes concerning future system operation.  
Household responses also include whether water committees should tackle other 
village water needs and whether they should expand to include other environmental 
infrastructure.  Table 13 summarizes these measurements, while Appendix III 
overviews their frequency distributions. 
Table 13: Household-level Descriptive Statistics for Sustainability Indicators 
Measure Category Ghana Peru 
Average Number of Breakdowns Last Six Months Physical  0.6 (0.86) 
Average Number of Days to Repair Service Physical  18 (88) 
Percent of Households Reporting Payment for Service Financial 62% 77% 
Estimated Monthly Water Payments for Paying Customers ($USD) Financial 
$1.06 
(1.20)  
$1.07 
(0.89) 
Percent of Households Using System as Primary Source Use 95% 95% 
Percent of Households Reporting Satisfaction with Maintenance and 
Repairs Satisfaction 85% 70% 
Percent of Households Reporting Satisfaction with Administration and 
Management Satisfaction 85% 61% 
Percent of Households that Trust Administration and Management Satisfaction 78% 61% 
Percent of Households Reporting Satisfaction with Water Pressure in 
Dry Season Satisfaction 72% 70% 
Percent of Households Reporting that Water Has No or Sweet Taste Satisfaction 58% 89% 
Percent of Households Reporting that Water is Safe to Drink Satisfaction 86% 72% 
Percent of Households Reporting Overall Satisfaction with System Satisfaction 75% 63% 
Percent of Households Believing System will Function Next 5 Years Future 55% 75% 
Percent of Households Believing System will Function Next 10 Years Future   48% 
Percent of Households Believing that Committee Should 
Expand/Improve System Scaling 86% 84% 
Percent of Households Believing that Committee Should Handle Other 
Needs Leveraging   39% 
* Standard deviations in parentheses  
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Peruvian households experience breakdowns fairly irregularly; some do not break 
down at all while other taps break down more often.  It takes an average of 18 days to 
get the taps working again, but household responses varied dramatically (many wait 
less than one week while others have waited for months to have their service 
restored).  Reported household financial results are similar to those reported by 
village-level surveys.  Over 75% of households in Peru pay for water.  On average 
they pay $0.70 per month.  A smaller percentage of households in Ghana reported that 
they pay some positive amount for water service (62% vs. 77% reported by the water 
committees).  However, Ghanaian villagers who do pay report paying more on 
average for monthly service.   
Households in both Peru and Ghana report overwhelmingly that they use the 
improved source as their primary source in both rainy and dry seasons.  Respondents 
in both settings report that they occasionally use other dry season sources as well.  
Due to the high percentage of primary users of improved water in both villages, 
consumer use is not a good measure to use as an indicator of sustainability in 
regression analysis.  
 Satisfaction measures include water attributes, current management, and 
operation and repair practices.  Over 2/3 of respondents in Peru believe their water is 
safe, available, and sufficient to meet their needs in either season and nearly 90% 
believe it tastes good.  Ghanaians have even more faith in the safety of water from 
boreholes, yet over 40% find some problem with its taste.  There were also high 
degrees of satisfaction reported among Ghanaians concerning repair service, 
administration, and management.  In Peru these figures indicated a moderate degree 
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of satisfaction (between 60% and 70% of all respondents).  Overall, ¾ of Ghanaian 
households were satisfied with their systems, while five out of eight Peruvian 
households report approval.   
Despite the higher degrees of satisfaction reported among the sample of Ghanaian 
households, however, a smaller proportion (55% in Ghana vs. 75% in Peru) believe 
that their systems will function in the next five years.  Peruvian households are more 
confident in the future of their systems; nearly the same percentages of Peruvians 
think their systems will function in ten years time as Ghanaians believe theirs will last 
five years.  These numbers compare favorably with country-level responses from 
village water committees.  Fifty-six percent of water committees in Ghana believed 
their systems would last another five years, while 84% of Peruvian committees 
agreed that their system would continue to function during the same period.  Support 
for some form of scaling up is high in both countries.  Leveraging, however, 
represents a significant departure among the sample in Peru – only 40% of Peruvian 
households want their committees to handle other responsibilities.   
6.1.2. Household-Level Factors 
Table 14 shows how household-level factors vary by category.  Over ½ of 
households in both countries use some form of sanitation besides open defecation or 
night soil collection.  Electricity use represents a dramatic difference between the two 
countries.  Most everyone owns their own home in Peru while ¾ of Ghanaian 
respondents are homeowners.  The average household contains six people in the 
Ghana sample and five in the Peru sample.  Room size and acreage of land owned are 
similar in Peru and Ghana.  Over ½ of Peruvian households report that their annual 
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income was less than U.S. $150 per year, while in Ghana median household expenses 
equal over $700 per year.  Attitudes toward social capital among households was 
generally more positive in Ghana than Peru, yet with respect to lending and 
borrowing, fewer Ghanaians believed they could definitely or probably borrow 
money from their neighbors or friends.   
Household participation and involvement in water training was relatively even in 
Peru and Ghana.  However, women were much more involved in Ghana than Peru.  
High percentages of households were aware of the project before construction and 
contributed something to the project during construction.  Many projects required 
cash contributions in Ghana; yet the median contribution was very low compared to 
other monthly household expenses.  Peruvians contributed varying degrees of labor to 
the project.  Over ¾ of respondents in both countries reported regular meeting 
attendance.  However, knowledge of how money was spent in the village differed, 
with Ghanaians more likely to be aware of expenditures than Peruvians.  Finally, 
about ¼ of Peruvian households reported that they were visited in the post-
construction phase of the project by a government agency, SANBASUR, and/or 
supporting non-governmental organization.  The percentage was slightly higher 
among Ghanaian respondents with respect to whether they had been visited by district 
level environmental health assistants or engineers, or representatives from donor and 
non-governmental agencies. 
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Table 14:  Household-Level Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesized Factors of 
Sustainability   
Measure Category Ghana Peru 
Percent of Households Reporting Electricity Connection Socio-economic 14% 60% 
Percent of Households Reporting Some Form of Improved 
Sanitation 
Socio-economic 
55% 57% 
Number of Household Members Socio-economic 6.02 (3.38) 4.91 (1.96) 
Number of Rooms in Household Socio-economic 3 (1.89) 3.4 (1.73) 
Percent of Households Reporting Home Ownership Socio-economic 76% 97% 
Acres of Land Owned (median) Socio-economic 2 (7401) 2.47 (3.10) 
Age of Respondent Socio-economic 42 (14.38) 47 (14.5) 
Percent of Population Earning US $150 or less per year 
(cash income) 
Socio-economic 
 60% 
Median Annual Household Expenditures (USD) Socio-economic $707 (141)  
Percentage of Households who Trust their Neighbors Socio-economic 75% 56% 
Percentage of Households who Trust their Local Leaders Socio-economic 77% 51% 
Perceived Ability to Probably or Definitely Borrow Money Socio-economic 37% 59% 
Percentage of Households that Boil or Filter Their Water Socio-economic 6%  
Median Household Participation Score re: input on 
decisions (range 0-13 Peru, 0-9 Ghana) Project  4 (3) 6 (3.9) 
Median Range of Meetings Attended by Household (range 
0-4; 4 is greater than 10 meetings) Project  2 2.5 
Percent of Households Contributing to Project Project  71% 86% 
Amount of Labor Contributed by Households (days) Project  1.16 (6.62) 18 (19.92) 
Amount of Funds Contributed per Household (USD) Project  $1.92 (6.27)  N/A 
Percent of Households that Have Attended Current 
Meetings Project 73% 75% 
Percent of Households who Believe System was Well-
Constructed Project 93% 69% 
Percent of Households Aware of How Money is Spent 
Regarding Project Project 67% 55% 
Age of Household Tap (years) Project  8.1 (6.6) 
Percent of Households Receiving any Post-Construction 
External Visits External 29% 25% 
* Standard deviations in parentheses  
 
6.1.3. Village-Level Factors 
Table 15 reports key statistics for sets of determinants hypothesized to influence 
sustainability.  On the whole, Ghanaian villages are larger than Peruvian ones 
sampled, although both exhibit considerable variation.  Ghanaian villages are also 
denser, as evident by the shorter average amount of time it takes to go from one edge 
to the other of a village.  Peruvian villages are more remote than Ghanaian villages.  
Households experience a shorter dry season in Ghana than in Peru, where it lasts on 
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average for over half of the year.  The average daily wage among unskilled laborers, 
including farmers (who represent the majority of respondents in both cases) would 
indicate that full-time wage earners make about U.S. $750 per year in both countries.   
Table 15:  Village-Level Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesized Factors of 
Sustainability  
 Measure Category Source Ghana Peru 
Average Number of Households in Village Socio-economic Leaders 202 (216) 182 (246) 
Average Number of People in Village Socio-economic Leaders 1119 (1361) 750 (821) 
Average Number of Minutes to Walk from One End of 
Village to Other 
Socio-economic 
Leaders 13 (11) 45 (280) 
Average Number of Kilometers to Nearest Paved Road Socio-economic Leaders 11 (13) 35 (50) 
Average Number of Kilometers to Nearest Area 
Mechanic 
Socio-economic 
Committee 20 (19)   
Average Number of Kilometers to Nearest Water Source Socio-economic Leaders 1.36 (1) 3.75 (7.91) 
Average Months of Dry Season Socio-economic Women 3.6 (1) 6.4 (1.91) 
Average Daily Wage for Unskilled Male Laborer (US 
Dollars) 
Socio-economic 
Leaders 
$2.22 
($0.77) 
$1.91 
($1.76) 
Average System Age (years) Project Committee 6 (3) 7 (3) 
Average Kilometers of Transmission Line from Source 
to Village 
Project 
Operator   2.2 (2.3) 
Percent of Water Systems with No Storage Cracks Project Engineers  68% 
Percent of Water Systems with No or Very Few Leaks in 
Distribution Lines 
Project 
Engineers  72% 
Average Number of Years of Operator's Experience  Project Operator   4 (3.75) 
Percent of Villages where Operator Received Technical 
Training 
Project 
Operator 36% 36% 
Average Number of Years Water Committee Has Existed 
in Community 
Project 
Committee 7.6 8 (6.8) 
Average Number of Committee Members Project Committee 8 (3.3) 5 (2.4) 
Percent of Projects Managed by Elected Water 
Committees 
Project 
Committee 42% 63% 
Percent of Committees Trained During or Post-Project Project Committee 85% 61% 
Percent of Villages without Tariffs Project Committee 13% 11% 
Percent of Villages with Monthly Fee Tariff Structures Project Committee 25% 82% 
Percent of Villages with “Pay as You Fetch” Tariff 
Structure 
Project 
Committee 39% 0% 
Percent of Villages Recovering Operating & 
Maintenance Costs 
Project 
Committee 53% 53% 
* Standard deviations in parentheses  
 
Generally, transmission lines from water sources to the villages in Peru are 
relatively short in distance.  Engineers in Peru found water systems in relatively good 
shape in 2/3 of the communities surveyed.  Water committees have existed longer in 
Ghanaian communities than Peruvian ones.  On average, they have more 
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representatives and are much more likely to have received training.  However, 
Peruvian committees are more likely to have been elected by citizens.  Operators are 
equally likely to have been trained in both settings.   Operators in Peru have served in 
their roles an average of nearly four years, while no comparative information was 
available for Ghanaian villages. 
Most villages in Peru and Ghana had enacted water tariffs, although in both 
countries over ten percent of villages did not have any tariff in place.  There was little 
variation among Peruvian communities with respect to the type of tariffs committees 
had adopted; over 80% chose flat fees systems in which users paid on a periodic 
(often monthly) basis.  Watsan committees in Ghana were more likely to select 
different options.  Government authorities have encouraged the most popular type – 
user payments for water as they collected it from the boreholes – yet less than 40% of 
villages relied on this system.  Regardless of these differences, however, an equal 
proportion (slightly more than ½ of committees) reported that annual household 
revenue collections covered operating expenses.  
While village-level project cost data was not available for this study, village water 
committees were asked to recall what percentage of construction cost was contributed 
by residents.  In Ghana, projects were designed such that villages contributed 
approximately 5% of total cost to the project.  The FONCODES and SANBASUR 
programs incorporated different rules for village contributions (for example, many 
villages contributed labor in lieu of cash), and reported contribution percentages from 
committees differed dramatically among Peruvian villages.  In contrast, equal 
proportions of village water committees (53%) in Peru and Ghana reported that 
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revenue collections covered operating and maintenance costs.  Cost and revenue 
figures varied widely across both countries.  Moreover, there were some cases where 
household data regarding water payments did not appear to coincide with reported 
household revenues.  However, most water committees could tell enumerators 
whether or not user fees covered O&M costs. 
6.2. Constructs and Variance Analysis 
6.2.1. Wealth Constructs 
Wealth indices were constructed based on a series of binary responses to 
questions concerning the materials used in home construction, assets owned by the 
household, and whether families used any improved sanitation and electricity.  
Principal components analysis generated factor scores and index values, using the 
first component to explain the maximum proportion of variance.  Tables 16 and 17 
present the scoring factors and index values contributed for Peru and Ghana. 
Table 16:  Wealth Index for Peruvian Households 
ITEM MEAN ST. DEVIATION SCORING FACTOR INDEX VALUE 
Floors (non-ground) 0.1036 0.3048 0.2913 0.9557 
Walls (non-adobe) 0.0458 0.2092 -0.0155 -0.0741 
Roof (non-grass or thatch) 0.7199 0.4491 0.3938 0.8769 
Radio 0.9148 0.2792 0.2243 0.8034 
Clock/watch 0.6482 0.4776 0.3394 0.7106 
Bicycle 0.2972 0.4572 0.355 0.7765 
TV 0.3722 0.4835 0.4674 0.9667 
Motorcycle 0.0102 0.1007 0.1199 1.1907 
Car/Tractor 0.0229 0.1497 0.1446 0.9659 
Sanitation 0.5696 0.4952 0.1446 0.2920 
Electricity 0.6069 0.4885 0.4393 0.8993 
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Table 17:  Wealth Index for Ghanaian Households 
ITEM MEAN ST. DEVIATION SCORING FACTOR INDEX VALUE 
Floors (non-ground) 0.6432 0.4791 0.2362 0.4930 
Walls (mud) 0.5756 0.4943 -0.2257 -0.4566 
Roof (non-grass or thatch) 0.6908 0.4622 0.277 0.5993 
Radio 0.7962 0.4028 0.2407 0.5976 
Clock 0.3677 0.4822 0.3477 0.7211 
Watch 0.7536 0.431 0.2632 0.6107 
Bicycle 0.4953 0.5 0.1489 0.2978 
TV 0.0931 0.2905 0.3743 1.2885 
Motorcycle 0.3474 0.1831 0.3118 1.7029 
Car 0.0313 0.1741 0.3487 2.0029 
Tractor 0.015 0.1217 0.3222 2.6475 
Sanitation (private) 0.2525 0.4345 0.1002 0.2306 
Sanitation (none) -0.1506 0.2044 0.4033 -0.3734 
Electricity 0.151 0.358 0.2256 0.6302 
 
The wealth indices explained approximately 25% of the variation in the Peru 
household sample and 20% of the variance among Ghanaian households.  Table 
18 presents the descriptive statistics for the wealth indices generated for the two 
samples and their correlation coefficients with land and income. 
Table 18:  Descriptive Statistics & Correlations for Peru & Ghana Wealth Indices 
MEASURE PERU GHANA1
# Households 2442 4922 
# Components 11 14 
Mean Wealth Index 3.26 3.01 
Standard Deviation 1.66 1.69 
Correlation – land 0.127 0.005 
Correlation – income2 0.414 0.241 
1: Negative values normalized to zero. 
2: Income reflected by income categories in Peru.  Income reflected by log expenditures in Ghana. 
Table 18 suggests that Peruvian households on average own more assets than 
Ghanaian households, particularly since the total potential scores are higher in 
Ghana than Peru (as observed by the number of components).  Both sets of 
households on average do not report high asset indices, and both contain some 
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degree of variance within each sample.  Correlations between wealth indices and 
land are positive but low in both cases.  Income/expenditure correlations are 
higher in both samples, although imperfectly correlated.  Both income/ 
expenditure measures and wealth indices are used in the multivariate analysis. 
It should be mentioned that this dissertation does not include the error 
associated with the generated measures into the multilevel model results.  More 
conservative tests of significance for these variables are probably necessary in the 
absence of this error information. 
6.2.2. Variance Decomposition 
Tables 19 and 20 present the results of decomposing the variance of the 
dependent model variables into the village and household levels.   
Table 19:  Variance Composition Analysis – Peru 
CATEGORY INDICATOR VARIANCE ERROR %VILLAGE %HH 
Physical Tap breaks last 6 month 1.530 0.706 68% 32% 
 Days to repair taps 79.02 78.350 50% 50% 
      
Financial HH pays for service 0.263 0.071 97% 3% 
 Amt. paid/month 4.711 0.601 89% 11% 
      
Satisfaction Water pressure 1.760 0.466 79% 21% 
 Water safety 2.747 0.665 81% 19% 
 Overall satisfaction 2.103 0.364 85% 15% 
 Satisfaction with O&M 2.272 0.452 83% 17% 
 Satisfaction with Administration 2.861 0.498 85% 15% 
 Trust in management 1.872 0.421 81% 19% 
      
Future 5 Years 13.911 6.416 68% 32% 
 10 Years 27.24 14.520 65% 35% 
      
Scaling &  Scaling up 0.3 0.126 70% 30% 
 Leveraging 0.588 0.225 72% 28% 
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Table 20:  Variance Composition Analysis – Ghana 
CATEGORY INDICATOR VARIANCE ERROR %VILLAGE %HH 
Financial HH pays for water 7.57 1.19 76% 24% 
 Amt. paid/month 262.18 579.33 76% 24% 
      
Satisfaction Water pressure 2.04 0.49 66% 34% 
 Water taste 3.01 0.242 66% 34% 
 Satisfaction with Administration 1.7 0.264 82% 18% 
 Trust in management 2.027 1.062 96% 4% 
      
Future 1 Year 0.603 0.072 77.5% 22.5% 
 5 Years 44.47 12.615 91% 9% 
      
Scaling Up Scaling up 0.559 0.102 84% 16% 
 
The variance analysis implies the following about the distribution of 
sustainability indicators across households and villages in Peru and Ghana.  As 
expected, the frequency of breakdowns and the number of days it takes to repair 
them vary widely across and within villages in Peru, since the unit of analysis is 
the household’s tap.  The variance for repair times is nearly equally partitioned 
between the household and village levels.   
The variance of household responses to whether they pay for water and the 
amount paid do not vary much at all among Peruvian households.  Three-quarters 
of households pay for water service, and nearly all of these customers pay flat 
fees or contribute labor in lieu of payment within villages.  This suggests that 
many household factors are not likely to influence payment.  Analyzing the 
variance of the Ghana sample shows, however, that there is a moderate degree of 
intra-class correlation among households within villages.  This may be due to the 
presence of tariffs based on household size (found in 7% of the sampled villages) 
and/or differences in the abilities of households to obtain water at lower prices.   
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A review of the variance analysis for household satisfaction with water (water 
pressure, safety, and overall satisfaction in Peru and water pressure and taste in 
Ghana) finds that village-level effects explain more variation in Peru vs. those in 
Ghana.  Both contain some degree of intra-class correlation, although this appears 
higher in the Ghana sample of households.  With respect to satisfaction with the 
operation and management of services, both samples exhibit a fair degree of 
within-level correlation – although village effects explain much more in both 
cases.  Interestingly, trust almost does not vary at all within clustered households 
in Ghana, while it does to a limited extent in Peru.   
Responses to whether systems will function over five and ten year time frames 
vary over villages and within them in Peru.  The Ghana data suggest some intra-
class correlation for one-year responses, yet very little (less than 10%) for five-
year data.  Similarly, household-level variation is a more important determinant of 
the overall variance for whether a household believes the water committee should 
scale up services in Peru than in Ghana; explaining almost double the variation in 
the Peru dataset vs. that of Ghana.  Leveraging also varies to a moderate degree 
within households in Peru, while this question was omitted from the Ghana study. 
 
6.3. Multivariate Model Results 
 6.3.1. Random Intercept and Slope Models - Peru 
The random intercept models postulate that each indicator of sustainability, 
measured at the household level, can be explained as a function of household-
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level factors and village-level factors.  The models allow the intercept for each 
village to vary, which enables different “base-case” scenarios for the dependent 
variables in each village.  The slopes in these models, however, do not vary; nor 
do the effects of the factors on the indicators.   
The following random intercept and structural model results for Peru and 
Ghana were generated with M Plus software.  M Plus uses an accelerated 
Expected Maximization (EM) algorithm as an optimization method to obtain full 
information maximum likelihood estimates (Dempster, Laird, & Rubin 1977).  A 
standard integration option (rectangular numerical integration with 15 integration 
points per level) was selected to construct the analysis.  EM algorithms do not 
decrease observed likelihood functions, but they do not guarantee that the 
sequence will generate a maximum likelihood estimate (Goldstein 1995).  The 
programs use robust standard errors for significance testing (M Plus 2006).   
The following tables present the results from the random intercept models 
tested on the sample of households and villages in Peru.  Each table shows the 
sample size, loglikelihood statistic for the model, a pseudo-R2 using Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC), the residual variance of the model (for continuous 
variables), and model specification.  Pseudo R2 resembles a goodness-of-fit 
measure which compares the AIC of the model with a null model featuring only a 
constant (a lower AIC indicates that the model better fits the structure of the data).  
The statistic should not be interpreted as a linear regression R2, since it compares 
information from the hypothesized vs. null model rather than the residual sum of 
squares.  Its’ formula appears below: 
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R2AIC = 1 – AICi / AIC0  where AIC = 2K - 2*Ln(L) 
K = number of parameters in the model  L = Likelihood function  
A zero-inflated Poisson model accounted for the frequency of tap breakdowns, 
including the moderate number of households which reported zero breakdowns.  
An Ordinary Least Squares model examined what factors were associated with 
the number of days a household waited for restoration of service among those that 
needed a repair.  A second OLS model predicted monthly household water 
payments.  Binary and ordinal logit models were fitted to the remaining 
categorical indicators.  Unstandardized coefficients with asterisks represent those 
which pass robust tests of significance at the ten percent rejection level (one *), 
five percent rejection level (two *) and one percent rejection level (three *).  
Factors with positive and significant (at least 10% rejection level) are noted in  
cells with upward-sloping lines, while cells with downward-sloping lines 
represent significantly negative factors.  Odds ratios also appear in the tables for 
household and village factor effects generated from random intercept models that 
contain categorical dependent variables.   
Table 21 presents results from the physical performance models.  Several 
household and village factors were associated with the number of tap problems a 
household experienced over the previous six months.  Larger households (both in 
terms of the number of people and the size of the home) experienced more 
outages.  A one-person increase in household size was associated with an 8% 
increase in the frequency of breakdowns and a one-room increase in the size of 
the home was associated with a 6% increase.  Older taps also broke down more 
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often – for a three-year increase in the age of the tap, households experienced an 
additional breakdown every six months.  Households with higher incomes and 
wealth indices experienced fewer breakdowns.  Households in the next highest 
income class were about 25% less likely to experience breakdowns every six 
months, while those with a unit increase in the asset index were 10% less likely.  
All of these effects appear in the expected directions.  In addition, older 
respondents tended to report breakdowns more often.  Other factors, such as pre-
project participation & contributions, current involvement and support, household 
social capital attitudes, and attitudes concerning system quality did not affect 
breakdowns. 
A set of village factors also predicted the frequency of tap breakdowns.  As 
with size factors at the household level, village size (in terms both of population 
and distance) was associated with more frequent household breakdowns.  For 
every additional 100 people who lived in the village and for every additional one 
hundred minutes of end to end travel distance across the village, household taps 
broke down 1% more often every six months.  Moreover, representation by 
elected committee members appeared to lower the frequency of breakdowns 
experienced.  Households were 23% less likely to have breakdowns every six 
months if they were governed by elected water committees.  In addition, 
households located in villages where engineers reported problems with fissures in 
storage tanks reported more tap problems.  This comes as no surprise, given that 
reported tap problems may have been influenced by system malfunctions.  Other 
potential village factors, such as program differences, operator and other 
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committee factors, and source characteristics were not associated with increased 
breakdowns. 
Table 21: Peru Random Intercept Models - Physical Performance 
 #HH LEAKS DAYS REPAIR 
MODEL INFORMATION   
Sample N 771 470 
Loglikelihood -676 -1501 
Pseudo R Square 0.749 0.515 
Residual Variance 1.37*** 1.59*** 
Model Type Zero-Inflated Poisson OLS 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS (eB)     
  Tap Age 0.33***  (1.39) 0.11  
  Participation - # Decisions -0.03  (0.97) 0.01  
  Contribution – # Labor Days -0.01  (0.99) -0.00  
  Meeting Attendance 0.06  (1.06) 0.12**  
  PCS Visit Received -0.06  (0.94) 0.00  
  HH Members 0.08***  (1.08) 0.06**  
  HH Rooms 0.06***  (1.06) N/A 
  Income Category -0.27***  (0.76) 0.07  
  Asset Index -0.11**  (0.90) -0.21*  
  Age of Respondent 0.01***  (1.01) -0.01  
  Social Capital Score 0.001  (1.001) N/A 
  System Well Constructed 0.09  (1.09) N/A 
  Knowledge How Funds Spent -0.05  (0.95) N/A 
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  SANBASUR -0.10  (0.90) -0.25  
  Operator Years Experience -0.03  (0.97) -0.003 
  Operator Trained -0.06  (0.94) 0.04  
  Source – # Dry Months -0.05  (0.95)  0.01  
  Source – Length of Distribution Line 0.003  (1.00) 0.00 
  System –  Storage Cracks Detected 0.28***  (1.32) N/A 
  System – No Distribution Leaks Detected 0.30***  (1.35) N/A 
  Village Population 0.001*  (1.001) -0.001***  
  Village Size 0.001*  (1.001) -0.01***  
  Committee – Years Experience -0.001  (0.999) 0.01 
  Committee Elected -0.26*  (0.77) 0.19 
  Committee Trained 0.19  (1.21)  -0.11 
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level, *** significant at 1% level. 
138 
Table 21 also shows results for the model which predicted the number of 
repair days a household reported for the last breakdown.  Several iterations of the 
model predicting repair times were attempted, owning to convergence difficulties 
associated with a restricted sub-sample of households which had experienced a 
breakdown during the period.  Household size and assets remained important 
household determinants, while others (such as household size, and tap and 
respondent age) dropped out.  A one-person increase in the number of household 
members was associated with a 1.5 hour increase in the time needed to restore 
service.  Conversely, households with more assets (a unit increase in the asset 
index) experienced five hour declines in the wait time before the problem was 
fixed.  Current meeting attendance was positively associated with increased 
breakdowns; a jump to the next category of meeting participation was associated 
with a three-hour increase in wait time.  This may indicate that people began 
going to meetings more often as they experienced problems.  At the village level, 
while village population and distance increased tap difficulties, households in 
larger communities actually experienced lower wait times to restore water service.  
For every additional 1,000 people in the village and for every 100 minutes of 
travel across the village, household repair times declined by one day.  
Table 22 highlights the results from models that predict whether a household 
currently pays for water service and the monthly amount households paid to 
receive water.   
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Table 22:  Peru Random Intercept Models – Household Payment and  
Amount Paid/Month 
MODEL INFORMATION HH PAYS FOR 
WATER 
MONTHLY HH 
PAYMENT 
Sample N 752 646 
Loglikelihood -159 -437 
Pseudo R Square 0.538 0.754 
Residual Variance N/A 0.10*** 
Model Type Binary Logit OLS
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS (Odds Ratio)     
  Tap Age 0.54 (1.71) 0.07  
  Participation - # Decisions -0.05 (0.95) -0.01  
  Contribution – # Labor Days -0.03*  (0.87) -0.01*  
  Meeting Attendance 0.29 (1.34) -0.02  
  PCS Visit Received -0.37 (0.69) 0.06  
  HH Members 0.11 (1.11) 0.002  
  HH Rooms 0.19 (1.21) -0.004  
  Income Category -0.19 (0.83) 0.05  
  Asset Index 0.12 (1.13) -0.02  
  Age of Respondent 0.01 (1.01) -0.002  
  Social Capital Score -0.01 (1.00) 0.02*  
  System Well Constructed 0.125 (1.15) 0.03 
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.59***  (1.80) -0.05  
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  SANBASUR 3.49*** (32.79) -0.52***  
  Operator Years Experience -0.25* (0.78) 0.004 
  Operator Trained 0.48 (1.62) 0.17***  
  Source – # Dry Months 0.20 (1.22) -0.08**  
  Source – Length of Distribution Line 0.001 (1.001) 0.004  
  System –  Storage Cracks Detected -0.87 (0.42) 0.05  
  System – No Distribution Leaks Detected -0.03 (0.97) -0.05  
  Village Population 0.001 (1.001) 0.00  
  Village Size 0.001 (1.001 0.00  
  Committee – Years Experience -0.01 (0.99) -0.02**  
  Committee Elected 0.94 (2.56) -0.25  
  Committee Trained 0.12 (1.13) 0.27*  
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level,*** significant at 1% level  
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Few household or village factors explained whether a household paid for 
service.  At the household level, this is not surprising given the limited degree of 
within-village variation of the data.  Households contributing more labor to 
project construction were less likely to pay for water service – every increase in 
labor days decreases the odds of paying by 13%.  Households which claim to 
know progressively more about how their water committee spends money were 
more likely to pay by a factor of 1.80.  More surprisingly, most village factors 
also do not inform the decision on whether households pay for service.  
Households in SANBASUR communities are considerably more likely to pay for 
service than those in FONCODES-only areas.  In contrast, those located in 
villages with longer-serving operators do not pay as often.  For every additional 
year an operator has served, the odds of payment decline by over 20%.    
More village factors explain the monthly amount that households pay for 
water service.  SANBASUR households may be more likely to pay for service, 
but they pay about 0.52 soles (US $0.16) less for the water they receive after 
controlling for other factors.  Households in communities with longer dry seasons 
pay less than those with longer rainy seasons (every additional month of the dry 
season is associated with a 0.08 soles decline in payment).  Training also appears 
correlated with higher water payments – households in villages with trained 
operators and water committees pay 0.17 and 0.27 soles per month, respectively, 
more than those in villages which lack training.  Just as operator experience 
reduced the likelihood of paying for service, committee experience was associated 
with lower customer payments, although the magnitude of the effect (-0.02 
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soles/month for every additional year) is negligible.  Most household factors were 
not associated with water payments.  Project contributions were negatively 
associated with payments, although the strength of the relationship is weak – for 
every ten days of contributed labor, monthly household payments decline by 0.1 
soles.  Household attitudes toward social capital improve payment amounts, but 
the magnitude and significance of this relationship are also weak.   
 The next three models, summarized in Table 23, predict dissatisfaction with 
water attributes – water pressure, safety, and overall quality.  Lower water 
pressure affects households in the sample relatively uniformly, although water 
pressure levels do vary by village.  Those who complain less about problems tend 
to believe their systems are well constructed, attend meetings more often, and 
surprisingly have older taps than those who have water pressure issues.  
Households who perceive that their water system was well-constructed are 37% 
less likely to think they experience water pressure problems, while every year 
increase in the age of the tap decreases the likelihood of the perception of water 
pressure difficulties by a factor of 0.65.  Meeting attendance registers a similar 
negative correlation; decreasing the odds of reporting low water pressure by a 
factor of 0.67.  At the village level, households located in villages where water 
travels longer distances from its water source do experience worse pressure in the 
dry season than those in other villages (for every additional kilometer, the 
likelihood of reporting lower pressure rises by 11%).  Those in larger villages 
actually are less likely to experience declines in water pressure, although the 
magnitude is slight (an increase of 100 minutes of travel time decreases the 
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probability of reporting pressure problems by about 10%).  Communities without 
water leaks experience less of a problem with pressure.  Yet the length of the dry 
season does not arise as an important factor.  Trained operators and elected 
committees also reduce the likelihood that a household will experience lower 
water pressure by about 25% and 45%, respectively.     
While variance analysis showed moderate amounts of within-level variance 
on responses regarding water safety, multilevel results revealed that the threshold 
levels in the models were not statistically significant.  Thus, many household-
level factors were not important determinants of whether a household believed in 
the safety of their water.  Those who valued the construction of the system were 
less likely to say that their water was unsafe, as expected.  Higher-income 
households were also more likely to believe that their water was not safe – as 
income rose from one category to the next, the likelihood of perceiving that their 
water was not safe increased by 76%.  A few village-level factors explained 
household perception of water safety.  For every additional month in the dry 
season, households were 37% less likely to report unsafe water, while those with 
fewer leaks were more 54% likely to contain household respondents who thought 
their water was safe.  Rainy months can bring washouts and other system 
contamination problems, while those without leaks would tend to have fewer 
opportunities for contamination.   
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Table 23:  Peru Random Intercept Models – Water Attributes 
MODEL INFORMATION LOW WATER 
PRESSURE 
UNSAFE WATER 
FROM TAP 
OVERALL 
DISSATISFACTION 
Sample N 734 739 738 
Loglikelihood -737 -335 -541 
Pseudo R Square 0.689 0.869 0.751 
Model Type Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Ordered Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS (Odds Ratio)       
  Tap Age -0.43***  (0.65) -0.24 (0.79) -0.79***  (0.45) 
  Participation - # Decisions -0.003 (1.00) -0.05 (0.95) -0.03 (0.97) 
  Contribution – # Labor Days 0.00 (1.00) -0.002 (1.00) 0.01 (1.01) 
  Meeting Attendance -0.16* (0.67) -0.132 (0.88) -0.004 (1.00) 
  PCS Visit Received 0.10 (1.11) -0.05 (0.95) 0.01 (1.01) 
  HH Members -0.26 (0.98) 0.01 (1.01) -0.04 (0.96) 
  HH Rooms 0.04 (1.05) 0.01 (1.01) -0.07 (0.94) 
  Income Category 0.07 (1.07) 0.57* (1.76) 0.19* (1.22) 
  Asset Index -0.10 (0.91) -0.06 (0.94) -0.10 (1.10) 
  Age of Respondent -0.01 (0.99) 0.002 (1.00) -0.003 (1.00) 
  Social Capital Score -0.01 (0.99) 0.01 (1.01) 0.08*** (1.08) 
  System Well Constructed -0.41*** (0.63) -0.61* (0.52) -0.73*** (0.44) 
  Knowledge How Funds Spent -0.18 (0.84) -0.11 (0.90) -0.15 (0.86) 
VILLAGE EFFECTS       
  SANBASUR -0.02 (0.98) -0.17 (0.84) 0.50 (1.65) 
  Operator Years Experience 0.05 (1.05) -0.05 (0.95) 0.13*** (1.14) 
  Operator Trained -0.29* (0.75) 0.01 (1.01) -0.19 (0.83) 
  Source – # Dry Months 0.07 (1.07) -0.47*** (0.63) -0.05 (0.95) 
  Source – Length of Distribution Line 0.10* (1.11) -0.05 (0.95) 0.03 (1.03) 
  System –  Storage Cracks Detected 0.04 (1.04) 0.37 (1.45) -0.72* (0.49) 
  System – No Distribution Leaks 
   Detected 
-0.57** (0.57) 0.43* (1.54) -0.76*** (0.47) 
  Village Population 0.000 (1.00) -0.000 (1.00) 0.000 (1.00) 
  Village Size -.001*** (0.999) -0.000 (0.999) -0.004*** (0.996) 
  Committee – Years Experience 0.01 (1.01) 0.002 (1.002) 0.03 (1.03) 
  Committee Elected -0.60* (0.55) -0.58 (0.56) -0.67 (0.51) 
  Committee Trained -0.09 (0.91) 0.03 (1.03) -0.04 (0.96) 
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level,*** significant at 1% level  
A majority (63%) of households was overall satisfied with their drinking 
water.  A balance of both household and village factors predicted overall 
dissatisfaction.  People who believed their system was well-constructed were 56% 
less likely to be unhappy with their water.  Surprisingly, though, people with more 
positive social capital attitudes and those with higher income were more 
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displeased with the water from the project.  Unit increases in social capital scores 
increased overall dissatisfaction by a factor of 1.08, while a household’s 
movement to the next income class in the village was associated with a 22% 
increase in the likelihood of dissatisfaction.  And those with older taps actually 
were more satisfied than others.  Village effects were also puzzling.  System 
quality measures appear to move in opposite directions (in villages with storage 
cracks and no leaks, households were not dissatisfied with their services).  Every 
additional year of operators’ service was associated with a 14% higher likelihood 
of displeasure, while people in villages of larger size were less likely to be 
unhappy with their service.   
The analyses shown in Table 24 considered satisfaction with operation and 
maintenance and the satisfaction and trust households held for their water 
committees.  With respect to O&M satisfaction, pre-project participation and 
labor contributions are associated with O&M, but the negative relationships 
appear in the opposite directions of original hypotheses.  An increase in the 
number of decisions in which a household originally participated decreases the 
odds of O&M satisfaction by 0.92, while an increase in project labor proffered by 
the household decreases the odds by 0.99 (the magnitude of the latter is very 
weak).  Income class acts as a stronger household factor in explaining declining 
O&M support, as households moving from one category to the next are 24% less 
likely to have a positive opinion about operation and maintenance.  Positive 
factors include satisfaction with original system construction (which may have 
less to do with actual repair service and more with the lack of need for repairs) 
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and knowledge about how funds are spent (those with progressively more 
knowledge about how water committees spend their funds are about 40% more 
likely to demonstrate support for current O&M service).  At the village level, 
households in villages with long-serving operators were 10% less satisfied with 
service for every additional year, while those in villages with elected committees 
appear 55% less satisfied with their O&M service.  Those who live in larger 
villages overall are more satisfied with O&M than those living in smaller 
communities.   
Satisfaction with administration follows similar lines as operation & 
maintenance.  Household labor contributions are negatively associated with 
committee satisfaction, although again the odds ratio (0.99) is very weak.  The 
odds ratios for attitudes concerning system construction and spending (at 1.85 and 
1.46, respectively) are nearly proportionately equal in magnitude and strength of 
significance to satisfaction with O&M.  On the village side of the equation, 
households with elected committees are again over 50% less satisfied with 
administration, while those in larger-sized villages are more pleased with the 
progress of the committees. 
The model predicting household trust in the water committee showed that pre-
project participation in decisions and respondents’ age are negatively associated 
trust, although the magnitudes of the odds ratios (0.94 and 0.98, respectively) are 
fairly weak.  Knowledge regarding water committee spending, however, was an 
important factor in gaining household trust, as it increased the likelihood of 
trusting the committees rose by a factor of 1.62.  Interestingly, higher social 
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capital scores did not affect household trust in the water committee.  Operator 
experience joins elected committees as a factor in explaining lower trust (although 
the magnitude of the effect of elected committees is much lower than those of 
committee satisfaction and O&M service).  Finally, both village size and 
population are positively associated with household trust.   
Table 24:  Peru Random Intercept Models - Satisfaction with O&M,  
Satisfaction and Trust in Water Committees 
MODEL INFORMATION O&M 
SATISFACTION 
COMMITTEE 
SATISFACTION 
COMMITTEE 
TRUST 
Sample N 775 775 772 
Loglikelihood -548 -585 -599 
Pseudo R Square 0.765 0.773 0.743 
Model Type Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Ordered Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS (Odds Ratio)    
  Tap Age 0.07 (1.07) 0.13 (1.14) 0.22 (1.32) 
  Participation - # Decisions -0.08* (0.92) -0.03 (0.97) -0.07* (0.94) 
  Contribution – # Labor Days -0.01** (0.99) -0.01* (0.99) -0.01 (1.00) 
  Meeting Attendance -0.02 (0.99) -0.03 (0.99) 0.11 (1.12) 
  PCS Visit Received -0.23 (0.80) -0.05 (0.95) 0.03 (0.97) 
  HH Members 0.04 (1.05) 0.07 (1.07) 0.02 (1.03) 
  HH Rooms 0.04 (1.04) 0.04 (1.04) 0.11 (1.12) 
  Income Category -0.28** (0.76) -0.20 (0.82) -0.15 (0.88) 
  Asset Index 0.02 (1.02) -0.04 (0.96) -0.02 (0.98) 
  Age of Respondent 0.001 (1.00) 0.005 (1.00) -0.02*** (0.98) 
  Social Capital Score -0.04 (0.96) -0.04 (0.96) 0.02 (1.02) 
  System Well Constructed 0.82*** (1.85) 0.80*** (1.82) 0.17 (1.19) 
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.33*** (1.39) 0.38*** (1.46) 0.46* (1.62) 
VILLAGE EFFECTS    
  SANBASUR 0.54 (1.72) 0.30 (1.35) 0.69 (1.99) 
  Operator Years Experience -0.11*** (0.90) -0.06 (0.94) -0.08***(0.92) 
  Operator Trained 0.11 (1.12) -0.01 (0.99) 0.004 (1.004) 
  Source – # Dry Months 0.12 (1.13) 0.05 (1.05) 0.10 (1.11) 
  Source – Length of Distribution Line -0.08 (0.92) -0.05(0.95) 0.00 (1.00) 
  System –  Storage Cracks Detected 0.17 (1.19) 0.58 (1.79) 0.00 (1.00) 
  System – No Distribution Leaks  
   Detected 
0.11 (1.12) 0.09 (1.09) 0.00 (1.00) 
  Village Population 0.000 (1.00) -0.000 (1.00) 0.001*** (1.001) 
  Village Size 0.001***  (1.001) 0.001***  (1.001) 0.001* (1.001) 
  Committee – Years Experience -0.01 (0.99) -0.003 (0.997) -0.001 (0.999) 
  Committee Elected -0.79** (0.45) -0.71* (0.49) -0.05* (0.95) 
  Committee Trained -0.05 (0.95) -0.07 (0.93) 0.18 (1.20) 
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level,*** significant at 1% level  
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 Table 25 demonstrates the results from factors predicting household 
perception of sustainable water service over five and ten year periods.  Over 
three-quarters of all respondents believe that the system will function over the 
next five years, and results show that this does not vary to a large extent within 
villages.  However, less than half of Peruvians (48.5%) have confidence that their 
system will keep running over a ten-year span; and these responses do vary both 
across and within villages.  Four household factors predict system confidence 
over five and ten year periods: 1) pre-project labor contributions (+), 2) the 
perception that the system is well-constructed (+), 3) income category (-), and    
4) whether a household has received a visit from an external agency (-).  A one-
day increase in household labor for the current water system increases the chances 
that a household believes the system will keep running by 2% over a five year 
period and 11% over ten years.  Naturally, those who think they have a well-
designed system are more likely to have confidence in its function over time, 
although the significance of this relationship in the shorter term can be rejected at 
a 5% level.  Higher-income households are less likely to think their systems will 
continue to function by factors of 0.69 and 0.64 for five and ten-year horizons, 
respectively.  Households receiving post-construction visits are as equally 
unlikely to have confidence in their systems as those in the next income bracket.  
Village population is the only village factor that predicts whether households 
believe a system will function over a five year period.  Respondents in larger 
villages are more likely to think that their water committee can keep the system 
running.  This drops out as important in estimating the ten-year confidence model, 
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yet village size assumes its place in direction and significance.  Households in 
SANBASUR villages are 46% less likely to think their system can function over a 
ten year period.  For every additional year of committee service, households are 
3% less satisfied with results.  Among households located in villages with trained 
operators and well-maintained distribution systems, households are 30% and 70% 
more likely to believe their systems can work over the long term.  
Table 25:  Peru Random Intercept Models - System Confidence 
MODEL INFORMATION FIVE YEAR 
CONFIDENCE 
TEN YEAR 
CONFIDENCE 
Sample N 776 776 
Loglikelihood -438 -689 
Pseudo R Square 0.818 0.742 
Model Type Binary Logit Binary Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS (Odds Ratio)     
  Tap Age -0.06 (0.95) -0.08 (0.93) 
  Participation - # Decisions -0.02 (0.99) -0.04 (0.96) 
  Contribution – # Labor Days 0.02** (1.02) 0.12*** (1.11) 
  Meeting Attendance 0.03 (1.03) 0.03 (1.02) 
  PCS Visit Received -0.44** (0.64) -0.33* (0.72) 
  HH Members 0.01 (1.01) -0.001 (1.00) 
  HH Rooms -0.04 (0.96) -0.11 (0.89) 
  Income Category -0.37*** (0.69) -0.44*** (0.64) 
  Asset Index -0.08 (0.92) 0.05 (1.05) 
  Age of Respondent 0.01 (1.01) 0.01 (1.01 
  Social Capital Score 0.04 (1.04) -0.01 (1.00) 
  System Well Constructed 0.41* (1.34) 0.38** (1.34) 
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.07 (1.07)  0.16 (1.17) 
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  SANBASUR 0.03 (1.03) -0.62* (0.54) 
  Operator Years Experience 0.01 (1.01) -0.01 (0.99) 
  Operator Trained 0.22 (1.25) 0.27*  (1.31) 
  Source – # Dry Months -0.03 (0.97) -0.03 (0.97) 
  Source – Length of Distribution Line -0.01 (0.99) 0.06 (1.06) 
  System –  Storage Cracks Detected 0.36 (1.43) 0.31 (1.36) 
  System – No Distribution Leaks Detected 0.37 (1.45) 0.53*** (1.70) 
  Village Population 0.001*** (1.001) 0.000 (1.00) 
  Village Size 0.001 (1.001) 0.000* (1.00) 
  Committee – Years Experience -0.01 (0.99) -0.03*** (0.97) 
  Committee Elected 0.35 (1.42) 0.43 (1.54) 
  Committee Trained 0.29 (1.34) 0.21 (1.23) 
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level, *** significant at 1% level  
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The vast majority (85%) of respondents believes their villages should scale up 
services.  Table 26 shows that a number of both household and village factors 
successfully predict this outcome.  People with older taps, who attend meetings, 
and who know how funds are spent are more likely to scale up service.  For every 
year increase in the age of the tap, the odds of favoring a scale up rise by 34%.  
The magnitude (37%) of the effect of favoring improvements among households 
who know how committees spend their money is similar to system age, although 
its significance can be rejected at a higher level.  Households that attend meetings 
are also more likely to favor scaling up, although this effect (at 1.04) is much 
smaller.  People from older generations are also more likely to support scaling up.  
People who value the original construction are less likely to support scaling up, as 
are those with positive attitudes regarding social capital and those who have been 
visited by an external agency.  Every unit increase in a household’s social capital 
score lowers the likelihood of favoring the decision by a factor of 1.08, while 
those who have been visited by external agencies are half as likely to support 
scaling up.  Important positive village factors include village population, the 
presence of storage cracks, and whether a community has an elected committee.  
Respondents are over twice as likely to support scaling up in areas where 
engineers detected storage cracks and where committee members are elected.  The 
latter is somewhat surprising, given the previously-revealed associations between 
elected committees and dissatisfaction with O&M and management.  
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Table 26:  Peru Random Intercept Models - Support for Scaling Up and Leveraging 
MODEL INFORMATION VILLAGE SHOULD 
SCALE UP 
VILLAGE SHOULD 
LEVERAGE 
Sample N 777 776 
Loglikelihood -195 -466 
Pseudo R Square 0.773 0.708 
Model Type Binary Logit Binary Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS (Odds Ratio)     
  Tap Age 1.10***  (1.34) -0.31 (0.74) 
  Participation - # Decisions 0.01 (1.01) 0.01 (1.01) 
  Contribution – # Labor Days 0.01 (1.01) 0.01 (1.01) 
  Meeting Attendance 0.04* (1.04) -0.18 (0.84) 
  PCS Visit Received -0.66* (0.52) -0.27 (0.76) 
  HH Members -0.01 (1.00) -0.03 (0.97) 
  HH Rooms 0.16 (1.17) -0.001 (1.00) 
  Income Category -0.18 (0.84) -0.59*** (0.56) 
  Asset Index 0.13 (1.14) 0.05 (1.05) 
  Age of Respondent 0.02* (1.02) 0.01 (1.01) 
  Social Capital Score -0.08** (0.92) -0.07** (0.94) 
  System Well Constructed -1.14*** (0.66) 0.24 (1.22) 
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.32* (1.37) 0.03 (1.03) 
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  SANBASUR 0.84 (2.32) 0.19 (1.21) 
  Operator Years Experience 0.04 (1.04) 0.03 (1.03) 
  Operator Trained 0.08 (1.08) 0.10 (1.11) 
  Source – # Dry Months -0.09 (0.91) -0.08 (0.92) 
  Source – Length of Distribution Line 0.02 (1.02) -0.01 (0.99) 
  System –  Storage Cracks Detected 0.79** (2.20) 0.59*** (1.80) 
  System – No Distribution Leaks Detected 0.39 (1.48) 0.25 (1.28) 
  Village Population 0.001* (1.001) 0.000 (1.00) 
  Village Size 0.001 (1.001) 0.001*** (1.001) 
  Committee – Years Experience -0.003 (0.997) -0.02 (0.98) 
  Committee Elected 0.76** (2.14) -0.35 (0.70) 
  Committee Trained -0.31 (0.73) -0.78*** (0.46) 
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level,*** significant at 1% level  
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Leveraging enjoyed much more limited support (39%) among households 
than scaling up.  Among household factors, only income and social capital – both 
negative – explained whether a household would support leveraging investments.  
Moving from to the next income category decreases the likelihood of favoring a 
leveraging strategy by a factor of 0.56, while social capital score gains decrease 
the chances of household support by 0.94.  As with the decision to scale up, 
households are more likely to support leveraging in areas where engineers 
detected storage cracks in the water system.  However, respondents were no more 
likely to favor leveraging in villages with elected committees, and those who have 
been trained actually received over 50% less support among households.   
Overall, variables in the random intercept models appear as statistically 
significant approximately 25% of the time.  Household and village-level factors 
average out as significant an equal 25% of the time.  Models which feature the 
largest number of significant factors feature the number of breakdowns and the 
decision to scale up as their dependent variables.  Models which contain the 
fewest significant variables are those that feature the decision to pay for water and 
water safety as the dependent variables.  Model fit (as measured by the pseudo R 
square values) indicates that most models provide a significant amount of useful 
information on the variation of the dependent variables in comparison to the 
constant-only models.  Goodness of fit values are at or near 70% for all models 
except 1) whether a household pays for water, and 2) the repair time reported by 
households during their last breakdown. 
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The random intercept models revealed program differences between 
SANBASUR and FONCODES regarding whether households paid for water, the 
amount they paid, and whether the system would function over a ten-year period.  
A random slope and intercept model also allows one to determine whether the 
location of households in a SANBASUR vs. a FONCODES village improves the 
strength of the relationship (positive or negative) between household factors and 
the dependent indicators in cases where SANBASUR emerged as an important 
factor.  Results suggest that the presence of SANBASUR positively (and 
significantly beyond a 10% rejection level) increases the slope of household 
factors shaping whether a household pays for water service and also for those 
respective factors shaping whether a household believes that the system will 
function over a ten year period.  There was no difference in the slope effect with 
respect to the amount households paid for service.     
 6.3.2. Random Intercept Models – Ghana 
Table 27 presents findings with respect to household financial measures, 
specifically whether a household pays for service and the log amount of water 
payments.  Neither variable differs significantly within villages in these models, 
and in both cases, the various employed tariff structures largely determine 
whether a household pays and the monthly payment (compared to no tariff).  Two 
household participation variables – previous participation in project decision-
making and current participation – both were positively associated with whether a 
household pays for service.  Every additional pre-project decision shaped by 
households increases the likelihood of payment by a factor of 1.39,  
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while an increase in current meeting participation more than doubles the payment 
likelihood.  By contrast, households that contributed to the project during 
construction paid about ½ as much in monthly log payments as those who did not. 
contribute to the project. 
* Significant at 10% rejection level, ** Significant at 5% rejection level,  
*** Significant at 1% rejection level 
MODEL INFORMATION HH PAYS  
FOR WATER 
AMOUNT PAID FOR 
WATER/MONTH (Log) 
Sample N 916 916 
Loglikelihood -105 -1527 
Pseudo R Square 0.948 0.814 
Residual Variance N/A 2.38** 
Model  Binary Logit OLS 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS (Odds Ratio)     
  Participation Index 0.33***  (1.39) 0.02  
  HH Contributes -0.85 (0.43) -0.53**  
  Meeting Awareness 0.78*** (2.17) 0.03  
  PCS visit -0.74 (0.48) 0.05  
  Social Capital -0.11 (0.90) -0.01  
  Age of Respondent -0.02 (0.98) -0.002  
  HH Members 0.06 (1.06) -0.01  
  HH Rooms -0.19 (0.83) -0.02  
  Treats water 0.48 (1.61) 0.41  
  Monthly Expenditures (log) 0.01 (1.01) -0.004  
  Asset Index -0.03 (0.97) 0.002  
  System Well Constructed -0.70 (0.45) -0.06  
  Knowledge How Funds Spent -0.45 (0.64) 0.045  
VILLAGE EFFECTS   
  Volta Region 1.57 (4.81) 0.27  
  Watsan Elected -0.09 (0.91) 0.48  
  Watsan Years 1.55  (4.71) -0.04 
  Watsan Trained 0.37 (1.45) 0.04  
  Operator – Number of -1.65 (0.19) 0.21  
  Distance to Area Mechanic 0.03 (1.03) 0.01  
  Source: # Dry months  -0.09 (0.91) 0.23  
  Village Population -0.000 (1.00) -0.000  
  Village Size 0.000 (1.00) 0.000 
  Tariff Payment – as needed -0.96  0.328  
  Tariff Payment - flat fee 6.82***  7.18***  
  Tariff Payment - HH fee 10.19***  6.86***  
  Tariff Payment – pay as fetch 9.65***  3.99***  
Table 27:  Ghana Random Intercept Models – Household Pays for Water and  
Monthly Log Payments 
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Table 28 summarizes the results from regressing two water attribute variables 
– water pressure and taste – on household and village factors.  Households which 
received some form of PCS were less likely to complain of low pressure by a 
factor of 0.45, as were those that believed their village had a well-designed 
system.  Households which knew how funds were spent by the watsan committee 
were significantly more likely to believe that they had lower pressure in the dry 
season by a factor of 1.83.  In villages with any tariff structure, households felt 
they faced worse water pressure.  All were highly significant effects, and the 
magnitude was strongest among households which were charged “pay as you 
fetch” tariffs.  Households in the Volta region were still over twice as likely to 
experience lower water pressure.  However, those who lived in communities with 
elected watsans were less than half as likely to report this as a problem. 
While the model for water taste employed a multinomial logit model (to 
account for chemical and mineral tastes as well), the results presented in this table 
are only based on salty taste.  Model results suggested numerous associations.  
Pre-project household participation and contribution were both positively 
associated with saltier water, as was current water treatment, respondent age, 
wealth, and knowledge how funds were spent.  Negative household factors 
included social capital and perception of construction.  Nearly all village factors 
were associated with saltiness.  Positive factors included 1) presence in Volta 
region, 2) elected and trained watsan committees, 3) village size, 4) most tariff 
schemes.  Negative factors were 1) watsan years, 2) number of operators, 3) 
distance to mechanic, 4) length of dry season, and 5) village population.  
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Table 28:  Ghana Random Intercept Models – Water Attributes 
* Significant at 10% rejection level, ** Significant at 5% rejection level 
*** Significant at 1% rejection level 
 
Administrative satisfaction and trust both rated high among over 80% of 
Ghanaian household respondents.  Table 29 reports respective model results.  
Variance analysis detected some within-village variation for administrative 
MODEL INFORMATION LOW WATER 
PRESSURE 
WATER HAS 
SALTY TASTE 
Sample N 932 946 
Loglikelihood -801 -489 
Pseudo R Square 0.820 0.828 
Model  Ordered Logit Multinomial Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS (Odds Ratio)     
  Participation Index 0.002 (1.00) -0.20  
  HH Contributes -0.43 (0.65) 4.85***  
  Meeting Awareness -0.18 (0.83) 2.19*** 
  PCS visit -0.79***  (0.45) -0.88  
  Social Capital -0.01 (0.99) -0.59***  
  Age of Respondent 0.002 (1.00) 0.175***  
  HH Members -0.01 (0.99) 0.334  
  HH Rooms 0.02 (1.02) -0.51  
  Treats water -0.45 (0.64) 10.7***  
  Monthly Expenditures (log) 0.06 (1.06) -0.50  
  Asset Index -0.06 (0.94) 0.74**  
  System Well Constructed -0.88*** (0.38) -1.43*  
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.60*** (1.83) 4.68***  
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  Volta Region 0.84* (2.32) 22.08***  
  Watsan Elected -0.74** (0.48) 3.32***  
  Watsan Years 0.03 (1.03) -0.33***  
  Watsan Trained 0.05 (1.05) 3.57***  
  Operator – Number of -0.55 (0.58) -2.06***  
  Distance to Area Mechanic -0.002 (1.00) -0.08***  
  Source: # Dry months  -0.55 (0.58) -2.98***  
  Village Population 0.000 (1.00) -0.001*  
  Village Size -0.02 (0.98) 0.52**  
  Tariff Payment – as needed 1.18**  2.24  
  Tariff Payment - flat fee 1.22***  5.96***  
  Tariff Payment - HH fee 0.85** 23.16***  
  Tariff Payment – pay as fetch 1.77***  6.83***  
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satisfaction and very little variation with respect to trust.  Yet thresholds for both 
models appeared significant in model estimation.  Household factors that 
predicted both satisfaction and trust included 1) the number of people in a 
household (+), 2) the size of the house (-), 3) social capital (+), 4) knowledge how 
funds are spent (+).  An increase of one additional person in the household is 
associated with higher administration by a factor of 1.12 and higher trust by a 
factor of 1.05.  Respondents are 8-9% more likely not to be satisfied with nor trust 
the watsan committee for every additional room in the home.  The magnitude of 
social capital attitudes resonated higher with respect to watsan trust and 
satisfaction – unit increases in scores were associated with approximately 25% 
gains in satisfaction and trust.  Finally, household knowledge concerning the 
watsan’s financial dealings impacted satisfaction and trust to the largest extent, as 
households with progressive increases in awareness were almost three times as 
likely to support watsan activities.  As with Peru, income (as measured in Ghana 
by monthly expenditures) arises as a negative predictor of watsan satisfaction, yet 
watsan trust was not swayed by differences in logged expenditures.  Several other 
household factors additionally appear as important determinants in watsan trust.  
Households are 7% more likely to trust watsans for every additional pre-project 
decision in which they participated, but less likely if they currently are involved 
with meetings (although the magnitude of this effect is negligible).  Households 
who contributed to the project are more suspicious of the committee than those 
who did not do so.  Households also tend to trust watsans if they have been visited 
by an external agency – a visit increases trust by over 40% compared to no visit.   
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The two village factors that are related both to trust and satisfaction are the 
distance of an area mechanic (negatively related) and the use of periodic 
collection fees vs. no fees (positively related).  Every additional kilometer a 
mechanic lives from the village was associated with lower degrees of watsan 
satisfaction by 1% and trust by 2%.  Village size has a positive effect on 
satisfaction but no effect on watsan trust.  Households in villages with occasional 
collections are much more likely to be satisfied with their committees than those 
which have no fees, but only slightly more likely to trust the watsans.  Those who 
pay flat water fees trust their committees a little more than those with no fees, but 
no detectable difference exists when measuring household satisfaction.  
Households trust watsans about 6% less for every additional year of service, while 
they place over 40% more trust in them if they have been trained to handle their 
committee responsibilities.   
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Table 29:  Ghana Random Intercepts Models – Watsan Satisfaction & Trust 
* Significant at 10% rejection level, ** Significant at 5% rejection level 
*** Significant at 1% rejection level 
 
 
MODEL INFORMATION WATSAN 
SATISFACTION 
WATSAN TRUST 
Sample N 1111 1103 
Loglikelihood -426 -559 
Pseudo R Square 0.884 0.846 
Model  Ordered Logit Ordered Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS (Odds Ratio)     
  Participation Index 0.02 (1.02)  0.07* (1.07) 
  HH Contributes -0.10 (0.90) -0.73*** (0.48) 
  Meeting Awareness 0.15 (1.16) -0.001*** (1.00) 
  PCS visit 1.02 (2.77) 0.34* (1.41) 
  Social Capital 0.24*** (1.27) 0.22*** (1.24) 
  Age of Respondent -0.003 (1.00) 0.004 (1.00) 
  HH Members 0.12*** (1.12) 0.05* (1.05) 
  HH Rooms -0.10** (0.91) -0.09** (0.92) 
  Treats water 0.47 (1.60) 0.28 (1.33) 
  Monthly Expenditures (log) -0.34* (0.71) -0.04 (0.96) 
  Asset Index -0.05 (0.96) -0.05 (0.95) 
  System Well Constructed 0.23 (1.25) 0.32* (1.38) 
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 1.02*** (2.77) 0.89*** (2.43) 
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  Volta Region -0.53 (0.59) -0.36 (0.70) 
  Watsan Elected 0.34 (1.40) 0.26 (1.30) 
  Watsan Years -0.06 (0.94) -0.06* (0.94) 
  Watsan Trained 0.25 (1.28) 0.35*** (1.42) 
  Operator – Number of 0.52 (1.68) -0.04 (0.96) 
  Distance to Area Mechanic -0.02** (0.98) -0.01* (0.99) 
  Source: # Dry months  -0.13 (0.88) -0.17 (0.84) 
  Village Population -0.000 (1.00) -0.000 (1.00) 
  Village Size 0.03* (1.03) 0.015 (1.015) 
  Tariff Payment – as needed 1.78***  1.03*  
  Tariff Payment - flat fee 0.49  0.96**  
  Tariff Payment - HH fee -0.04  0.74  
  Tariff Payment – pay as fetch -0.28  0.21  
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Table 30 highlights effects on household responses to five year performance 
and the decision to scale up services.  About 70% of households think their 
system will perform over the next five years.  Household factors influence this 
decision more frequently than village-level attributes in the sample.  Households 
with higher social capital scores, which treat water, and who believe in the 
integrity of their systems have more confidence in this short-term performance.  
Unit increases in social capital scores increase the likelihood of system 
confidence by a factor of 1.04, while those who value system construction are 
about 40% more likely to believe the handpumps will keep running.  However, 
households that are more aware of meetings and how funds are spent are less 
confident in the watsan to keep the system running.  Meeting awareness exhibits 
virtually no statistical impact on perceptions of future performance, but increases 
in the knowledge of watsan financial dealings are associated with a decreased 
likelihood of household confidence in five year system operation by a factor of 
0.70.  The distance of area mechanics plays a minor role in responses – villages 
where area mechanics travel further to get there contain households which are 1% 
less ebullient about future function for every additional kilometer.  Finally, 
regional differences persist.  Volta households are about 80% more confident that 
their systems will keep going than Brong Ahafo residents after controlling for 
other factors. 
An overwhelming number of respondents would like the watsan committees 
to scale up their efforts.  Households that originally contributed to the project, 
report higher social capital scores, and know how their money is spent are more 
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likely to support these efforts.  Committee knowledge is particularly important 
since households are more than twice as likely to support a watsan’s efforts to 
scale up.  A number of village-level factors influenced household responses.  
Households with elected watsans were over twice as likely to support scaling up 
practices.  Volta households were over five times as likely to do the same.  
Increases in mechanic’s distances increased the probability that villagers would 
choose to scale up by 2% for every kilometer and 1% for every additional traveled 
minute in the village.  Negative influences featured village population and the 
number of operators in a village.  For every additional caretaker, households were 
65% less likely to support the idea. 
Factors in these analyses appear as significant an average of 38.5% of the 
time.  Village-level factors are significant on average slightly more often than 
household factors (39% to 38%).  Water taste and watsan trust contain the largest 
number of significant factors, while the two financial models perform the poorest 
in this regard.  Pseudo R-square values are relatively high for all of the models, 
indicating that the household and village variables included have added important 
information to the structure of the data over models which only feature a constant. 
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Table 30:  Ghana Random Intercept Models – Five Year Confidence and Prospects 
for Scaling Up Services 
* Significant at 10% rejection level, ** Significant at 5% rejection level *** Significant at 1% rejection 
level 
 
 
 
MODEL INFORMATION FIVE-YEAR 
CONFIDENCE 
WATSAN SHOULD 
SCALE UP 
Sample N 1112 1062 
Loglikelihood -4018 -319 
Pseudo R Square 0.781 0.766 
Model  Binary Logit Binary Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS (Odds Ratio)     
  Participation Index 0.03 (1.03) -0.05 (0.95) 
  HH Contributes 0.27 (1.32) -0.04 (0.97) 
  Meeting Awareness -0.002*** (1.00)  0.32* (1.38) 
  PCS visit 0.15 (1.17) 0.03 (1.03) 
  Social Capital 0.04** (1.04) 0.05* (1.05) 
  Age of Respondent 0.004 (1.00) -0.01 (0.99) 
  HH Members -0.02 (0.98) -0.001 (1.00) 
  HH Rooms 0.02 (1.02) -0.02 (0.99) 
  Treats water 0.97*** (2.64) 0.17 (1.18) 
  Monthly Expenditures (log) -0.03 (0.97) -0.25 (0.78) 
  Asset Index 0.02 (1.02) 0.09 (1.09) 
  System Well Constructed 0.32*** (1.41) 0.06 (1.07) 
  Knowledge How Funds Spent -0.36*** (0.70) 0.73*** (2.08) 
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  Volta Region 0.58* (1.79) 1.63*** (5.10) 
  Watsan Elected 0.15 (1.16) 0.76*** (2.14) 
  Watsan Years -0.01 (0.99) 0.05 (1.05) 
  Watsan Trained -0.03 (0.97) 0.15 (1.16) 
  Operator – Number of 0.17 (1.19) -1.06*** (0.35) 
  Distance to Area Mechanic -0.01*** (0.99) 0.02*** (1.02) 
  Source: # Dry months  0.01 (1.01) 0.16 (1.17) 
  Village Population 0.000 (1.00) -0.001*** (0.999) 
  Village Size 0.002 (1.00)  0.04***(1.04) 
  Tariff Payment – as needed 0.01   -0.71 
  Tariff Payment - flat fee -0.32  -0.98  
  Tariff Payment - HH fee -0.10  -0.29  
  Tariff Payment – pay as fetch -0.43  -0.57  
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 6.3.3. Structural Models – Peru 
Table 31 summarizes the household-level exogenous and endogenous 
variables considered in these models.   
Table 31:  Household-level Exogenous and Endogenous Variables in Structural 
Equation Models 
VARIABLE TYPE HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS ON ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
# Members Exogenous Participation (-), Contributions (+), Meetings (-), Funds Spent (-) 
# Rooms Exogenous Participation (+), Contributions (+), Meetings (+), Funds Spent (+) 
Income Exogenous Participation (+), Contributions (+), Meetings (+), Funds Spent (+) 
Assets Exogenous Participation (+), Contributions (+), Meetings (+), Funds Spent (+) 
Respondent Age Exogenous Participation (-), Contribution (-), Meetings (-), Funds Spent (-) 
Social Capital Exogenous Participation (+), Contribution (+), Meetings (+), Funds Spent (+) 
PCS Visit Exogenous Participation (0), Contribution (0), Meetings (+), Funds Spent (+) 
Age of Tap Exogenous None 
Perception of 
Construction 
Exogenous None 
Pre-Project 
Participation 
Endogenous None 
Pre-Project 
Contribution 
Endogenous None 
Current Meeting 
Attendance 
Endogenous None 
Current Knowledge 
How Funds Spent 
Endogenous None 
 
The ideas behind the indirect hypotheses are as follows.  Adults in households 
with larger families are less likely to have participated in pre-project decisions 
and less likely to be aware of current dealings due to the need to take care of more 
people in the household.  However, they are more likely to have contributed labor 
because more family members would have been available.  Families with larger 
homes, higher incomes, greater wealth, and a stronger sense of social capital 
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would be more likely to participate in projects, contributed more easily to 
projects, participate in current meetings, and know how funds are spent.  Older 
respondents would be less interested in participation, less capable of contributing 
labor, and less aware how funds are spent.  Post-construction support would 
neither affect pre-project participation or contributions (since these occurred 
before operation), yet it may positively enhance current participation and 
awareness how funds are spent.  This analysis does assume that any change in the 
exogenous variables before and after the project remains proportional (i.e. 
incomes among households did not shift from the time a project was designed 
until the present that would change how income may have affected pre-project vs. 
post-project endogenous factors).  It is an important assumption, but there is no 
evidence of dramatic changes in these communities that would challenge its’ 
credibility.     
These models are specified based on information from the random intercept 
models.  At the household level, all direct effects are estimated.  Indirect effects 
for exogenous variables are estimated based on the significance of the 
endogenous variables.  For example, regressing the number of tap leaks on 
household-level variables would not require a structural model because none of 
the endogenous variables above significantly influenced the outcome in the 
random intercept model.   Yet a structural model would be in order for the other 
physical performance outcome variable – repair days – since meeting attendance 
was initially associated with an increase in the number of repair days needed.  
Thus, each structural model calculates all household-level direct effects and 
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regresses significant endogenous variables from the previous models on the 
specified exogenous factors to determine any additional indirect effects.  These 
models are intended to present a more complete picture of the relationships 
between non-project household variables, project-based variables, and outcomes 
of performance.   
The focus of these models rests primarily on detecting household-level 
impacts.  Village-level factors are mostly exogenous in these models since very 
few (e.g. water source, village size, etc.) can be considered functions of other 
variables.  The program type variable (SANBASUR) may influence other village-
level factors, such as operator and water committee training, yet the lack of 
information on other village factors inhibits structural model estimation.  Previous 
model results inform specification of these models.  Most models include program 
type, village population, and village size.  In addition, each model which 
contained significant village factors from the RI models are included as controls 
in the structural models below.  Finally, these models have included a variable for 
‘cost recovery’ – measured as a binary variable indicating whether the committee 
has indicated that revenues from households cover annual operating costs – in 
those situations where the dependent variable represents administrative 
satisfaction, trust, and future operation.  These represent the only cases where 
village-level indirect effects are calculated. 
This background forms the basis of the models summarized below.  The top of 
each table resembles the format of the random intercept table results, except that a 
sample size-adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion is reported instead of a 
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pseudo R2. The latter statistic is not useful in structural models since there is more 
than one equation to consider in estimation.  Each of the following tables’ first 
columns list unstandardized coefficients (and odds ratios for categorical variables) 
which are considered direct effects on the outcome variables.  The second column 
reports the effects of exogenous variables on significant endogenous variables, 
which are listed in the third column beside it.   A fourth column highlights the 
sign of the indirect effect of the exogenous variable on the outcome.  White cells 
indicate that indirect effects were estimated but were not significant in the model.  
Cells with upward-sloping lines indicate significant positive effects, while cells 
with downward-sloping lines indicate significant negative effects.  Cells with 
trellises (cross-hatched lines) represent cases where indirect effects may be 
considered both positive and negative – these are situations where an exogenous 
variable positively influences the outcome via one endogenous variable and 
simultaneously, negatively influences the outcome via a second endogenous 
variable.  Finally, cells coded in gray represent cases where effects were not 
estimated.   
There are four possibilities which determine the cells in the fourth column 
(besides the gray cells).  Variables which contain white cells in the table are those 
where either the direct effect of the endogenous variable on the outcome is not 
significant or the effect of the exogenous variable on the endogenous variable is 
not significant.  That is, both coefficients must be significant in order to have any 
indirect effect.  Cells with upward-sloping lines indicate the presence of a positive 
indirect effect.  This occurs in two cases: 1) where an exogenous variable 
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positively influences an endogenous variable and that endogenous variable 
positively influences the outcome, or 2) where an exogenous variable negatively 
influences an endogenous variable which in turn has a negative impact on the 
outcome.  The latter situation occurs because indirect effects are calculated as the 
product of the two coefficients – allowing for a ‘double negative’ (and thus 
positive) association with the outcome.   Cells with downward-sloping lines 
exhibit the reverse situation (the third case), in which only one of the significant 
effects is negative.  For example, if household income is positively associated 
with household contributions but contributions in turn negatively impacts water 
committee satisfaction, then one can infer that income indirectly is negatively 
associated with satisfaction.  The final case (cross-hatched lines in a cell) occurs 
when positive and negative indirect effects are present.  This happens when there 
are at least two significant indirect effects (e.g. mediated by two different 
endogenous variables) that have opposite signs.  Treatment of these indirect 
effects is consistent with the literature on structural equation modeling. 
With this background in mind, the reader may now turn to the results.  The 
physical performance results from the application of the random intercept models 
in the case of Peru demonstrated that none of the four endogenous variables (pre-
project participation, contributions, current meeting attendance, and awareness of 
committee spending) influenced the number of household breakdowns.  Thus no 
structural models were attempted.  However, current meeting attendance did 
influence the length of repair days, so a structural model calculated the direct 
effects of all household variables on repair days as well as the indirect effects of 
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exogenous household variables on repair days via their influence on meeting 
attendance.  The results are shown in Table 32.   
Respondents in wealthier households and older respondents reported fewer 
days to repair problems with household taps.  Households with increases in asset 
index scores experienced over 2 ½ fewer days in repair times. Those with higher 
social capital scores reported longer wait times, although the effect (less than one 
full day) is fairly weak.  The magnitude of the effect of household membership 
size declines in importance in this model as compared to the RI model, as does the 
influence of village population.  The model postulated that meeting attendance (a 
significant variable in the RI model) could be explained as a function of seven 
exogenous household variables.  However, since meeting attendance is not 
significantly associated with wait time, no indirect effects emerge as important in 
this model.   
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Table 32:  Peru Structural Equation Models – Number of Repair Days 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECT ON 
OUTCOME 
EFFECT ON SIGN. 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLE 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLE1 
DIRECTION 
OF INDIRECT 
EFFECT2 
Sample N 512 
Loglikelihood -4696 
BIC-adjusted 9508 
Residual Variance 17.51 
Model Type Ordinary Least Squares 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS       
  Tap Age -0.37      
  Participation - # Decisions 0.20     
  Contribution – # Labor Days -0.09      
  Meeting Attendance -0.95      
  PCS Visit Received -0.82      
  HH Members 1.16      
  HH Rooms -1.03      
  Income Category -0.95      
  Asset Index -2.76**      
  Age of Respondent -0.47***      
  Social Capital Score 0.93*      
  System Well Constructed 2.55     
  Knowledge How Funds Spent -3.88     
VILLAGE EFFECTS       
  SANBASUR -2.41    
  Operator Years Experience      
  Operator Trained      
  Source – # Dry Months      
  Source – Length of  
   Distribution Line   
   
  System –  Storage Cracks 
   Detected   
   
  System – No Distribution  
   Leaks Detected   
   
  Village Population 0.000     
  Village Size -0.01***     
  Committee – Years  
   Experience   
   
  Committee Elected     
  Committee Trained      
  Operating Costs Recovered  
   from HHs  
   
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level, *** significant at 1% level 
1: No significant endogenous variables in model 
2:  Grey cells = not included in model, White cells = not statistically significant at 10% rejection level, 
Cells with upward lines = positive and significant at 10% level, Cells with downward lines = negative 
and significant at 10% level 
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 The next model, reported in Table 33, considers the direct and indirect effects 
of household factors and direct village-level influences on whether a household 
pays for water.  Households that know how money is spent in the village for the 
project and those with more wealth are more likely to pay for water service by 
factors of 1.48 and 1.44, respectively.  Contribution levels no longer are 
associated with whether households pay for water as in the RI model.  Regressing 
household knowledge of committee spending on exogenous variables shows some 
interesting indirect effects.  The impact of wealth is directly and indirectly 
associated with  whether households pay for water – wealthier households are 
about 20% more likely to keep tabs on committee’s finances.  Households with 
higher social capital are also more likely to know how money is spent (unit 
increases increase the likelihood by over 10%), which influences whether they 
pay for service.  By contrast, older respondents are less certain how funds are 
spent in the village and therefore less likely to pay for water.  Regarding village 
impacts, households in SANBASUR communities and larger-sized areas were 
again more likely to pay for water service and less likely in cases with long-
serving operators (as previously seen in the RI model).   
The other financial indicator – household payments – is also regressed on 
village and household factors.  Results appear in Table 34.  At the village level, 
only two of the regressors – SANBASUR and the length of the dry season – 
emerge as significant explanatory variables.  Both are negative as in the previous 
model specification.  SANBASUR households pay -0.29 soles less than 
FONCODES households when controlling for other factors, while an increase in 
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the number of months of the dry season is associated with slightly lower 
payments ( -0.08 soles) per month.  Households with older taps, higher income, 
and more positive attitudes about social capital pay more for water service, 
although the effect sizes are very small.  Household labor contributions during the 
construction phase are also negatively associated with water expenditures, 
although again the effects are limited in size.  A regression of contributed 
household labor on exogenous factors suggests divergent indirect effects for the 
two important household factors; income and social capital.  Social capital and 
labor were positively associated, which means that the total effect of social capital 
on water payments is reduced due the presence of this negative indirect 
relationship.  By comparison, households with higher incomes contributed less 
labor.  Thus, the total effect of income on payments is strengthened due to this 
‘double negative’ indirect effect. 
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Table 33:  Peru Structural Equation Models – Users Pay for Water Service 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECT ON 
OUTCOME 
EFFECT ON 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLE 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLE 
DIRECTION OF 
SIGNIFICANT 
INDIRECT 
EFFECTS1 
Sample N 1199 
Loglikelihood -6481 
BIC-adjusted 13102 
Model Type Binary Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS 
(Odds Ratio) 
     
  Tap Age 0.43 (1.53)     
  Participation - # Decisions -0.04 (0.96)     
  Contribution – # Labor Days -0.01 (0.99)     
  Meeting Attendance 0.16 (1.17)     
  PCS Visit Received -0.18 (0.838)     
  HH Members 0.05 (1.05) 0.003 (1.003) Funds Spent   
  HH Rooms 0.07(1.07) -0.02 (0.98) Funds Spent   
  Income Category -0.23 (0.79) -0.10 (0.90) Funds Spent   
  Asset Index 0.36*** (1.44) 0.19*** (1.21) Funds Spent   
  Age of Respondent -0.01 (0.99) -0.02*** (0.98) Funds Spent   
  Social Capital Score -0.06 (0.95) 0.11*** (1.12) Funds Spent   
  System Well Constructed  0.10 (0.90)     
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.39*** (1.48)     
VILLAGE EFFECTS      
  SANBASUR 2.59*** (13.33)    
  Operator Years Experience -0.18* (0.84)    
  Operator Trained      
  Source – # Dry Months      
  Source – Length of 
Distribution Line   
   
  System –  Storage Cracks 
   Detected   
   
  System – No Distribution 
   Leaks Detected   
   
  Village Population 0.000 (1.00)    
  Village Size 0.001** (1.001)    
  Committee – Years  
   Experience   
   
  Committee Elected     
  Committee Trained      
  Operating Costs Recovered  
   from HHs   
   
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level, *** significant at 1% level 
2:  Grey cells = not included in model, White cells = not statistically significant at 10% rejection level, 
Cells with upward lines = positive and significant at 10% level, Cells with downward lines = negative 
and significant at 10% level 
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Table 34:  Peru Structural Equation Models – Payments for Water Service 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECTS ON 
OUTCOME 
EFFECTS ON 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
DIRECTION OF 
SIGNIFICANT 
INDIRECT 
EFFECTS1 
Sample N 889 
Loglikelihood -5316 
BIC-adjusted 10770 
Model Type OLS 
Residual Variance 0.14***    
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS       
  Tap Age 0.04*      
  Participation - # Decisions -0.01      
  Contribution – # Labor Days -0.01*      
  Meeting Attendance -0.01      
  PCS Visit Received 0.05      
  HH Members -0.01  0.49 Contributions   
  HH Rooms -0.001  -0.11 Contributions   
  Income Category 0.04**  -3.54** Contributions   
  Asset Index -0.01  -0.57 Contributions   
  Age of Respondent -0.001  -0.03 Contributions   
  Social Capital Score 0.01**  0.88*** Contributions   
  System Well Constructed 0.01     
  Knowledge How Funds Spent -0.04      
VILLAGE EFFECTS      
  SANBASUR -0.29**     
  Operator Years Experience     
  Operator Trained 0.02     
  Source – # Dry Months -0.08***     
  Source – Length of  
   Distribution Line   
   
  System –  Storage Cracks  
   Detected   
   
  System – No Distribution  
   Leaks Detected   
   
  Village Population 0.000     
  Village Size 0.000     
  Committee – Years  
   Experience -0.01  
   
  Committee Elected     
  Committee Trained 0.09     
  Operating Costs Recovered  
   from HHs   
   
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level, *** significant at 1% level 
2:  Grey cells = not included in model, White cells = not statistically significant at 10% rejection level, 
Cells with upward lines = positive and significant at 10% level, Cells with downward lines = negative 
and significant at 10% level 
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The previous random intercept models did not detect any statistically 
significant relationships between endogenous household variables and water 
safety.  Low water pressure was correlated with meeting attendance; thus a 
structural equation model predicts direct effects as well as indirect household 
effects using meeting attendance as an intermediary variable.  Table 35 finds that 
low pressure is negatively associated with older taps, higher construction quality, 
and meeting attendance.  Meeting attendance was regressed on other variables, 
and indirect effects are witnessed for respondent age (positive) and social capital, 
income, and PCS (all negative).  Households with higher degrees of social capital, 
higher incomes, and those that received post-construction visits are 9%, 32%, and 
over 165% more likely to attend meetings and thus indirectly less likely to report 
lower water pressure.  At the village level, significant direct factor effects occur in 
the same direction as the RI model except that operator training (a previously 
weak negative determinant) drops out in importance in the structural model.   
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Table 35:  Peru Structural Equation Models – Low Water Pressure 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECTS ON 
OUTCOME 
EFFECTS ON 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
DIRECTION OF 
SIGNIFICANT 
INDIRECT 
EFFECTS1 
Sample N 813 
Loglikelihood -3123 
BIC-adjusted 6419 
Model Type Ordered Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS 
(Odds Ratio) 
     
  Tap Age -0.29*  (0.75)     
  Participation - # Decisions -0.01 (0.99)     
  Contribution – # Labor Days 0.00 (1.00)     
  Meeting Attendance -0.19*** (0.82)     
  PCS Visit Received 0.06 (1.06) 0.98*** (2.66) Meeting Attendance   
  HH Members -0.04 (0.96) -0.02 (0.98) Meeting Attendance   
  HH Rooms -0.02 (0.98) 0.08 (1.08) Meeting Attendance   
  Income Category 0.19 (1.21) 0.28*** (1.32) Meeting Attendance   
  Asset Index -0.12 (0.89) -0.12 (0.89) Meeting Attendance   
  Age of Respondent -0.01 (0.99) -0.02*** (0.98) Meeting Attendance   
  Social Capital Score -0.02 (0.98) 0.09*** (1.09) Meeting Attendance   
  System Well Constructed -0.50*** (0.60)     
  Knowledge How Funds  
   Spent -0.15 (0.86) 
  
  
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  SANBASUR 0.12 (1.13)     
  Operator Years Experience      
  Operator Trained -0.26 (0.77)     
  Source – # Dry Months      
  Source – Length of  
   Distribution Line 0.13** (1.14) 
  
  
  System –  Storage Cracks  
   Detected   
  
  
  System – No Distribution   
   Leaks Detected -0.50*** (0.60) 
  
  
  Village Population -0.000 (1.00)     
  Village Size -.001*** (0.99)     
  Committee – Years  
   Experience  
  
  
  Committee Elected -0.66* (0.52)    
  Committee Trained      
  Operating Costs Recovered  
   from HHs   
  
  
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level, *** significant at 1% level 
2:  Grey cells = not included in model, White cells = not statistically significant at 10% rejection level, 
Cells with upward lines = positive and significant at 10% level, Cells with downward lines = negative 
and significant at 10% level 
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Operation and maintenance satisfaction is handled slightly differently than 
other models.  This model postulates it as a function of the household and village-
level regressors plus the repair time a household experiences.  At the household 
level, therefore, there are five endogenous variables: 1) pre-project participation, 
2) pre-project contributions, 3) current participation, 4) knowledge how funds 
spent, and 5) repair time.  Table 36 shows that participation, contribution, and 
knowledge of how funds are spent no longer are significant in the model (as they 
were in the random intercept specifications).  However, higher repair times and 
meeting attendance are negatively associated with satisfaction (as expected).  The 
previous regression showed that asset wealth and respondent age were associated 
with lowered responses on wait times, and here these variables are also indirectly 
associated with improving satisfaction.  In this model, social capital drops out as 
carrying any significant indirect effects on satisfaction with O&M, even though it 
originally appeared as significant in the regression on wait time.  The three 
explanatory variables which arose as important from the other O&M model 
specification (SANBASUR, operator service, and village size) also appear 
significant in this model. 
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Table 36:  Peru Structural Equation Models – O&M Satisfaction 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECTS ON 
OUTCOME 
EFFECTS ON 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
DIRECTION OF 
SIGNIFICANT 
INDIRECT 
EFFECTS1,2 
Sample N 485 
Loglikelihood -4705 
BIC-adjusted 9300 
Model Type Ordered Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS 
(Odds Ratio) 
     
  Tap Age -0.15*** (0.86)     
  Participation - # Decisions -0.04 (0.96)     
  Contribution – # Labor Days -0.002 (0.998) -0.003  Repair Days   
  Meeting Attendance -0.29 (0.75) 0.05  Repair Days   
  PCS Visit Received  0.05 (1.05)     
  HH Members 0.01 (1.01) 0.05  Repair Days   
  HH Rooms 0.04 (1.04)     
  Income Category -0.21 (0.81)     
  Asset Index -0.04 (0.96) -0.15***  Repair Days   
  Age of Respondent -0.02 (0.98) -0.02***  Repair Days   
  Social Capital Score -0.03 (0.97)     
  System Well Constructed 0.44** (1.55)     
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.27 (1.31)     
  Number of Repair Days – last 
   breakdown (log) -0.30*** (0.74) 
  
 
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  SANBASUR 1.08*** (2.94)     
  Operator Years Experience -0.12*** (0.89)     
  Operator Trained 0.000 (1.00)     
  Source – # Dry Months      
  Source – Length of  
   Distribution Line  
  
  
  System –  Storage Cracks  
   Detected  
  
  
  System – No Distribution  
   Leaks Detected  
  
  
  Village Population 0.000 (1.00)     
  Village Size 0.001*** (1.001)     
  Committee – Yrs. Experience      
  Committee Elected     
  Committee Trained      
  Operating Costs Recovered      
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level, *** significant at 1% level 
1:  Grey cells = not included in model, White cells = not statistically significant at 10% rejection level, 
Cells with upward lines = positive and significant at 10% level, Cells with downward lines = negative 
and significant at 10% level 
2: Indirect effects via repair time 
177 
Tables 37 and 38 examine some direct village and household effects and signs 
of indirect household effects on committee satisfaction and trust.  Some 
differences emerge in comparing the RI model for administrative satisfaction with 
the structural model.  Households which contributed less labor and believe the 
system is well-constructed are still more satisfied with water committees.  Again, 
the magnitude of the effects is small for contributions (0.99) and large for 
construction quality (2.07).  Respondents who knew how funds were spent were 
more no more likely than others to have confidence in the committee.  Other 
factors assume greater importance in this model.  Increases in social capital scores 
decrease administrative satisfaction by a factor of 0.93, while every additional 
member in the household increases the likelihood of committee support by a 
factor of 1.095.  When contributions are regressed on exogenous factors, the 
negative relationship between social capital and the satisfaction with the water 
committee is actually strengthened, since people with more social capital also 
contributed more labor to the project.  In contrast, the total positive effect of 
household size is mitigated by the fact that larger households were more likely to 
contribute project labor.  The effect of income is indirectly positive, since 
wealthier households contributed less labor than others.  At the village level, the 
training of committees in villages has led households to support their water 
committees.  There is also a strong positive relationship between cost recovery 
and committee satisfaction.  However, the only village-level variable that 
significantly influenced cost recovery was whether SANBASUR had organized 
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the project – in these areas, households were nearly six times more likely to be 
satisfied with the committee if they were recovering their costs.   
An examination of household trust in the committees also produced some 
interesting total effects.  Table 38 reports that older respondents were slightly less 
trustworthy than others with respect to the committee, yet those with older taps 
were much more trustworthy by a factor of 1.36.  Those who knew how the 
committee spent its resources trusted their leaders as often as those with older 
taps.    Regressing this endogenous factor found that wealth, social capital, and 
PCS visits exerted indirect positive effects on trust in the water committees, while 
household size and respondent age registered as negative indirect impacts.  Unit 
increases in social capital scores and asset index values improved the likelihood 
of knowing how funds were spent by factors of 1.13 and 1.22, while households 
visited in the post-construction phase were more than twice as likely to know how 
funds were spent.  Operator service remained a negative influence on trust (as in 
the RI model), but others factors (such as village size and election of committees) 
flipped their signs.  Since cost recovery was not an important determinant of 
committee trust, no indirect effects were reported in the table.   
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Table 37:  Peru Structural Equation Models – Administrative Satisfaction 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECTS ON 
OUTCOME 
EFFECTS ON 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
DIRECTION OF 
SIGNIFICANT 
INDIRECT 
EFFECTS1 
Sample N 796 
Loglikelihood -4877 
BIC-adjusted 9940 
Model Type Ordered Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS 
(Odds Ratio) 
     
  Tap Age 0.05 (1.05)     
  Participation - # Decisions -0.002 (0.99)     
  Contribution – # Labor Days -0.01** (0.99)     
  Meeting Attendance -0.10 (0.90)     
  PCS Visit Received -0.16 (0.85)     
  HH Members 0.09** (1.10) 0.09**  Contributions   
  HH Rooms 0.01 ((1.01) -0.10  Contributions   
  Income Category -0.17* (0.84) -3.15**  Contributions   
  Asset Index -0.02 (0.98) -0.07  Contributions   
  Age of Respondent 0.004 (1.00) 0.18  Contributions   
  Social Capital Score -0.07*** (0.93) 0.69**  Contributions   
  System Well Constructed 0.73*** (2.07)     
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.15 (1.16)     
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  SANBASUR -0.20 (0.82) 1.77** (5.87) Operating Costs   
  Operator Years Experience       
  Operator Trained       
  Source – # Dry Months       
  Source – Length of  
   Distribution Line   
  
  
  System –  Storage Cracks  
   Detected   
  
  
  System – No Distribution  
   Leaks Detected   
  
  
  Village Population 0.000 (1.00) 0.001 (1.001) Operating Costs   
  Village Size -.003*** (0.99) 0.03 (1.03) Operating Costs   
  Committee – Years  
   Experience -0.02 (0.98) 
0.10 (0.90) Operating Costs 
  
  Committee Elected -0.55 (0.58) -0.81  (0.44) Operating Costs  
  Committee Trained 0.57* (1.77) -0.90 (0.41) Operating Costs   
  Operating Costs Recovered  
   from HHs 0.45*** (1.57) 
  
  
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level, *** significant at 1% level 
1:  Grey cells = not included in model, White cells = not statistically significant at 10% rejection level, 
Cells with upward lines = positive and significant at 10% level, Cells with downward lines = negative 
and significant at 10% level 
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Table 38:  Peru Structural Equation Models – Administrative Trust 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECT ON 
OUTCOMES 
EFFECT ON 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
DIRECTION OF 
SIGNIFICANT 
INDIRECT 
EFFECTS1 
Sample N 884 
Loglikelihood -3882 
BIC-adjusted 7933 
Model Type Ordered Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS 
(Odds Ratio) 
     
  Tap Age 0.30** (1.36)     
  Participation - # Decisions -0.03 (0.97)     
  Contribution – # Labor Days -0.002 (1.00)     
  Meeting Attendance 0.01 (1.01)     
  PCS Visit Received -0.14 (1.04) 0.71*** (2.03) Funds Spent   
  HH Members 0.05 (1.05) 0.05 (1.05) Funds Spent   
  HH Rooms 0.03 (1.03) -0.10** (0.90) Funds Spent   
  Income Category -0.02 (0.98) -0.14 (0.87) Funds Spent   
  Asset Index 0.03 (1.03) 0.20*** (1.22) Funds Spent   
  Age of Respondent -0.01*** (0.99) -0.02*** (0.98) Funds Spent   
  Social Capital Score 0.04 (1.04) 0.12*** (1.13) Funds Spent   
  System Well Constructed       
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.34*** (1.41)     
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  SANBASUR 0.08 (1.08)     
  Operator Years Experience -0.07* (0.93)     
  Operator Trained       
  Source – # Dry Months       
  Source – Length of   
   Distribution Line   
  
  
  System –  Storage Cracks  
   Detected   
  
  
  System – No Distribution  
   Leaks Detected   
  
  
  Village Population 0.00 (1.00)     
  Village Size -0.002*** (0.99)     
  Committee – Years  
   Experience   
  
  
  Committee Elected 0.65** (1.92)    
  Committee Trained       
  Operating Costs Recovered  
   from HHs 0.20 (1.22) 
  
  
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level, *** significant at 1% level 
1:  Grey cells = not included in model, White cells = not statistically significant at 10% rejection level, 
Cells with upward lines = positive and significant at 10% level, Cells with downward lines = negative 
and significant at 10% level 
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Tables 39 and 40 summarize model results for whether a respondent believes 
their system will function over the next five and ten year periods.   People whose 
households contributed to the water system were slightly more likely to have 
confidence over both periods of time.  Those who judged their systems as well-
designed and knew how money was spent were more likely to believe their 
systems would perform over both time frames.  The magnitudes for these effects 
were relatively large – households that viewed system construction more 
favorably were more likely to have confidence by a factor of 1.79, while those 
who knew how funds were spent also exuded more confidence by a factor of 1.27.   
In contrast, movements into higher income brackets lowered confidence by one-
third; an effect similar to that found in the RI specification.  Respondent age and 
attitudes toward social capital (weakly) also improved the chances they would say 
yes over a five year period, but failed to reject the null hypothesis over a ten year 
frame.  Indirect effects were identical across five or ten year periods.  Via labor 
contributions, households with more members thought their systems would 
function over time while higher-income households did not think this was the 
case.  Indirect effects of post-construction support, social capital, and wealth via 
knowledge of spending showed that these households were more likely to believe 
they would perform, while older respondents and again higher-income households 
did not find that their system would be maintained over these time frames.  No 
village factors emerged as significant in the five-year model, while only 
households in SANBASUR communities were more likely to believe that their 
system would not function in the next ten years.   
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Table 39:  Peru Structural Equation Models – Confidence Over Five Year Period 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECT ON 
OUTCOME 
EFFECT ON 
SIGN.  ENDO. 
VARIABLE 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLE 
DIRECTION OF 
INDIRECT 
EFFECTS1 
Sample N 955 
Loglikelihood -5499 
BIC-adjusted 11127 
Model Type Binary Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS 
(Odds Ratio) 
     
  Tap Age 0.23 (1.26)     
  Participation - # Decisions 0.03 (1.03)     
  Contribution – # Labor Days 0.02** (1.02)     
  Meeting Attendance 0.05 (1.05)     
  PCS Visit Received -0.36 (0.70) 0.59*** (1.80) Funds Spent   
  HH Members -0.02 (0.98) 0.84***,  
0.05 (1.05) 
Contribution, 
Funds Spent   
  HH Rooms 0.07 (1.08) -0.23, 
-0.07 (0.93) 
Contribution, 
Funds Spent   
  Income Category -0.41*** (0.67) -2.60**,  
-0.19 (0.83) 
Contribution, 
Funds Spent   
  Asset Index -0.13 (0.88) 0.18,  
0.16*** (1.17) 
Contribution, 
Funds Spent   
  Age of Respondent 0.02** (1.02) -0.09,  
-0.02*** (0.98) 
Contribution, 
Funds Spent   
  Social Capital Score 0.05* (1.05) 0.40,  
0.11*** (1.12) 
Contribution, 
Funds Spent   
  System Well Constructed 0.58*** (1.79)     
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.24** (1.27)     
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  SANBASUR -0.15 (0.86)     
  Operator Years Experience       
  Operator Trained       
  Source – # Dry Months       
  Source – Length of  
   Distribution Line   
  
  
  System –  Storage Cracks  
   Detected   
  
  
  System – No Distribution  
   Leaks Detected   
  
  
  Village Population 0.000 (1.00)      
  Village Size       
  Committee – Yrs. Experience       
  Committee Elected      
  Committee Trained       
  Operating Costs Recovered 0.03 (1.03)     
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level, *** significant at 1% level 
1:  Grey cells = not included in model, White cells = not statistically significant at 10% rejection level, 
Cells with upward lines = positive and significant at 10% level, Cells with downward lines = negative 
and significant at 10% level 
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Table 40:  Peru Structural Equation Models – Confidence Over Ten Year Period 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECT ON 
OUTCOME 
EFFECT ON 
SIGN.  ENDO. 
VARIABLE 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
DIRECTION OF 
INDIRECT 
EFFECTS1 
Sample N 799    
Loglikelihood -5379    
BIC-adjusted 10916    
Model Type Binary Logit    
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS 
(Odds Ratio) 
     
  Tap Age 0.22 (1.24)     
  Participation - # Decisions -0.01 (0.99)     
  Contribution – # Labor Days 0.01*** (1.01)     
  Meeting Attendance -0.03 (0.97)     
  PCS Visit Received -0.07 (0.94) 0.25*** (1.28) Funds Spent   
  HH Members -0.001 (1.00) 0.78**  
0.02 (1.02) 
Contribution, 
Funds Spent   
  HH Rooms -0.04 (0.97) 0.10,  
-0.03 (0.97) 
Contribution, 
Funds Spent   
  Income Category -0.35*** (0.70) -3.31***,  
-0.04 (0.96) 
Contribution, 
Funds Spent   
  Asset Index -0.11 (0.90) 0.36,  
0.09*** (1.10) 
Contribution, 
Funds Spent   
  Age of Respondent 0.002 (1.00) -0.07,  
-0.01** (0.99) 
Contribution, 
Funds Spent   
  Social Capital Score -0.02 (0.98) 0.59*,  
0.04*** (1.04) 
Contribution, 
Funds Spent   
  System Well Constructed 0.37*** (1.45)     
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.36*** (1.44)     
VILLAGE EFFECTS     
  SANBASUR -0.79*** (0.45)     
  Operator Years Experience       
  Operator Trained 0.03 (1.03)     
  Source – # Dry Months       
  Source – Length of  
   Distribution Line       
  System –  Storage Cracks     
   Detected      
  System – No Distribution  
   Leaks Detected 0.12 (1.13)     
  Village Population       
  Village Size -0.002 (1.00)     
  Committee – Yrs. Experience -0.02 (0.98)     
  Committee Elected      
  Committee Trained       
  Operating Costs Recovered 0.13      
* significant at 10% rejection level, ** significant at 5% rejection level, *** significant at 1% level 
1:  Grey cells = not included in model, White cells = not statistically significant at 10% rejection level, 
Cells with upward lines = positive and significant at 10% level, Cells with downward lines = negative 
and significant at 10% level 
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6.3.4. Structural Models – Ghana 
These models identify the same set of endogenous and exogenous variables as 
those in the Peru study.  The key difference between these models and the 
previous section is the presence of variables which account for different tariff 
schemes in Ghanaian villages.   
Tables 41 and 42 describe the direct and indirect effects on financial 
indicators.  At the household level, only previous participation and current 
meeting awareness determine whether a household pays for water after 
controlling for other factors.  An increase in the number of decisions a household 
gave input upon increased the likelihood of payment by a factor of 1.39, while 
meeting awareness more than doubled the likelihood of payment.  Both of these 
endogenous factors were regressed on the exogenous household factors in this 
model.  Older respondents and those in households with higher expenditures were 
indirectly more likely to pay for water service via participation in the process.  
Additionally, those with higher incomes, a more positive attitude about social 
capital, and who had been visited in the past by outside agencies indirectly were 
more likely to pay for service via their current involvement in meetings.   Tariff 
structures solely explained the village-level factors that predict whether a 
household paid.  Regressions of the two most common tariffs (flat fees and pay as 
you fetch) on other village factors suggested that households communities with 
elected watsans are about 70% less likely to pay flat fees and nearly three times 
more likely to pay as they fetch (hence the cross-hatched cell in the last column).   
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Table 41:  Ghana Structural Equation Models – Users Pay for Water 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECT 
ON 
OUTCOME 
EFFECT ON 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES1 
DIRECTION OF 
SIGNIFICANT 
INDIRECT 
EFFECTS 
Sample N 928 
Loglikelihood -3900 
BIC-adjusted 8074 
Model  Binary Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS 
(Odds Ratio) 
     
  Participation Index 0.33** (1.39)     
  HH Contributes -0.79 (0.45)     
  Meeting Awareness 0.76**  (2.13)     
  PCS visit -0.79 (0.46) 0.23 (1.26) Meeting Aware.   
  Social Capital -0.10 (0.90) 0.05,  
0.05*** (1.05) 
Participation, 
Meeting Aware 
  
  Age of Respondent -0.02 (0.99) 0.03***,  
0.004 (1.004) 
Participation, 
Meeting Aware 
  
  HH Members 0.06 ((1.06) 0.05,  
-0.04* (0.96) 
Participation, 
Meeting Aware 
  
  HH Rooms -0.19 (0.83) -0.05,  
0.002 (1.002) 
Participation, 
Meeting Aware 
  
  Treats water 0.48 (1.62)     
  Monthly Expenditures (log) 0.003 (1.00) 0.50***,  
0.21* (1.23) 
Participation, 
Meeting Aware 
  
  Asset Index -0.02 (0.98) 0.07,  
0.04 (1.04) 
Participation, 
Meeting Aware 
  
  System Well Constructed -0.70 (0.50)     
  Knowledge How Funds Spent -0.43 (0.65)     
VILLAGE EFFECTS       
  Volta Region 0.46 (1.58) -0.57 (0.57),  
0.78 (2.18) 
Flat fee, pay as 
fetch 
 
  Watsan Elected 1.02 (2.77) -1.49** (0.23), 
1.06** (2.88) 
Flat fee, pay as 
fetch 
 
  Watsan Years -0.08 (0.92) 0.03 (1.03),  
-0.05 (0.95) 
Flat fee, pay as 
fetch 
 
  Watsan Trained 0.28 (1.32) -0.15 (0.86),  
-0.22 (0.80) 
Flat fee, pay as 
fetch 
  
  Operator – Number of       
  Distance to Area Mechanic       
  Source: # Dry months  -0.28 (0.68) -0.30 (0.74),  
0.16 (1.17) 
Flat fee, pay as 
fetch 
  
  Village Population -0.00 (0.999) 0.000, 0.000 
(1.00) 
Flat fee, pay as 
fetch 
  
  Village Size 0.05 (1.05) -0.004 (0.996),  
0.03 (1.03) 
Flat fee, pay as 
fetch 
  
  Tariff Payment – as needed       
  Tariff Payment - flat fee 7.29***      
  Tariff Payment - HH fee 10.35***      
  Tariff Payment – pay as fetch 9.92***      
  Operating Costs Recovered      
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Table 42:  Ghana Structural Equation Models – Monthly Log Water Payments 
 
 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECT 
ON 
OUTCOME 
EFFECT ON 
SIGN. 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLE 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLE1 
DIRECTION OF 
SIGNIFICANT 
INDIRECT 
EFFECTS 
Sample N 932 
Loglikelihood -1526 
BIC-adjusted 4307 
Model  OLS 
Residual Variance 1.30** 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS      
  Participation Index 0.03      
  HH Contributes -0.28      
  Meeting Awareness 0.07      
  PCS visit -0.03      
  Social Capital -0.01      
  Age of Respondent -0.002      
  HH Members -0.01      
  HH Rooms -0.02      
  Treats water -0.23      
  Monthly Expenditures (log) -0.03      
  Asset Index 0.01      
  System Well Constructed -0.45      
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.05      
VILLAGE EFFECTS       
  Volta Region -0.09  -0.57, 0.78 Flat fee, pay fetch  
  Watsan Elected 0.06  -1.49**, 1.06** Flat fee, pay fetch  
  Watsan Years -0.02  0.03, -0.05 Flat fee, pay fetch  
  Watsan Trained 0.02  -0.15, -0.22 Flat fee, pay fetch   
  Operator – Number of       
  Distance to Area Mechanic       
  Source: # Dry months  0.12  -0.30, 0.16 Flat fee, pay fetch   
  Village Population 0.00  0.000, 0.000 Flat fee, pay fetch   
  Village Size 0.01  -0.004, 0.03 Flat fee, pay fetch   
  Tariff Payment – as needed       
  Tariff Payment - flat fee 5.36***      
  Tariff Payment - HH fee 5.20***      
  Tariff Payment – pay as fetch 2.54***      
  Operating Costs Recovered      
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Tables 43 and 44 summarize the results of structural models that examine 
household satisfaction and trust in the watsan committees.  The same positive 
(social capital, household members, and knowledge of funds) and negative 
(household size and income) relationships emerge as direct effects as those in the 
RI specifications.  Households with higher social capital scores are 27% more 
likely to be satisfied with the watsan committee.  Increases in household members 
also raise this likelihood by 1.12, while gains in financial knowledge improve the 
likelihood by almost three-fold.  Regressing knowledge of how committees spend 
their funds on other household variables found that attitudes toward social capital, 
PCS visits, and logged expenditures indirectly improved the level of household 
satisfaction with committees.  Unit increase in social capital scores produced 17% 
gains in knowledge of committee spending, while expenditure increases were 
associated with an even higher probability of understanding.  Since income also is 
positively correlated with knowledge, this effect mitigates the overall negative 
perception which higher-income households may have concerning the 
committees’ work.  Moreover, households which have been visited by external 
agencies are almost 75% more likely to know how committees spend their money 
and thus more likely to be satisfied with their work.  Households are less satisfied 
in places where area mechanics live further away and happier with watsans when 
they only collect fees every once in a while (as opposed to never).  Cost recovery 
was not a significant component in predicting watsan satisfaction; thus no indirect 
effects are reported. 
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Household levels of watsan trust were associated with similar factors as 
watsan satisfaction (social capital, household members, household size (-), and 
knowledge of spending).  The magnitudes of odds ratios for social capital (1.27), 
household membership (1.05), and knowledge of committee spending (2.06) are 
less than those reported for committee satisfaction.  People who believed in the 
integrity of the water systems and who were aware of meetings also were more 
likely to trust watsans more often (by factors of 1.37 and 1.33, respectively), 
while those who contributed to the project were about ½ as trusting after 
controlling for other factors.  Three significant endogenous variables 
(contribution, meeting attendance, and spending knowledge) were regressed 
simultaneously in the model.  Results showed that larger-person households were 
less aware of meetings and of spending and thus indirectly were not as trusting of 
the committees.  Positive indirect effects were tallied for household size (since 
those in larger households actually contributed less often), social capital (via 
knowledge of meetings and spending), income (via the same), and respondent age 
(via meeting involvement).  At the village level, the area mechanics’ distance 
negatively impacted watsan trust, though the magnitude of this relationship was 
limited given the weak size of the direct effect.     
Table 45 presents the final structural model, which features five-year system 
confidence as the indicator of sustainability.  People with more positive attitudes 
toward social capital, who treated their water, and who perceived that contractors 
built their system well were more likely to have confidence that they would have 
water from project boreholes over the next five years.  The effect of social capital 
189 
attitudes was minor (unit increases increased the probability of saying yes by a 
factor of 1.04), while system construction registered higher values (at 1.37).  
Those who treated their water were most confident, as they were more than twice 
as likely to believe the handpumps would continue to run.  Surprisingly, those 
who knew how the watsan spent its money were less sanguine about this 
projection.  When this variable was regressed on exogenous household factors, 
positive associations with this knowledge (income, social capital, and PCS visits) 
meant that those with higher income, more positive attitudes about social capital, 
and who had received visits were indirectly less promising about the chances of 
future operation.  Once again, at the village level, distance to the area mechanic 
was a key negative explanatory factor in predicting household confidence.  
Regional differences between Volta and Brong Ahafo from the previous RI model 
also appeared here, as Volta residents on the whole were 57% more likely to 
believe that their systems would function over five years than those in Brong 
Ahafo.  The practice of recovering operating costs did not emerge as a significant 
direct impact, therefore no significant village-level indirect effects were detected.   
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Table 43:  Ghana Structural Equation Model Results – Watsan Satisfaction 
* Significant at 10% rejection level, ** Significant at 5% rejection level, *** Significant at 1% rejection level 
 
 
 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECT ON 
OUTCOMES 
EFFECT ON 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
DIRECTION OF 
SIGNIFICANT 
INDIRECT 
EFFECTS 
Sample N 1111 
Loglikelihood -5050 
BIC-adjusted 10276 
Model  Ordered Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS 
(Odds Ratios) 
     
  Participation Index 0.01 (1.01)     
  HH Contributes -0.06 (0.94)     
  Meeting Awareness 0.16 (1.18)     
  PCS visit 0.22 (1.24) 0.55*** (1.73) Funds spent   
  Social Capital 0.24*** (1.27) 0.16*** (1.17) Funds spent   
  Age of Respondent -0.003 (1.00) 0.001 (1.001) Funds spent   
  HH Members 0.11*** (1.12) -0.04 (0.96) Funds spent   
  HH Rooms -0.11** (0.90) -0.04 (0.96) Funds spent   
  Treats water 0.45 (1.56)     
  Monthly Expenditures (log) -0.34* (0.71) 0.29*** (1.34) Funds spent   
  Asset Index -0.04 (0.97) -0.05 (0.95) Funds spent   
  System Well Constructed 0.26 (1.29)     
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 1.00*** (2.71)     
VILLAGE EFFECTS       
  Volta Region -0.57 (0.57)    
  Watsan Elected     
  Watsan Years     
  Watsan Trained      
  Operator – Number of      
  Distance to Area Mechanic -0.02*** (0.98)     
  Source: # Dry months       
  Village Population      
  Village Size 0.03 (1.03)     
  Tariff Payment – as needed 1.91***      
  Tariff Payment - flat fee      
  Tariff Payment - HH fee      
  Tariff Payment – pay as fetch      
  Operating Costs Recovered 
from HH fees 
-0.48 (0.61)     
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Table 44:  Ghana Structural Equation Model Results – Committee Trust 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECT ON 
OUTCOME 
EFFECT ON 
SIGN. ENDOG. 
VARIABLES 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
DIRECTION OF 
SIGN. IND. 
EFFECTS 
Sample N 1103 
Loglikelihood -9443 
BIC-adjusted 19177 
Model  Ordered Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS 
(Odds Ratios) 
     
  Participation Index 0.06 (1.06)     
  HH Contributes -0.72*** (0.49)     
  Meeting Awareness 0.29** (1.33)     
  PCS visit 0.32 (1.38) 0.28 (1.32),  
0.66** (1.93) 
Meeting Aware.,  
Funds Spent  
  
  Social Capital 0.22*** (1.24) 0.05 (1.05), 
0.04** (1.04), 
0.15*** (1.16) 
Contribution, 
Meetings,  
Funds Spent 
  
  Age of Respondent 0.002 (1.00) -0.004 (0.99), 
0.01* (1.01), 
0.001 (1.00) 
Contribution, 
Meetings,  
Funds Spent 
  
  HH Members 0.05* (1.05) 0.07 (1.08), 
0.04** (1.04), -
0.04* (0.96) 
Contribution, 
Meetings,  
Funds Spent 
 
  HH Rooms -0.09** (0.92) -0.09**(0.91), -
0.001, (1.00), 
0.06 (1.06) 
Contribution, 
Meetings,  
Funds Spent 
  
  Treats water 0.35 (1.41)     
  Monthly Expenditures (log) -0.06 (0.94) -0.06 (0.94), 
0.18* (1.20), 
0.25** (1.28) 
Contribution, 
Meetings,  
Funds Spent 
  
  Asset Index -0.05 (0.95) 0.09 (1.10),  
0.02 (1.02), 
-0.03(0.97) 
Contribution, 
Meetings,  
Funds Spent 
  
  System Well Constructed 0.32* (1.37)     
  Knowledge How Funds Spent 0.80*** (2.26)     
VILLAGE EFFECTS       
  Volta Region -0.20 (0.82)     
  Watsan Elected 0.35 (1.42)    
  Watsan Years -0.05 (0.95)    
  Watsan Trained 0.40*** (1.49)     
  Operator – Number of  0.40 (1.49)     
  Distance to Area Mechanic  -0.01* (0.99)     
  Source: # Dry months        
  Village Population       
  Village Size       
  Tariff Payment – as needed 0.48 (1.62)     
  Tariff Payment - flat fee 0.70*** (2.01)     
  Tariff Payment - HH fee      
  Tariff Payment – pay as fetch      
  Operating Costs Recovered -0.29 (0.75)     
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Table 45:  Ghana Structural Equation Model Results – Five-Year Confidence 
* Significant at 10% rejection level, ** Significant at 5% rejection level, *** Significant at 1% rejection level 
 
MODEL INFORMATION EFFECTS ON 
OUTCOME 
EFFECT ON 
SIGN. ENDOG. 
VARIABLES 
SIGNIFICANT 
ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
DIRECTION OF 
SIGN. IND. 
EFFECTS 
Sample N 1112 
Loglikelihood -9737 
BIC-adjusted 19731 
Model  Binary Logit 
HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS 
(Odds Ratio) 
     
  Participation Index 0.03 (1.03)     
  HH Contributes 0.27 (1.30)     
  Meeting Awareness -0.04 (0.97)     
  PCS visit 0.16 (1.18)     
  Social Capital 0.04** (1.04) 0.15*** (1.16) Funds Spent   
  Age of Respondent 0.004 (1.00) 0.002 (1.002) Funds Spent   
  HH Members -0.02 (0.98) -0.04 (0.96) Funds Spent   
  HH Rooms 0.02 (1.02) -0.06 (0.94) Funds Spent   
  Treats water 0.97*** (2.64)     
  Monthly Expenditures (log) -0.02 (0.98) 0.24** (1.27) Funds Spent   
  Asset Index 0.02 (1.02) -0.04 (0.96) Funds Spent   
  System Well Constructed 0.32*** (1.37)     
  Knowledge How Funds Spent -0.36*** (0.70)     
VILLAGE EFFECTS       
  Volta Region 0.57* (1.57)    
  Watsan Elected 0.18 (1.20)    
  Watsan Years -0.003 (0.997)    
  Watsan Trained -0.01 (0.99     
  Operator – Number of      
  Distance to Area Mechanic -0.01*** (0.99)     
  Source: # Dry months  0.01 (0.99)     
  Village Population 0.00 (1.00)     
  Village Size 0.001 (1.001)     
  Tariff Payment – as needed      
  Tariff Payment - flat fee -0.14      
  Tariff Payment - HH fee 0.07     
  Tariff Payment – pay as fetch -0.34      
  Operating Costs Recovered -0.15 (0.86)     
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 6.3.5. Structural Equation Models with Sustainability as Latent Variable 
The final section of the chapter identifies a general model of sustainability for 
the Peru and Ghana cases.  It uses a random intercept framework and ignores the 
distinction between exogenous and endogenous household variables.  In these 
models, sustainability is conceived as a single-factor latent variable; indicated by 
six dependent variables which are estimated simultaneously along with the 
household and village factors.  Table 46 lists the selected dependent indicator 
variables used in each model and the estimated coefficients.  The signs of the 
coefficients are relative to those of the variable for which the model fixes the 
variance at 1 for estimation.  Water pressure was substituted for overall water 
dissatisfaction in the Ghana analysis.   
Table 46:  Indicators and Values Used in General Sustainability Models 
INDICATOR PERU GHANA 
Household Pays for Water Fixed at 1 1.043 
Low Water Pressure N/A Fixed at 1 
Water Dissatisfaction -1.671***     N/A 
O&M Satisfaction 2.296** -1.87* 
Committee Satisfaction 2.067***     -1.60 
Five Year Confidence 0.776***     -0.486* 
 
While both models converged successfully, Table 46 shows substantial 
differences in the quality of the results.  The Peru model generated indicators 
which converged reasonably well around the notion of sustainability.  All 
indicators were highly significant and in the expected direction (household 
satisfaction with O&M and committee work and five-year confidence all move in 
a positive direction while overall dissatisfaction moves in a negative direction).  
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In the Ghana case, the signs of these variables are reversed since they are based 
on their direction relative to low water pressure.  However, only two of the four 
indicators in the Ghana study were significant indicators of the latent 
sustainability variable, and their significance can be rejected at a 5% level.  The 
problem may have been due to the model’s difficulty with the assumption of 
multivariate normality, which estimators can relax fairly well but which may have 
been too difficult a problem to overcome with the Ghana data.  Another 
possibility is that the values of these variables are less related to one another in 
the Ghana case than they are in the Peru study.  This would suggest that Ghana’s 
indicators of sustainability do not reasonably measure sustainability together. 
Table 47 in the Appendix summarizes the results from the Peru model.  The 
model suggests that households who believe in the integrity of their systems and 
know how their water committee spends its money are more likely to have a 
positive outlook about the sustainability of their project.  The strength and 
magnitude of attitudes concerning system design are very strong, while the 
magnitude of the knowledge coefficient is fair but the strength of significance is 
weak.  Families with higher incomes are less likely to believe in the sustainable 
performance of their systems.  Those with higher social capital scores are also less 
likely – yet the magnitude of the coefficient is fairly weak.  The two village 
factors that emerge as determinants of sustainable performance are village 
population and length of operator service.  The magnitudes of these coefficients, 
however, are fairly weak, limiting the relevance of the results. 
  
VII. Discussion of Findings 
7.1. Assessment of Sustainability of Rural Water Systems in Peru and Ghana 
 
The success of many villages in both Peru and Ghana suggests that the 
participatory, demand-oriented model of development overall is working quite well.  
In Peru, over 90% of yard taps were found in working condition.  Households in 
many villages experience few problems with their taps and wait less than one week 
for their service to be restored.  Others encounter more periodic breakdowns and, in 
some villages, must wait much longer until someone can repair the problems.  Most 
households are paying some flat fee for water service in each village, although the 
amounts in many places are relatively nominal.  Water committees report that they are 
covering basic O&M costs in about half of the sampled villages.  Many households 
are satisfied with water attributes like safety, color, and taste, although water pressure 
could be better in the dry season in some areas.  A majority is satisfied overall with 
their potable water and with the work of the operators and water committees, yet 
there are clearly some villages where households registered dissatisfaction with their 
work.  There are moderate degrees of difference across and within villages on these 
measures.  Most respondents do believe the systems will function over the next five 
years, but less than half share the same confidence that the water committee can keep 
the systems running over ten years.  Given the relative levels of poverty that exists 
among most of these communities and the remote locations of many villages, much of 
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this news is encouraging for advocates of extending rural water services in highland 
Peru. 
The situation in Ghana also holds promise for participatory, community-managed 
water projects.  Villagers in the Brong Ahafo and Volta regions experience on average 
less than two breakdowns per month.  Wait times for restoration of service are longer 
on average than in Peru (18 days vs. 5 days), and this varies considerably across 
villages.  Almost three-quarters of Ghanaian households reported that they paid for 
water service, which leaves a substantial minority of users who do not pay for service.  
However, users who are charged for service pay more on average per month than 
Peruvian households.  There are a variety of tariff structures utilized by villages to 
encourage payment.  As a result, an equal proportion of villages (53%) in both 
countries reported that they covered basic operation and maintenance costs.  While 
Ghanaian households detect that their water has an unfavorable taste much more often 
than their Peruvian counterparts, Ghanaian respondents are as likely to be satisfied 
with water pressure in the dry season and even more sanguine about the safety of 
their water (86%) than Peruvian respondents.  Over three-quarters of households are 
satisfied with and trust their watsan committees.  All of these indicators suggest that 
the new water systems are holding up fairly well after periods of five to ten years and 
that many are satisfied with their operation and administration.  However, despite 
efforts to encourage villages to meet their own O&M costs with user revenues, this 
remains a problem among some water committees.  In addition, Ghanaian households 
are more uncertain that their water committees have the resources to keep these 
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systems running over the next five years.  Almost ½ of respondents do not believe 
their handpumps will continue to deliver water in five years time. 
 
7.2. Relationship Between Sustainability Indicators and System-Related Project Factors 
 From a planning perspective, project factors can be separated into two categories.  
The first category represents system-related characteristics and perceptions that 
describe the physical capacity of the existing water system.  At a household level, 
these measures refer to the age of yard taps (in Peru) and the quality of system 
construction as perceived by respondents.  One village-level measure (used in both 
Ghana and Peru) that potentially affects the ability of the source to deliver water to 
the system is the length of the dry season.  Other measures found in the Peru case 
include assessments of storage tanks, distribution lines, and the length of the main 
transmission line from the source to the village.  Planning responses to these factors 
primarily involve upgrading the structural integrity and capacity of the physical 
system and improving the efficiency of the system to store and deliver available water 
to residents. 
Overall, many respondents in both countries praised the quality of initial 
construction and its’ ability to continue to deliver water services through the present 
day.  Household perceptions of the quality of initial system construction were 
positively and strongly associated with perceptions of water pressure in both 
countries, the safety of water in Peru, and the lack of salty, mineral, or chemical taste 
in Ghana.  Households in Peru which valued the integrity of initial construction were 
more likely not to voice dissatisfaction with water from their tap.  These results come 
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as no surprise, given that households may associate initial construction with the 
quality of water attributes.  Moreover, households in Peru are more likely to show 
satisfaction with watsan committees if they valued initial construction, while 
Ghanaian respondents are more likely to trust watsans for the same reason.  There 
seems to be a spillover effect - watsan committees are praised for their efforts in areas 
where residents valued the initial construction.  In addition, households in both 
countries are much more likely to believe that their systems will function in the next 
five years if they were confident in initial construction.  System construction appears 
to be an area of strength for these potable water programs in both countries. 
One might expect that if the system was not well constructed, over time the 
household would experience more problems.  Yet there is little evidence that 
households with older taps are performing worse.  Households which connected 
earlier to the system have experienced more breakdowns (an estimated one additional 
breakdown for every three years in age), but this is not a large number for many 
households at the moment.  More importantly, households with older taps actually 
complain less of water pressure problems in the dry season and are more satisfied 
overall with their water.  These effects are robust to sensitivity analyses which 
subsequently remove household predictors.  Coefficients for the effect of older taps 
range in values from -0.43 to -0.53 for water pressure and -0.79 to -0.85 for overall 
satisfaction.  These data suggest that water systems (at least in the Peruvian 
highlands) can be designed to bring water directly to households over long periods of 
time. 
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One potential factor considered by agencies in designing water projects is whether 
there is enough water at the source to meet village needs.  The length of a dry season 
can impact the amount of available water and reduce the performance of the project.  
This factor did not influence results from the Peru and Ghana studies in a meaningful 
fashion.  The main finding to emerge was that households located in villages with 
longer dry seasons in Peru (but not Ghana) paid less on average for water than those 
with shorter seasons.  It would be troubling if there was a large discrepancy in 
payments, but the magnitude (at 0.08 soles per extra month) is too low to consider as 
important.  Other system factors in Peru also did not emerge as empirically important 
in the results.  The length of transmission lines was not a factor among most 
indicators.  Engineers’ assessments of storage cracks and fissures in distribution lines 
produced conflicting results with respect to the numbers of breakdowns households 
experienced as well as their satisfaction.  While these systems in Peru may have 
structural problems, in most cases they are not imposing burdens on households, 
affecting payment for services, increasing dissatisfaction, or instilling a sense of 
foreboding about future system operation.    
 
7.3. Relationship Between Sustainability Indicators and Management-Related 
Project Factors 
The other category of project factors focuses on the actors, processes, and 
decisions regarding water system management.  While system-related factors deal 
more with engineering decisions, these factors focus more on pre-project planning 
decisions, current management techniques and involvement, and external resources 
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for system support.  At the household level, variables in both countries included 
participation in pre-project decisions, contributions toward the project during 
construction, current meeting attendance, current awareness of how committees spend 
funds, and visits received for support in the post-construction phase.  An additional 
variable measured in Ghana – household-level water treatment practices – was also 
considered.  Several village-level measures entail management activities and 
operating support.  Committee experience, training, and management structure are 
included as measures in both countries.  In Peru, agency type, operator experience 
and training, and cost recovery practices were also considered; while in Ghana 
operating support, tariff structures and cost recovery practices, and the distance to 
nearby mechanics round out these variables.   
Both the Peru and Ghana cases demonstrated that previous participation did not 
generally explain sustainable outcomes.  Involvement in project decisions was not 
associated with better performance, satisfaction with water attributes, or future system 
confidence.  Ghanaian households were more likely to pay for water service if they 
participated in the project, and the magnitude of the change in this likelihood was an 
important factor.  However, this was not the case in Peru.  Relationships between 
previous participation and attitudes toward operators and committees varied with the 
countries, as high-participating Peruvian households were less likely to be satisfied 
with O&M and trust their water committee while more involved Ghanaian 
households were more likely to trust watsans.  The strengths of significance and 
effect sizes, however, were rather low for these relationships.  It is not surprising that 
past participation in project decisions is not related to many of these measures.  
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Households that participated in more decisions may have an equal chance of having 
breakdowns, may receive less than satisfactory water, or believe that their system 
would not function over time.  The evidence does not condemn participation per se, 
as the study design does not allow for comparisons against villages with no 
participation in obtaining new water services.  However, it does suggest that pre-
project participation does not guarantee post-project results. 
What about the relationship between current meeting participation and indicators 
of sustainability?  Results in Peru do not indicate strong correlations on most 
measures.  Households who participate more often experience a few additional hours 
of repair time.  They are, however, considerably less likely to report problems with 
water pressure.  In Ghana, there is a strong association between meeting attendance 
and payment for water service.  One speculation is that households attend meetings 
much more often if they pay for water service, rather than vice versa.  They are also 
much more likely to report problems with salty water than those who don’t pay and 
are significantly less trustworthy of watsans and prospects for the future (although the 
effect sizes on trust and future performance are virtually zero).  This might indicate 
that one of the reasons households attend meetings is to complain about or encourage 
committees to improve water taste (which would not be surprising given that over 
30% reported that their water tasted salty).  In general, households are not using 
meetings as a major forum to either voice support for the committees’ work or push 
for improvements to the system.  Possible exceptions are the association with low 
water pressure in Peru and water taste in Ghana. 
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The results from both countries show that a household’s contribution toward 
construction of the new project does not necessarily portend satisfactory results.  The 
Peru study uncovered evidence that mean labor contributions are negatively 
associated with the likelihood of paying anything and paying more for water service 
(although the latter effect is negligible).  The effect on the probability of payment is 
low, and once additional household factors (such as attitudes toward construction 
quality) are removed from the analysis, the significance can be summarily rejected.  
However, the estimate remains stable and significant regardless of household-level 
model specification.  Many households in Peru appeared to have substituted labor for 
cash contributions, so they may be less willing to pay for service (but not necessarily 
less able, since wealth does not arise as a significant factor in predicting financial 
outcomes).  Several other significant relationships emerge between pre-project 
contributions and indicators of sustainability, but the low odds ratios suggest that pre-
project contributions do not impact satisfaction with current service or prospects for 
the future.  A different picture arises in the Ghana case, however.  Households which 
contributed to the project pay just over ½ less than those who did not contribute.  This 
is possible, for example, if water committees waive tariffs (per bucket, flat fees, etc.) 
for those who contributed more toward the project.  They are also four times as likely 
to report that their water tastes salty and half as likely to trust the watsan committee. 
The latter effect is relatively robust to removing household predictors, although its’ 
significance declines when social capital is excluded.  This may indicate that 
households which contributed to the project believe they deserved more from their 
water system and committee members, and are able and willing to refuse to pay for 
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service.  These results are also important in light of the fact that households in some 
villages were required to contribute funds toward their projects.   
One of the key results to emerge from both countries is that households who are 
aware how the committee spends its funds (from the village, households, or both) are 
generally happier about their water projects.  While no differences exist regarding 
financial payments in Ghana, Peruvian households are almost twice as likely to pay 
for water service if they know about the committee’s financial dealings.  They are 
also about one and one-half times more satisfied with and trustworthy of committee 
members.  The relationship between keeping tabs on water committees and watsan 
satisfaction and trust is even higher in Ghana, as progressive increases in knowledge 
lead to rates of satisfaction that are two and three times higher than less knowledge.  
These findings suggest that greater transparency leads to higher user satisfaction and 
(in the case of Peru) a greater likelihood of paying for service.  Villages where water 
committees make their financial dealings more known to the public contain 
households which are more likely to pay for service.  A further, unintended 
consequence of improved knowledge of financial dealings is that well-informed 
households in Peru are also more likely to be satisfied with operation and 
maintenance in the village.  The one caveat to this positive news is that transparency 
does not necessarily inspire future confidence.  In Ghana, gains in financial 
knowledge were associated with reductions (of about 1/3) in the probability that 
households believed their systems would function in the next five years.  Sensitivity 
analysis indicates that effects range from -0.26 to -0.36 and remain significant until 
social capital and income effects are excluded.  This may represent a problem for the 
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village if knowledgeable persons do not believe their committee’s financial dealings 
enable them to be prepared for future threats to the system.  If this is the case, 
however, interested parties may have other means of holding committee members 
accountable.  In areas with elected committees, the democratic process is one possible 
method.  Conversely, among those villages that appoint members, households may 
turn directly to village or district leaders.   
The final management-related measure considered at the household level was 
whether households had received post-construction visits from external groups.  The 
results of the association of this factor with sustainability indicators are decidedly 
mixed.  In Peru, respondents who had been visited were about one-third less likely to 
have confidence in their water systems over five and ten-year periods.  It is not clear 
why these households would exude less confidence. Perhaps they were unimpressed 
by the nature of the visits, or that these households were targeted based on related 
criteria (e.g. they were higher-income households with contacts to external agents).  
These results are also somewhat sensitive to model specification.  Results from 
Ghana are more promising.  Visited households were half as likely to complain of 
water pressure problems and about 40% more likely to trust their committee 
members.  These results are not staggering, but they may indicate the effects of a 
more regular post-construction assistance program in Ghana (particularly the MOM 
program in the Volta region).  Households visited by district-level representatives or 
outside non-profit organizations appear more understanding when problems with 
handpumps arise and less suspicious of committee activities.   
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The other possibility considered in this dissertation is that post-construction visits 
can also shape responses on other project related measures which in turn affect 
sustainability indicators.  The structural models examined these impacts.  In Peru, 
households with PCS visits were more likely to attend meetings and thus indirectly 
less likely to report water pressure problems.  They were also more likely to know 
how funds were spent and therefore more trusting of their water committees.  
Furthermore, the impact of knowledge regarding financial dealings is indirectly 
associated with  the confidence which households have concerning the future.  On the 
whole, households visited by external agencies remain less optimistic than others, yet 
visits also improve the chances that households will become aware of committee 
activities and thus more confident in the future.  A similar situation is revealed in the 
Ghana analysis.  Households that received visits were more likely to know how funds 
were spent and thus more satisfied and trusting of their water committees.  
Household-level visits in both settings appear to have improved the level of 
understanding in villages which can have indirect, beneficial consequences. 
A different form of post-construction support – area mechanics – was valued by 
many village leaders and committee members in Ghana (this form of support was not 
systematically available in Cuzco villages, nearly all of which had caretakers).  The 
dissertation considered the association of the distance to the nearest area mechanics 
across several indicators.  Households in villages where mechanics lived further away 
were significantly less likely to voice satisfaction and trust in their committees, and 
exhibit confidence in the future operation of the boreholes.  The magnitudes of these 
relationships are relatively small but persistent (a 1-2% decrease in satisfaction & 
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confidence for every kilometer increase in distance).  This relationship assumes 
greater importance in the Brong Ahafo region, where villages must call upon 
mechanics for assistance if they have problems, and in the northern areas of both 
regions where distances among villages are further apart. 
At the village level, committee attributes – such as experience, training, and 
structure – can influence household measures of sustainability.  The initial hypothesis 
regarding experience is that households in villages with more experienced committees 
would have better service, pay more often, approve of their committees’ work, and 
express hope in the future.  This theme did not resonate in either country.  If anything, 
in Peru households paid slightly less for water and were slightly less confident in the 
future.  A similar relationship occurs in Ghana, where households governed by more 
experienced watsan committees trusted watsan members less.  Committee members’ 
experience does not generate better results.  It also appears that some water 
committees have members who have overstayed their welcome and that village 
leaders may want to consider bringing on new people to take over system 
administration.  Committee training was hypothesized to positively affect indicators 
of sustainable performance.  In Peru, there was little evidence of this effect in either 
direction, although households did pay more for water service in areas where 
committees were trained.  Trained committees did inspire significantly more trust in 
Ghana among households.   
An examination of the effect of electing water committees produced some 
interesting outcomes.  Households in villages with elected committees report fewer 
tap breakdowns and better water pressure in Peru compared to other forms of 
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governance (e.g. appointments, external management by a municipality, etc).  Yet 
they are also much less satisfied with O&M and administration, and do not trust their 
committees as much (though this latter effect is slight).  O&M satisfaction results are 
robust to different village-level specifications – effects range from -0.79 to -0.83.  
Water committee satisfaction also remains relatively robust, although the range of 
coefficients varies more (-0.62 to -0.84).  The mismatch between elected committees’ 
good performance on delivering water reliably and disenchantment with their work 
may represent a situation of democracy at work; where households have taken for 
granted the work that operators and committees have done and asserted their rights to 
focus on problems because they are elected.  The effects are more nuanced in Ghana, 
as households in villages with elected watsan committees report better pressure but 
worse taste.  Elected committees fare no better on other indicators of sustainability, 
although the reader will note later that respondents in more democratic areas are more 
likely to favor scaling up. 
The impacts of operator characteristics resemble those found for committees in 
Peru.  Households in villages with longer serving operators are significantly more 
likely to register dissatisfaction with O&M activities and overall water service.  They 
are also more likely to not pay for water service and distrust their water committees.  
Again, this suggests that villages and supporting agencies should consider replacing 
and/or augmenting operators to take over or assist with their duties.  Training for 
operators, by contrast, has posted some positive results – households pay more for 
water service, report better pressure, and are more confident in the future if they lived 
in a village with a trained operator.  While training may improve prospects for 
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sustainability in Peru, the number of operators was not meaningfully associated with 
sustainability indicators in Ghana. 
The Peru and Ghana cases both considered whether committees that reported 
covering operating costs with household collections were more likely to feature 
improved household satisfaction and future confidence.  The structural models largely 
did not bear this conjecture out.  In Peru, households expressed considerably more 
satisfaction with committees that recovered costs, yet there was no statistical 
difference with respect to trust or future operations.  Ghanaian households were no 
more satisfied, trusting, or confident of the future in those committees that recovered 
costs with household collections.  These measures may prove less important, 
however, for committees who are trying to meet recurring costs while planning for 
the future.  Models also examined the impact of tariff structures on indicators in 
Ghana.  Households were obviously more likely to pay for (and pay more for) water 
with flat fee, household-based fee, or pay as you fetch tariffs in place (compared to 
villages with no tariffs).  They also complained more often of water pressure and taste 
- voicing displeasure with water attributes more frequently when they are required to 
pay for it.  There is good news for those who contend that enacting water fees will not 
necessarily promote public outcry.  No negative relationships between tariff structures 
and committee satisfaction or trust were found.  Moreover, advocates of flat fee 
structures can take some comfort in recognizing that households actually trusted 
water committees more often when they employed these tariffs (vs. no tariffs).   
The final village-level variable considers whether the SANBASUR program 
outperformed the FONCODES program in Peru after controlling for other project, 
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community, and external characteristics.  Obviously these agencies selected the 
villages in which they decided to work, and this can impact comparison of program 
differences.  Moreover, the programs themselves shaped some of the variables 
considered in the analysis.  However, SANBASUR communities still differed from 
FONCODES villages, primarily in terms of financial impacts.  SANBASUR 
households were over three times more likely to pay for service than FONCODES 
ones.  While SANBASUR households paid about 0.5 soles less per month, 
SANBASUR committees reported that they recovered operating costs more 
frequently than FONCODES committees.  The main concern for SANBASUR lies in 
the long-term sustainability of the project.  SANBASUR respondents were about half 
as likely to express optimism for service over a ten year period compared to 
FONCODES respondents.  This may reflect the fact that some FONCODES villages 
have allowed larger municipalities to take over their service, while SANBASUR 
villages are supposed to be self-sustaining.  It should also be noted that these results 
are highly sensitive to model specification and less damaging, given the long-term 
speculation involved in the question.  Nevertheless, the long-term sustainability of 
projects remains an important point for non-governmental organizations like 
SANBASUR to consider in designing and supporting effective rural water programs. 
 
7.4. Relationship Between Sustainability Indicators and Demographic Factors 
The literature on evaluating rural water systems did not yield consistent 
hypotheses on the relationship between village population, size, and sustainability in 
this study.  On the one hand, some studies found that larger villages were able to 
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achieve economies of scale and were better equipped with the necessary resources to 
operate and administer new projects.  On the other hand, others had found that larger 
villages faced greater system challenges and required households to expend more 
time in collecting water.   
  Results demonstrated that village population made a difference among some 
indicators in Peru but not among those in Ghana.  Households in larger villages 
experienced more breakdowns but shorter repair times.  However, the relative 
magnitude of population effects was small.  Respondents who lived in more 
populated villages were, however, significantly more likely to trust their water 
committees and exhibit greater confidence in five year operations.  These measures 
seem to indicate that, in Peru, larger villages are more capable of finding a pool of 
committee members who can gain user trust and confidence (at least over a shorter 
term period).  This was not the case among Ghanaian households.  Possible 
explanations for these differences may lie in the populations found in samples of 
Peruvian and Ghanaian villages.  Villages in Peru were smaller on average than those 
in Ghana.  Moreover, the range of population sizes was more restricted.  At least 
among smaller villages, then, the study uncovered evidence that more populated 
villages (i.e. 1000+ persons) may perform better than those of smaller sizes (i.e. 200-
500 persons). 
Village size registered as a more important factor in predicting physical indicators 
of performance in Peru.  As with village population, the effect on household 
breakdowns was positive and significant but the magnitude was very small.  Repair 
times were also significantly lower among households in larger villages, but again the 
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effect of size was relatively minor.  However, households were much less likely to 
report problems with water pressure and signify that they were dissatisfied with their 
water supply.  They were also more likely to favor current O&M activities and 
support and trust the water committees in these villages.  Finally, households in these 
villages were more likely to believe that the water committee over a ten-year time 
period would keep water flowing to the taps.  To some extent, these findings are 
surprising for villages where water can travel some distance to taps across often hilly 
terrain.  It raises the possibility that enumerators in some larger villages may have 
selected households which were closer to the center of town than others, although 
there was no evidence to support this contention in the field.  It may also be the case 
that the systems have not yet reached those furthest from the main village.  In any 
case, the evidence rejects the notion that piped water systems are necessarily more 
problematic in villages of larger size. 
The other village-level variable tested as a geographic factor in Ghana was the 
region of the country.  Volta households were more likely to report problems with 
water pressure and water taste.  Regional differences in these water attributes do 
persist, although it should be noted that they can be rejected at a 5% level of 
significance.  Households in Volta are also more likely to exude confidence in five 
year operation.  The magnitude of the effect is large relative to other factors, but again 
the significance of the difference is not great.   
Household-level characteristics were also considered in the analysis.  The random 
intercept models predicted the direct effects of household demographic factors on 
responses, while the structural models also tested whether these factors indirectly 
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influenced outcomes by also affecting endogenous project factors.  These models 
consider not only how demographic characteristics affect household responses to 
sustainability outcomes, but also how they influence household factors related to 
planning, implementation, and current project activities.   
Household size was measured both in terms of the number of members in the 
household and the size of the homes themselves.  Household membership size in Peru 
did not directly influence most indicators of sustainability.  Larger-person homes did 
experience more breakdowns and longer repair times, but the magnitude of these 
effects were small.   An examination of the indirect effects in Peru finds that the 
effects of household membership size moves in opposite directions in influencing 
satisfaction with current committee activities and prospects for the future.   
Households with more members contributed more labor toward the construction of 
the project, and those that did were less likely to approve of their committees.  This 
suggests that households which expend more total labor in projects may believe that 
their committees should have done a better job in administering their potable water 
resources.  However, those expending more labor are also more likely to believe that 
their systems will keep delivering water over short and long-term periods (regardless 
of management).  Larger households contributed more toward the project and are 
more convinced in the quality of their work.  Overall, the evidence on the relationship 
between household size and outcomes is mixed in Peru.  In Ghana, however, 
respondents with larger families and other occupants were more likely to be satisfied 
with watsan activities and trust their committee members.  The indirect effects in 
Ghana were split – larger person households trusted committees more since they were 
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more likely to attend meetings but trusted them less because they were less aware of 
committee financial spending.  Overall in Ghana, then, larger-person households were 
more likely to approve of the watsan committees.   
The physical size of a household bears little relationship to outcomes or project 
factors considered at a household level in Peru.  No major direct effects emerge in the 
random intercept models.  The structural models reveal that respondents in larger 
homes were less likely to know about committee spending toward the project and 
therefore less likely to trust the committee members, but the association seems 
spurious.  In Ghana, however, respondents in households with more rooms are less 
likely to be satisfied with and trust watsan members.  These effects move in the same 
direction as log expenditures; suggesting the presence of a wealth effect.  Other 
wealth effects are described in more detail below.   
Income class and expenditure measures of wealth offer an interesting mix of 
effects on project factors and outcomes.  In Peru, high-income households report 
fewer breakdowns than low-income ones, but the difference is not great (slightly over 
one breakdown between the lowest and highest income bracket).  The results are 
more dramatic and negative when considering other indicators.  High-income groups 
are much more likely to complain of unsafe water and quality of existing service, less 
satisfied with operators, and less confident in performance over both short and long 
terms.  Interestingly, there were no statistically different effects with respect to 
committee satisfaction and trust, indicating the real possibility that higher-income 
households are involved in those positions of leadership.  These results provide 
evidence that these water systems are meeting the needs of lower-income groups but 
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not necessarily the demands of upper-income members of the village.  The structural 
models reveal that higher-income respondents were much less likely to contribute 
labor toward the project.  Since upper-income households contributed less, they are 
also less likely to be dissatisfied with their committees but also less confident in 
system operation over time.  These results reveal a stratification of responses by 
income class among households in Peru.  High-income respondents are more likely to 
pay for water service but less likely to receive water and maintenance service at the 
level they desire.   
In Ghana, respondents who spend more per month on total household expenses 
were more likely to show dissatisfaction with the watsan committee.  Results from the 
structural models, however, mitigate this effect.  Households which spend more are 
also more likely to be aware of how the committee spends its resources, which is 
associated both with committee satisfaction and trust.  The reverse is true with respect 
to five-year confidence, since households which are more aware of financial activities 
are also less likely to believe their systems will keep functioning.  A final identified 
indirect effect emerges with respect to the likelihood of paying for service.  High-
expenditure households are more likely to participate in the project and thus more 
likely to pay for water service in Ghana.  The results are similar to those in Peru from 
the standpoint that respondents reporting higher expenditures pay more for service 
and are less confident in future operations.  Yet while upper-income groups in Peru 
are frustrated with operators, high-expenditure respondents in Ghana register their 
disapproval at the committees.  It should be noted that caretakers are often considered 
members of watsan committees in Ghana.   
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Differences among the random intercept and structural models emerge in 
considering another measure of wealth – the asset index.  In both studies, this 
measure was directly correlated with few indicators of sustainability when the 
random intercept specifications were employed.  The main exception to this finding 
was in Peru, where wealthier households experienced fewer breakdowns and spent 
less time waiting for restoration of service.  However, the structural models reveal 
that asset wealth played other roles in shaping household responses in Peru.  
Wealthier households are more aware of how funds are spent (similar to the income 
measure).  Thus they are more likely to pay for water, trust the committee, and show 
confidence in shorter and longer-term system operations.  By contrast, asset indices 
were not associated indirectly with any measures of sustainability in Ghana.   
Measuring wealth and determining its’ impacts are not straightforward activities 
when dealing with rural areas of developing countries.  Results from both countries 
show that while households with more assets experience fewer breakdowns and 
shorter repair times (in Peru) and pay more in monthly water expenses, they are also 
more likely overall to be dissatisfied with some aspect of the service (either O&M in 
Peru or administration in Ghana).  Poorer households appear more satisfied that 
projects are meeting their needs while wealthier ones wish that the projects catered 
better to their demands.  It is possible that poorer respondents are simply more 
deferential to enumerators and less willing to express their opinions.  However, the 
total effects are mitigated by other factors.  Households with more 
income/expenditures and assets are more likely to keep track of committee finances.  
The benefits of transparency fall to a larger extent upon these individuals and thus 
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limit the extent of dissatisfaction with services.  Moreover in Peru, wealthier 
households contributed less labor toward the project and thus do not disapprove of the 
lack of services (O&M and administration) as frequently.  One explanation is that 
they do not share the level of entitlement that poorer households which contributed 
more labor do.  They may also serve on committees more frequently.  Wealth effects 
are thus more complicated than examining whether a project benefits “the rich” or 
“the poor”, as other studies (van Domelen 2002, Engel 2004) have either attempted to 
evaluate or claim. 
The other instructive measure considered in this dissertation was learning the 
effect of attitudes concerning social capital.  While other studies measured social 
capital at a village level, this investigation examines household attitudes.  In Peru, 
social capital attitudes were not directly associated with most indicators of 
sustainability, except that high SC households were moderately more dissatisfied with 
the overall water they received.  Dissatisfaction among respondents with more 
positive attitudes toward social capital remained consistent regardless of model 
specification.  However, the structural models show that respondents who report 
higher degrees of social capital are also more likely to know how water committees 
are spending their resources.  Thus they are more likely to trust committee members 
and maintain faith in the future of the projects.  These individuals are more likely to 
stay involved in the management of the water system, which improves trust and 
future confidence.  In Ghana, stronger direct relationships between household 
attitudes toward social capital and outcomes emerged that confirmed initial 
hypotheses.  High SC households were considerably more likely to be satisfied with 
217 
and trust their committees, and slightly more confident in the future.  Indirect effects 
detected in Ghana were similar to those in Peru and bolstered the direct results.  
Respondents with higher degrees of social capital were more likely to participate and 
thus more likely to pay for service.  They also kept tabs on their committees more 
frequently, which was associated with greater committee satisfaction and trust.  
Conversely, though, they also displayed less confidence in future operations.   
The results show a positive direct relationship in Ghana and a “no decision” direct 
relationship between household attitudes and outcomes of sustainability.  Moreover, 
the structural models uncovered additional interesting findings because they 
demonstrate that, in both cases, social capital attitudes can shape outcomes through 
project-related household activities, even if no direct relationships emerge. 
 
7.5. Factors Regarding Household Attitudes Concerning Scaling Up and Leveraging  
Data from the Peru and Ghana studies reveal that most households (84% in Peru, 
86% in Ghana) are interested in having their committees improve some aspect 
(quantity, quality, expansion of service, etc.) of their current water service.  This study 
finds several factors in both countries are associated with the likelihood of households 
to support this decision.   
The Peru case reveals some expected and unanticipated results.  Households with 
aged taps are more likely to support scaling up, as are those who attend meetings 
more often (although this relationship is rather weak).  Pre-project participation and 
contributions are not good predictors of support.  Those who know how the 
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committee handles its funds are more likely to encourage their committee to scale up 
their project since they know how the committee can utilize its resources.  However, 
those who believe they have well-constructed systems are less likely to support 
improvements.  Existing users may wish to keep their water situation “as is” and may 
show concern that committee tinkering or expansions may damage some aspect of the 
current system.   
Larger households and wealthier ones are no more likely to support improvements 
than others.  Other exogenous household-level variables yield some interesting 
findings.  Older respondents are more likely to support scaling up.  By contrast, those 
with more positive attitudes toward social capital are less likely to support 
improvements.  Previous models would suggest that there are some indirect 
relationships that permeate this nexus, yet the direct negative effect of social capital 
on the decision to scale up appears counterintuitive.  Households receiving some 
degree of PCS also fall into this category.  In this situation, the lack of confidence in 
their systems may discourage this set of households into believing that scaling up is 
not possible.  In any case, it does not substantiate the view that policymakers will find 
willing support for scaling up activities in areas with favorable household-reported 
social capital or areas with household-level post-construction support.   
At the village level, households were more likely to support improvements if they 
lived in larger-populated villages with storage problems and/or had elected officials 
from the community.  Larger villages may have more people willing and able to help 
the committee scale up.  Fixing periodic water losses can be considered an 
improvement.  The positive relationship with elected committees is interesting.  These 
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same respondents are less likely to be satisfied with the existing O&M and 
administration from elected committees, yet they are twice as likely to believe that the 
water committee should improve their project.  Such respondents provide some 
incentive for democratic committees to expand their reach and build on previous 
project success, even if some are unhappy with existing services. 
Results from the model on scaling up as applied to the Ghana sample suggest that 
household meeting participation and knowledge about watsan finances were 
associated with whether households believe their systems should be improved.  Both 
effects are considerably larger (approximately 35% and 70%, respectively) among 
Ghanaian households than those in Peru.  In contrast, however, social capital is 
positively associated with household support for village improvements.  This may 
have something to do with the differences in technologies.  The Ghana projects use a 
few handpumps placed in public areas of villages, while Peruvian households 
maintain their own private taps.  Attitudes regarding social capital may apply more 
specifically to cases where respondents believe they must work together more closely 
to obtain clean water.  Finally, it is also important to recognize that the magnitudes of 
social capital effects are not large in either country.   
More village-level factors impact this household decision than household ones.  
Volta households are five times more likely to support scaling up, indicating large 
regional differences in attitudes.  More populated communities are less likely to 
contain households supporting the decision to scale up, while larger-sized villages are 
more likely to contain supportive households.   This distinction may be related to the 
distance which more remote households must travel to the handpumps (which usually 
220 
are near the center of the village).  Communities with more operators are less likely to 
support scaling up, while those that are further away are more likely.  One 
explanation for the latter effect is that villagers believe their committees must respond 
more proactively to the lack of service they obtain since their mechanics reside 
further away.  Finally, the chances that households will support improvements are 
twice as large in villages with elected committees.  This adds credence to the notion 
that elected committees are more responsive to household demands.  
In contrast to scaling up, less than 40% of Peruvians believe that their committees 
should leverage their resources into related environmental services such as sanitation, 
solid waste, and health/hygiene.  High-income households are much less likely to 
support these investments.  This may be true if these families already have access to 
these services on the premises or nearby.  As with scaling up, though, social capital is 
again negatively associated with prospects of leveraging.  Though the effect is not 
large, it provides further support to not predict support squarely on the basis of social 
capital.  More household-level information is clearly needed, given the limited 
number of factors that accurately estimate significant effects on this decision.  The 
same is also true at the village level.  Household support is stronger among those 
villages where engineers detected leaks in storage tanks.  This is rather surprising; 
one may expect that villages with such problems would be more likely to encourage 
their committees to focus their efforts on water improvements (as the results 
previously indicated) and not encourage leveraging.  Committee training is also very 
counter-intuitive; one would expect that households would support leveraging if they 
know their committee has received training.  Finally, village size also significantly 
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influences the propensity for this decision.  This effect is consistent since households 
in larger villages may have more difficulty obtaining these services (all else being 
equal).  Overall, these models suggest some intriguing ideas.  Yet more information is 
certainly needed to make these speculations more compelling. 
 
7.6. Research and Policy Implications 
The success of many villages in both Peru and Ghana suggests that the 
participatory, demand-oriented model of development overall is working quite well.  
This encouraging news holds promise for extending household connections in 
villages with gravity-fed systems as well as for sustaining service in villages that use 
handpump technologies.  It is important to remember that the sampled communities 
represent those which successfully obtained a water project through a community-
driven approach and have taken over operation of their systems.  Thus, while results 
show that pre-project household participation in decisions does not account for most 
indicators of sustainability within these samples, the fruits of participation may lie in 
the ability of villages to mobilize support to obtain a project in a participatory-based 
program, not necessarily whether individual households participated in key decisions.  
Another pre-project factor – household contributions – was generally negatively 
associated with outcomes.  This suggests that household contributions are not a good 
proxy for estimating ex ante demand or satisfaction with the project and may imply 
that contributing households believe they “deserved more” for their efforts.  
Moreover, current awareness and participation in meetings did not uniformly improve 
project outcomes.  Meeting involvement may be viewed as “two-way street.”  People 
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may participate to help the village enhance project outcomes, yet they may also 
participate if they are not receiving decent service. 
One factor which was associated with several improved outcomes in both cases 
was whether a household was aware of how the committee expended its financial 
resources.  This suggests that a transparent process empowers households to 
understand how leaders are managing their systems and thus improves project 
outcomes from their perspective.  A more open process may uncover problems in the 
finances or operation which may displease or give pause for some households.  In 
these cases, though, households are more likely to favor new projects when they are 
aware of their committee’s financial dealings. 
Income and wealth effects at the household level exhibit some interesting 
influences on household outcomes which policymakers should take into account.  
Wealthier households are less likely to experience breakdowns and wait for their yard 
taps to be repaired in Peru.  Yet they are also less satisfied and less confident in their 
water and management.  This may signify that these projects are relatively “pro-
poor”; since poorer households reported more satisfaction with water and service (or 
that poorer respondents are simply reporting what they wanted enumerators to hear).  
The results would also suggest that the current projects are not meeting the demands 
of upper class households for water and service.  Indirect effects temper this 
relationship, however.  Wealthier households tend to know how funds are spent in the 
village and less likely to contribute to projects (particularly in the form of labor).  
These differences in transparency and contributions mitigate negative perceptions of 
performance and future operations.  The results provide evidence that the benefits of 
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demand-responsive projects with transparent operations do not uniformly trickle 
down to all members of society.      
The literature on social capital has generally shown that communities with higher 
social capital attain more positive project outcomes.  No data are available here to 
compare social capital across communities that did and did not receive a project.  It is 
possible that, due to the nature of the process for obtaining a project, villages with 
higher social capital were more effective at mobilizing to win a project.  An analysis 
of household perceptions of social capital, however, presents a more split outcome.  
Ghanaian households that measured higher on the SC index were much more likely to 
be satisfied with their water, their committee, and the project’s future outlook. The 
Peruvian case told a different story.  Households with high social capital were more 
likely to pay, yet less likely to be satisfied with service.  Indirect effects were also 
mixed.  The effect of household attitudes regarding social capital, therefore, hinges on 
the ability to deliver good water and service, manage expectations, and promote 
understanding of how villages manage their projects.  While projects may stand a 
better chance of succeeding in areas where villagers are more trusting and willing to 
come together, decision-makers should not use social capital as a primary basis for 
making project decisions.  
This dissertation augments previous research (Prokopy and Thorsten 2005, 
Komives et. al 2006) conducted at the village level on the relationship between post-
construction support and sustainability.  Household-level analysis shows that 
households who received external visits were generally no more likely to report better 
physical performance (in Peru), higher water payments (in both countries), or 
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increased satisfaction (in both countries).  PCS visits have not improved these 
outcomes directly, yet indirectly they may increase the likelihood that households will 
be supportive because it has promoted more involvement in the process and more 
understanding of how committees spend their funds.  PCS programs that increase 
participation and transparency would help to advance project outcomes by 
encouraging individuals to hold their leaders accountable for service and 
administrative objectives.  These goals are not often the primary purposes of current 
visits, but external agencies and organizations should consider extending household 
visits in addition to existing village-level forms of post-construction assistance (and 
whether the benefits of extending these visits are worth the costs).   
One of the important questions considered at the village level in Peru was whether 
alternative forms of service delivery (i.e. a social investment fund or a donor-assisted 
NGO) achieved better outcomes.  Generally SANBASUR villages outperformed 
FONCODES villages on most measures of sustainability.  However, after controlling 
for other factors, there were few substantial differences between household groups – 
save for financial payments and long-term assessments of operation.  The 
SANBASUR program should consider encouraging people to pay more for water 
service and providing more ongoing support to villages to help ensure villagers that 
their systems will remain in tact over time.  The FONCODES program should 
concentrate on reducing the number of failed systems, promoting a greater culture of 
payment to enhance operational cost recovery, and improving operator performance.   
Results from both Peru and Ghana question the notion that more experience 
translates into better outcomes.  Villages with long-serving operators and committee 
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members should consider turning over these positions more often if they can find 
capable people to handle these responsibilities.  The level of training among 
committees generally was not associated with higher measures on sustainability 
indicators.  This would suggest that villages could replace and retrain new committee 
members relatively easily without losses in household-level performance.  Trained 
operators (in Peru), however, are an important asset (not only in terms of better water 
pressure but also in the forms of higher water payments and more system confidence).  
Training new operators should remain an important objective for villages and 
programs that provide them with operational support.  Another important external 
factor that programs should consider is the distance of villages to spare parts and 
other forms of assistance.  Distance was an important factor in predicting household 
satisfaction and future confidence in Ghana (where spare parts are vital).  Some 
Cuzco villages also represent even greater challenges due to their remote locations in 
mountainous terrain.  Organizations interested in supporting these relatively nascent 
success stories should identify those communities where routine external assistance 
requires considerable time and expense.   
The democratic nature of management – specifically whether villagers elect their 
own committees – was associated with positive water system outcomes such as fewer 
breakdowns (-0.26 fewer in Peru) and better water pressure (both cases).  This 
research also uncovered some evidence that households (in Peru) were more likely to 
voice displeasure for operation & maintenance service and water committee 
satisfaction.  Elected committee structures are not conclusively superior to other 
forms of administration, yet they have attained some positive results while allowing 
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dissent.  This phenomenon may benefit communities in the long run if elected 
committee members remain responsive to household input and needs.   
Committees looking for additional guidelines should also take some comfort in 
knowing that making difficult tariff decisions do not necessarily produce negative 
feedback from households.  In Ghana, households located in villages with tariff 
schemes are no more likely to voice opposition to watsan activities and slightly more 
likely to trust their committees.  It is possible, however, that there are unobserved 
differences in villages that would lead to widespread household dissatisfaction if 
committees without tariffs schemes decided to impose them.  Moreover, those 
villages that recover their operating costs with revenues contain households that are 
no more likely to show displeasure with watsans (in Ghana) and significantly more 
likely to be satisfied with water committees in Peru.  In particular, the evidence 
demonstrates that households that are located in villages with a transparent, 
accountable management process are at least no more likely to mobilize against their 
committees who seek to reconcile cost recovery and user satisfaction objectives.  
These issues become more important for those communities which are in need of 
major repairs of or replacements to their existing systems (particularly those which 
have longer-serving projects).  Most villages in both countries have not factored in 
the cost of major repairs (and certainly not capital replacement) in their tariff systems.  
While current needs do not seem very great, the long-term prospects of these systems 
could be jeopardized unless villages begin to develop the means to save for these 
overhauls.  The demand for these measures is uncertain (the data do not reveal 
whether households have been asked by committees to make such payments), but one 
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could anticipate that segments of the populations may be willing to pay for these 
services given the relatively high levels of satisfaction with the systems in both 
countries. 
Issues of cost recovery also impact the interest in and demand for new services.  
Donors and communities looking to find support for scaling up water projects should 
engage households which are currently involved in meetings and are aware of how 
the committee operates and spends its resources.  Village factors can also assist 
decision-makers in evaluating prospects.  Households are more likely to support 
scaling up in villages where they have a voice in the process; i.e. via committee 
members elected by the community.  Households in larger communities (measured by 
size) are generally more likely to support their endeavors (due in part to the larger 
distances required by households to obtain water from other improved or unimproved 
sources), as are those which are located in villages further away from towns and other 
places where mechanics, spare parts, and other services are available.  Of course, 
each decision carries its own costs and benefits which officials at any level (village, 
district, national, etc.) must evaluate in conjunction with project beneficiaries before 
deciding on a course of action.
  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
8.1. Contributions to the Literature 
The methods and findings from this dissertation make several contributions to the 
literature on the sustainability of water service provision in developing countries.  
Previous studies that used quantitative methods have either focused their evaluations 
at the village level (which aggregates household level data and ignores the 
distribution of impacts within villages) or conducted household-level analysis while 
omitting village-level factors and clustering effects.  The use of random intercept 
models estimates household and village-level factors that influence indicators of 
sustainability and allows the base case in each village (the intercept) to vary, which 
accounts for differences in performance.  The study demonstrated that variation 
existed for many indicators at both household and village levels and that both sets of 
factors can influence a household’s experience with physical performance, financial 
payment, use, satisfaction, and future confidence.  The multi-level nature of these 
models and the use of multiple project, community, and external factors also allow 
this study to infer causal relationships better than other studies, which either lack data 
on household or village measures or sample size to estimate both household and 
village-level effects. 
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Previous research has attempted to examine the influence of non-project 
household factors on project decisions, such as the degree of participation in a project 
and how much to contribute toward its’ attainment.  Other studies have focused their 
attention (as this one does) on project outcomes.  This study represents, to the 
authors’ knowledge, the first attempt to simultaneously measure the influence of non-
project household factors on project outcomes by estimating both direct effects and 
indirect effects via the endogenous project-level decisions and variables which can 
influence project success.  This method provides a more holistic perspective on how 
variables like household size, income, and social capital are associated both with the 
set of project-related factors of performance and the outcomes themselves.  It also 
demonstrates that indirect effects may either mitigate the extent of direct relationships 
or bolster the strength of direct effects. 
Previous studies have normally assigned one or some set of indicators as 
sufficient in explaining sustainability. This dissertation hypothesized that previously-
identified indicators of sustainability may not completely represent the concept itself.  
It considered the notion of sustainability as indicated by a set of variables while also 
containing some degree of measurement error, then modeled its relationship with 
household and village factors via a structural equation model.  The results portrayed 
two different stories in Peru and Ghana.  The Peruvian model showed that the 
indicators of sustainability were significantly related to one another, while a small set 
of household and village factors were associated with the concept.  Results from 
Ghana indicate that the indicators did not “come together” so well and, as a result, no 
factors were related to the concept.  The models were less useful in testing individual 
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hypotheses of factors on sustainability, but helpful in demonstrating a method to 
determine to what extent the indicators of sustainability matched the concept as 
outlined in prior research.   
The findings of this investigation also shed light on research in this field.  One 
important first conclusion that emerges is that donors and managers in the water 
sector of different countries have begun to incorporate past experience and a new 
paradigm of participation and demand responsiveness into projects which have 
overall achieved some significant long-term impacts.  Many projects still work 
despite challenging terrains (in Peru) and challenging technologies (in Ghana).  A 
culture of payment has emerged among some villages in both settings, although 
O&M cost-recovery is not universal and full cost recovery (including major repairs 
and capital replacement) remains elusive.  Almost everyone regularly uses the 
improved sources and many are satisfied with the water and service they receive.  
These results counter those of prior evaluations which decried the lack of success and 
sustainability in the water sector. 
Specific contributions from testing individual hypotheses also arise from the 
study.  Among participatory, community-managed projects, household-level 
participation in decisions and contributions do not influence outcomes over time, yet 
research has revealed the importance of transparency in achieving positive impacts.  
Households that are more aware of their committee’s work are generally more likely 
to pay for service, support their efforts, and have confidence in the future (in Peru).   
The study also unveiled some of the nuances in the relationship between non-
project household factors, project-related factors, and current indicators of 
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sustainability.  The mixed relationship between income/wealth and outcomes supports 
studies that found that water projects have benefited lower-income groups while 
leaving upper-income group dissatisfied with the water and service they receive.  Yet 
to the extent that wealthier households are aware of successful committees’ work, 
they remain pleased with progress.  The results also challenge some of the uniformly 
positive literature on the significance of social capital.  This story held true in Ghana, 
where households with high social capital not only were more satisfied and confident 
in the outlook of the project, they were also more likely to stay involved in meetings 
and know how committees spent its resources.  Households in Peru were also more 
likely to participate and stay abreast of committee activities, and these respondents 
were more likely to pay for water and register their approval.  However, households 
with more positive attitudes toward social capital were slightly more dissatisfied in 
the performance of their water systems and less willing to support the committee’s 
efforts to scale up or leverage their water project activities.  Policymakers cannot 
presume that areas with high social capital will automatically lend themselves to 
favorable project impacts.   
The study also contributed to decomposing the effect of post-construction support 
on project outcomes.  Other studies from this research have focused on this question 
in terms of village-level outcomes.  This research shows that households in Peru were 
no less likely to experience breakdowns, no more likely to pay for water, and no more 
satisfied than others if they were assisted at the household-level by external 
organizations after the completion of the project.  Moreover, they were less sanguine 
about the prospect of future operation and scaling up.  These less favorable findings, 
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however, are brightened by the prospect that visited households participate more 
often and are more engaged in a water committee’s financial dealings.  Given the 
strong relationships between household understanding and support, donor agencies 
should consider focusing more attention on visits as a means of encouraging 
household participation and transparent processes at the village level. 
The results also uncovered some of the roles which village factors play in 
predicting household outcomes.  Generally the donor-assisted, NGO-based project 
fared better than the government’s social investment fund at the village level, but 
program differences alone did not explain most household outcomes once other 
factors were controlled.  It is important to recognize that some of these other village 
and household factors were influenced by participation in either the SANBASUR or 
FONCODES scheme.  Nevertheless, each program has its own set of challenges – the 
social investment program needed to place more emphasis on user payment and cost 
recovery while the NGO scheme should consider working with partner agencies to 
encourage long-term support.   
Another important finding to emerge was the negative relationship between 
experience and sustainability outcomes.  Finding persons to be trained and serve as 
operators and committee members is one of the critical steps in designing and 
implementing projects intended to transfer operation to the village.  This research 
suggests, however, that some villages may not achieve desirable outcomes because 
operators and committee members are serving too long in their roles.  The lack of 
turnover may inhibit cost recovery, delay operation and maintenance, and produce 
stagnant committee leadership which appears unresponsive to customer needs.  These 
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issues become more important as communities which have achieved initial successes 
request more service, expansion, and movement into other areas of community need. 
One activity which can potentially energize stagnant leadership is direct election 
of water committees.  The research shows that elected water committees have 
achieved fewer breakdowns (in Peru) and better water pressure in both countries.  
Households may well complain more often about current leaders, but regular 
elections can promote needed changes in operation and management.  Moreover, 
households in elected committees are more likely to voice support to scale up 
services.  These findings present new information on how committee structures can 
influence household satisfaction and confidence. 
Finally, this dissertation sheds new light on what other household and village 
factors predict support for scaling up.  Research in this field is currently very limited.  
Results indicate that households are more likely to favor tackling these new 
responsibilities if they are currently aware of and participate in the current governing 
process and if they understand how the committee collects and spends its money.  
Social capital effects varied in the two countries.  Village factors (besides elected 
committee structures) included the distance to the nearest area mechanic and village 
size.  These initial findings can help researchers in designing studies to ascertain 
where and how much a successful potable water program can scale up its activities 
within villages and into other areas.  
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8.2. Study Limitations 
One of the initial limitations of the study was the tight schedule field teams were 
presented with to collect data from a variety of households and village groups.  
Enumerators were unable to collect data from all households on all of the variables 
tested in this dissertation.  The analysis contained enough information to proceed, on 
the assumption that the values were missing at random.  Researchers were not able to 
return to villages to learn more once the initial data were collected and analyzed.  
This would have been helpful to check the quality of the information collected and 
also further address some of the relationships posited in the results.   
This study represents an ex-post evaluation.  Researchers did not collect data on 
most conditions in the village before the project.  These baseline data would have 
been helpful to understand changes which may have taken place in villages and 
households that could have explained some of the findings.   The information could 
have also been used to determine if there were unobservable differences in the 
villages that would account for some results.  In Peru, for instance, it is possible that 
SANBASUR may have employed more favorable selection criteria for its 
communities than FONCODES (as was suggested by some officials) which would 
explain differences in water payments.  Likewise in Ghana, regional differences could 
have produced some of the results which showed that Volta communities were more 
likely to have water pressure problems yet more confident in long-term operations.  
This study controlled for more village and household factors than similar published 
studies and thus can make more appropriate causal inferences than others.  However, 
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ex-post research designs are less effective than other approaches, such as natural 
experiments, in attributing causality of the factors presented in this study.   
The success of many villages in both samples provides reason for celebration in 
the sector, yet the limited variation of some variables makes it more difficult to 
generate (and generalize) results.  It was impossible to predict the success of these 
villages before inception.  Employing this study in a more challenging environment 
would have allowed more rigorous examination of relationships between factors and 
outcomes. 
Random intercept models do not facilitate easy comparison in terms of overall 
model quality.  Unstandardized results and odds ratios are reported since most 
indicators are categorical, yet these can be challenging to interpret.  The structural 
models show the relationship between exogenous and endogenous household 
variables.  However, calculating precise indirect (and total) effects of exogenous 
variables on outcomes was not attempted due to the differences in variable scales and 
types (continuous, ordered categorical, nominal, binary).  It is also unfortunate that 
more household level information was not available to determine other indirect 
effects.  For example, are there other factors that drove households to participate and 
contribute during project construction?  What other household factors may influence 
household knowledge of water committee activities?  In addition, there were 
situations where a non-recursive model may have more accurately represented 
household or village-level dynamics.  One example at the household level is current 
participation.  This dissertation speculates that current household participation 
influences water payments and satisfaction measures.  Another possibility is modeled 
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in a two-way path relationship; whereby household participation and water payments 
simultaneously influence each other.  These models are more difficult to estimate and 
not possible given the complex survey data obtained and models employed.   
Most path models did not concentrate on village-level factors due to limitations 
on data and village size.  Except for the random slopes model in the Peru case, these 
models also did not feature cross-level interactions in which a set of village level 
factors could also influence household-level factors.  Model estimation is more 
complicated using this approach and relies even more heavily on the discretion of the 
researcher.  It is possible, however, that these interactions do exist (e.g. households 
know less about water committee activities because their committee is not elected).   
Selection models would have been interesting to incorporate further in this study.  
For example, a selection model could have estimated how village factors affect 
sustainability indicators by initially modeling the probability that a village obtained a 
project (compared to non-project villages), then examining the conditional effect of 
village factors on the outcome.  Another potential application at the household level 
would first model the probability that a household paid for water, then examine how 
much the household paid.  Unfortunately there are limited examples of research that 
account for selection in multilevel modeling (Borgoni & Billari 2002, Bellio & Gordi 
2003).  Grilli & Rampachini (2005) demonstrate that the selection problem is more 
complex in multilevel modeling because it can occur at multiple levels, shape the 
variance/covariance matrix structure, and modify the hierarchical structure of the data 
which complicates estimation algorithms.  This study did not consider such models, 
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and thus its’ statistical applications depend on the assumption that covariance 
parameters of the error terms at both levels are null.   
 
8.3. Avenues for Further Research 
The methods, results, and conclusions from this research open up new 
possibilities for evaluating the success and future outlook of rural water systems in 
developing countries.  Comparisons on project performance could be strengthened by 
collecting and incorporating more data from the pre-project period.  The baseline data 
would assist in analyzing the benefits that these systems have provided to villagers, 
particularly if the benefits are measurable (e.g. in an economic framework) and less 
subject to pre-project household and villages expectations.  It would also help control 
for more pre-project differences.   
Researchers who are interested in applying this framework should consider 
programs in countries where sustainability outcomes have been more difficult to 
attain.  Another option is to conduct this analysis on a set of communities which 
received projects and compare them to others which have not received project 
assistance.  Comparisons with villages which had been denied project assistance yet 
moved forward with building their own systems could further test the participatory 
framework against less participatory schemes using multi-level modeling.  
Researchers may also consider comparing project villages with pipeline communities 
(those in line for a project) if they were interested in further exploring the relationship 
between non-project household and village factors and sustaining potable water.  
These settings could provide venues for examining how households respond to less 
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than desirable outcomes.  For example, do households participate more in the process 
because they are not receiving quality water and/or service at the price they have 
paid?  Do they demand more improvements, or simply return to unimproved sources?   
Some of the counterintuitive associations uncovered in the analyses deserve future 
attention.  The relationship between a household’s socio-economic status and 
outcomes merits future consideration in rural settings.  Research that identified wealth 
from a household perspective may elaborate on some of the opposing results obtained 
when using two different measures (income and assets).  Case studies that probed 
further into the distributional impacts of these projects would strengthen quantitative 
research.  At the village level, findings which show that larger-sized villages are 
outperforming smaller ones deserve further investigation.  One might initially suspect 
that households in larger settings would be less satisfied (in Peru, due to the distance 
water and operators must travel to reach homes farther away and in Ghana, due to the 
longer distance villagers would have to travel to obtain water from handpumps).  
These households may, however, compare their present service with previous, 
unimproved supplies.  Moreover, case studies that examined village dynamics, 
particularly the relationship between operators, water committees, and their 
communities, would enhance understanding of how well villages manage projects 
over time and what villages should do to ensure that well-functioning projects do not 
stagnate due to village failures.  Finally, further analysis on the relationship between 
more specific post-construction support received by households and household 
impacts could assist policymakers in designing effective, targeted PCS at both the 
household and village levels.   
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This study compared performance of the FONCODES social investment fund and 
SANBASUR’s NGO-driven water supply program in the Cuzco region of Peru.  PCS 
programs in Brong Ahafo and Volta regions were also used as a basis of comparison 
for the World Bank study that generated data for this dissertation.  One area of 
research which would augment studies of specific programs would analyze the cost-
effectiveness of these programs.   In Peru, for example, while SANBASUR generally 
outperformed FONCODES on village outcomes, their costs may have been much 
higher as well.  Likewise in Ghana, the MOM program incurred more program cost to 
administer in the Volta region than the purely demand-driven program in Brong 
Ahafo.  Research that compared the costs and benefits of alternative forms of service 
delivery and post-construction support would enable policymakers to make more 
appropriate economic decisions. 
The literature on scaling up and leveraging certainly needs more treatment.  One 
improvement to this investigation would involve a willingness to pay survey, in 
which researchers would provide households with hypothetical water and specific 
other improvements along with prices and ask if the household would pay specified 
amounts for the committee to provide the new service.  This research would help 
assess how much existing customers would contribute toward water or leveraged 
service improvements.  Other studies could focus on evaluating areas which have 
attempted to scale up or leverage investments.  One option would examine a program 
which has attempted to extend a rural water scheme into nearby villages or districts.  
Another possibility is to evaluate a small set (case study) or a larger set (quantitative 
analysis) of communities which have attempted to scale up and/or leverage 
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investments within their villages.  This research would mark a crucial component in 
understanding what factors allow programs to expand rural water coverage and/or 
environmental health services while sustaining existing programs or services.  As 
more rural water programs earn the level of success found in these studies, there will 
be more pressure to scale up and leverage these projects in order to meet the 
development challenges outlined in places such as Goal 7 of the Millennium 
Development Goals.  Research that identifies areas where households are demanding 
improvements and demonstrates what factors can predict project success would 
improve the theory and practice of development in the water and sanitation sector. 
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Appendix I – Peru Protocol for Sampling Households  
within Communities 
 
 
Introduction 
 There are different methods of selecting households for the household surveys in 
each community.  Each technique depends upon the level of information available at each 
village.  The following outlines the protocol that field coordinators should use to 
determine how to sample households at the village level.  These options are ordered from 
best-case to worst-case scenarios.  Field coordinators must select the option that best fits 
the amount of information available at the village level. 
 
First Steps 
 Upon arrival in a village, the field coordinator will seek out village leaders and 
ask to see a list of households in the village.  Some villages will have a list of households 
either from census information or from village resources.  If a village does have a 
complete list of households no more than two years old, field coordinators will use the 
Option 1 strategy for household selection described below. 
 
 If a village does not have a complete, updated list of households, the field 
coordinator will ask village leaders to work with them in devising a sample map of 
households.  For some SANBASUR projects, a preliminary map from the initial 
diagnostic (pre-project) study may already be available; field coordinators should check 
their documents to see if they have this map in hand.  The field coordinator will work 
with the village leaders to sketch this map.  In particular, this map should identify: 
1) The location of the main pipeline within village limits 
2) Higher-wealth and lower-wealth residential areas, providing a rough estimate 
of their relative sizes. 
 
Upon completion of this map, the field coordinator will use the Option 2 
strategy for household selection, described below. 
 
 Field coordinators may be unable to sketch a residential map of the area; possibly 
because they cannot find village leaders or others in the village that has the necessary 
information to sketch an informal map.  This represents a worst-case scenario, and field 
coordinators should do their best to obtain either a list of households or a village map.  In 
this case, field coordinators should proceed to the Option 3 strategy for household 
selection, described below. 
 
 
Option 1:  Complete List of Households Available in the Village 
 Upon obtaining a complete list of households from the village, field coordinators 
will use simple random sampling to draw 40 households from the list.  The simplest 
method for doing this is to write down numbers from one to the last number of 
households on small scrap sheets of paper, place them in a hat, bowl, etc., then randomly 
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select 40 numbers.  Field coordinators with computers that have random-number 
generating programs may use these programs as an alternative to this strategy.   
 
These numbers will represent your sample of households.  Field coordinators will 
collect address or location information for each household, and work with village leaders 
or registry keepers to determine what areas of town these households are located in.  
Field coordinators will divide these into four proportional areas of different sizes, and 
then send enumerators to each area to conduct household interviews during the day.  
Field coordinators will divide areas and assign households to each selected enumerator 
based on the following formula (please see Chapter 2 schedule for reference). 
 
ENUMERATOR # INTERVIEWS 
REQUIRED 
# POTENTIAL HOUSEHOLDS 
ASSIGNED 
1 3 5 
2 6 10 
3 6 10 
4 8 15 
 
 
Enumerators will visit each of the assigned households until they have completed 
the requisite number of interviews.  If they have visited all of their households but have 
not completed their interviews, they should revisit the houses to check if a household 
member has returned.  Once an enumerator has completed their interviews, they can 
return to a site designated by the field coordinator and begin checking surveys.  If an 
enumerator was not able to locate the requisite number of interviewees in his/her area, the 
field coordinator can advise them to assist another enumerator. 
  
 
Option 2:  List of Households Unavailable, Detailed Social Map of Village Available 
 
 Once the field coordinator has produced a detailed sketch map identifying the 
main water pipeline, residential concentrations, and spatial areas of wealth in the village, 
the field coordinator will attempt to divide the village into clusters.  These clusters will 
roughly typify the following categories: 
1) Higher-wealth area, near the main pipeline 
2) Higher-wealth area, further from main pipeline 
3) Lower-wealth area, near the main pipeline 
4) Lower-wealth area, further from main pipeline 
 
Please see Figure 1 for an example of a detailed social map.  It may be difficult to 
define these clusters.  Some villages may feature little difference in wealth or distance 
from the main pipeline.  Households in other villages may be more dispersed.  The 
objective, however, is to sample households from areas of relatively higher and lower 
wealth and areas that are closer to and farther away from the main distribution line.  If 
field coordinators determine, for instance, that the differences in wealth and distance 
from the main pipeline are small, then field coordinators should select clusters that 
represent the diversity of wealth and distance in the village. 
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Once these clusters have been identified, the field coordinator will place the clusters 
into the following groups.  Group 1 will contain households in high-wealth, close-
distance areas and low-wealth, close distance areas.  Group 2 will contain households 
located in high-wealth, further-distance areas and households located in low-wealth, 
further-distance areas.   
 
Field coordinators will send Enumerators #1 and #4 to work in the two groups near 
the main pipeline and send Enumerators #2 and #3 to work in the two groups further 
from the main pipeline.  Enumerators will begin at an intersection in the group closest 
to the center of the village, and then walk through the cluster and interview 
households encountered based on the following formula with respect to village 
populations: 
 
• Populations 400-599:  Every 2nd Household 
• Populations 600-799:  Every 3rd Household 
• Populations 800-999:  Every 4th Household 
• Populations 1000-1199:  Every 5th Household 
• Populations 1200-1399:  Every 6th Household 
• Populations 1400-1599:  Every 7th Household 
• Populations 1600-1799:  Every 8th Household 
• Populations 1800-1999:  Every 9th Household 
  
Enumerators who are working through the day who have completed their walks 
through the clusters but have not completed their requisite number of interviews should 
return to the beginning household.  If no one was home at this household during the first 
round, the enumerator should check to see if someone has since arrived to interview.  If 
no one is home again, the enumerator should then go to the household next door (e.g. on 
the right).  The enumerator will follow the same procedure for every n th household (i.e. 
the enumerator will go to the 5th household, check if they have been interviewed and 
knock if they have not, and then proceed to the household next door).  Once an 
enumerator has completed their interviews, they can return to a site designated by the 
field coordinator and begin checking surveys.   
 
If an enumerator was not able to locate interviewees in his/her area, the field 
coordinator can advise them to assist another enumerator.  Enumerators who assist 
another enumerator in a different cluster must check with that person to determine where 
they are in the rotation, and operate using the same formula described above. 
 
 
Option 3:  List of Households Unavailable, Detailed Social Map Unavailable 
 If field coordinators are unable to obtain a list of households or sketch a detailed 
social map, field coordinators must resort to what is called systematic cluster sampling 
with random starting points.  In this method, field coordinators will divide the village into 
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four geographic areas (these are not based on wealth or distance since these measures are 
presumably unavailable), based on a walk through the village.  Field coordinators will 
guess how many people live in each area, and then send enumerators to each geographic 
area in proportion to the assigned number of interviews they need to complete. 
 
 From the household closest to the village center, the enumerator will then proceed 
to count all of the houses in his/her geographic area and number them on a map they will 
sketch (please see Figure 2 for an example of a sketch map).  Afterwards, the enumerator 
will select one number at random from the list and begin interviews at that household.  
Field coordinators will instruct enumerators to use the same strategies for interviewing 
subsequent numbered households as that described in Option 2.   
 
 
Sampling Female and Male Respondents 
 Enumerators should try to achieve some balance of female and male respondents.  
It is likely that, in early interviews during the day, there will be more female respondents 
at home.  Enumerators who conduct interviews later in the day should make a concerted 
effort to find male subjects.  At least two of the interviews conducted by each enumerator 
in the afternoon should be men (or women, if the morning’s enumerators find that they 
have a very high proportion of men in their sample).  Field coordinators should work with 
enumerators to help ensure gender representation. 
 
 
At the End of the Day 
 Field coordinators will explain in detail the procedures they used for sampling 
households in each village and justify their reasons for doing so in the Field Note.  They 
will also report any difficulties they or their enumerators encountered along the way, and 
discuss what measures they took in response.  This information is extremely important 
for the Study Team because it allows us to cross-check the collected household data with 
the protocols used by field coordinators and enumerators to determine the quality of the 
information obtained by households in each village. 
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Appendix II – Ghana Protocol for Sampling Households  
within Communities 
 
 
Introduction 
 There are different methods of selecting households for the household surveys in 
each community.  Each technique depends upon the level of information available and 
whether boreholes are located within the village or in a nearby community.  The 
following outlines the protocol that field coordinators should use to determine how to 
sample households at the village level.  Field coordinators must select the option that 
best fits the amount of information available at the village level. 
 
Step 1 
 Upon arrival in a village, the field coordinator will seek out the village President 
and/or the watsan committee Chairperson.  The coordinator will need to learn the 
following from this/these person(s). 
 
• The number of communities that use the CWSP/Danida borehole(s) and the 
location(s) of these villages. 
• The numbers of people that live in each of the village(s) that normally use the 
borehole(s). 
• Whether any of the village(s) maintains a current, complete list of households no 
more than two years old. Some villages may have a list of households either from 
census information or from village resources.  
 
Step 2a (for localities in which only one village uses the borehole(s) 
 If households in only one village use the borehole(s), the field coordinator will 
sample in one of two ways. If a village has a complete list of households no more than 
two years old, field coordinators will use the Option 1 strategy described below. 
 
 If a village does not have a complete, current list of households, the field 
coordinator will ask village leaders to work with them in devising a sample map of the 
village. This map should identify: 
 
3) The location of the main borehole(s) within the village 
4) An estimate of the number of households in each of four geographic areas in 
the community, using the borehole(s) as a central point.   
 
Upon completion of this map, the field coordinator will use the Option 2 
strategy for household selection, described below. 
  
Option 1:  Complete List of Households Available in the Village 
 Upon obtaining a complete list of households from the village, field coordinators 
will use simple random sampling to draw 40 households from the list.  The simplest 
method for doing this is to write down numbers from one to the last number of 
households on small scrap sheets of paper, place them in a hat, bowl, etc., then randomly 
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select 40 numbers.  Field coordinators with computers that have random-number 
generating programs may use these programs as an alternative to this strategy.   
 
These numbers will represent your sample of households.  Field coordinators will 
collect address or location information for each household, and work with village leaders 
or registry keepers to determine what areas of town these households are located in.  
Field coordinators will divide these into four proportional areas of different sizes, then 
send enumerators to each area to conduct household interviews during the day.  Field 
coordinators will divide areas and assign households to each selected enumerator based 
on the following formula (please see Chapter 2 schedule for reference). 
 
ENUMERATOR # INTERVIEWS 
REQUIRED 
# POTENTIAL HOUSEHOLDS 
ASSIGNED 
1 2 4 
2 5 9 
3 6 9 
4 6 9 
5 6 9 
 
Enumerators will visit each of the assigned households until they have completed 
the requisite number of interviews.  If they have visited all of their households but have 
not completed their interviews, they should revisit the houses to check if a household 
member has returned.  Once an enumerator has completed their interviews, they can 
return to a site designated by the field coordinator and begin checking surveys.  If an 
enumerator was not able to locate the requisite number of interviewees in his/her area, the 
field coordinator can advise them to assist another enumerator. 
  
Option 2:  List of Households Unavailable, Village Map Available 
 Once the field coordinator has produced a detailed sketch map identifying the 
main boreholes and residential concentrations, the field coordinator will divide the village 
into four geographic areas with a relatively even number of households.  The field 
coordinator will send enumerators to each of these areas.  Enumerators 1 and 2 will likely 
go to the same area (near the center of town, since they will work with the field 
coordinator on conducting focus groups later in the afternoon). 
 
Enumerators will begin from the center of the village, then walk through their area 
and interview households.  They will visit households based on the following formula 
with respect to total village populations: 
• Populations 100-499:  Every House 
• Populations 500-999:  Every 2rd House 
• Populations 1000-1499:  Every 3rd House 
• Populations 1500-1999:  Every 4th House 
• Populations 2000-2499:  Every 5th House 
• Populations 2500-2999:  Every 6th House 
• Populations 3000-3999:  Every 7th House 
• Populations 4000-4999:  Every 8th House 
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This formula guarantees that field teams do not only interview those households that 
are closest to the borehole(s). 
   
Enumerators who are working through the day who have completed their walks 
through the areas but have not completed their requisite number of interviews should 
return to their first household.  If no one was home at this household during the first 
round, the enumerator should check to see if someone has since arrived to interview.  If 
no one is home again, the enumerator should then go to the next household.  The 
enumerator will follow the same procedure for every n th household (for example, the 
enumerator will go to the 5th household, check if they have been interviewed and knock if 
they have not, then proceed to the next household).  Once an enumerator has completed 
their interviews, they can return to a site designated by the field coordinator and begin 
checking surveys (or preparing for the focus groups, depending on their role that day).   
 
If an enumerator was not able to locate interviewees in his/her area, the field 
coordinator can advise them to assist another enumerator.  Enumerators who assist 
another enumerator in a different geographic area must check with that person to 
determine where they are in the rotation, and operate using the same formula described 
above. 
 
Step 2b (for localities in which more than one village uses borehole(s) 
 If the field coordinator learns that there is more than one village where 
households use a borehole, the field coordinator will need to send enumerators to 
different villages to gather household interviews.  This will require a simple calculation. 
 
 The coordinator will take the total population of all of the villages that use the 
borehole(s).  S/he will then estimate the proportion of the total population belonging to 
each village, and assign the corresponding number of enumerators to each village.  Again, 
Enumerators 1 and 2 should remain at the village with the borehole, since they will be 
needed to conduct and/or take notes during afternoon focus groups.   
 
For example: Village A contains a borehole and 1,000 people live there. 
  Village B uses the borehole and 500 people live there 
  Village C also uses the borehole and 500 people live there. 
 
 Thus, Village A represents 50% of the total, while Villages B and C each represent 
25% of the total.  The best alternative would be to keep Enumerators 1-3 in Village A, 
and send Enumerators 4-5 to Villages B and C, respectively.  The field coordinators will 
need to use their judgment concerning how many enumerators to send to each village, but 
it is imperative that teams visit a sample of households in all villages that use the 
borehole(s)! 
 
 Once the field coordinator has decided how many enumerators to send to each 
village, teams will use either Options 1 or 2 described above to select what households to 
visit.  If a village does have a complete list of households, use Option 1.  If not, then use a 
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modified version of Option 2.  Here, cases will arise where only one or two enumerators 
will be placed in a village.  Nevertheless, we still want teams to obtain geographic 
representation within the village, and to use the formula described above to interview 
households.   
 
For example, if Enumerator #3 is selected to go to a village without a list of 
households, s/he should divide the village into three areas, then visit households in each 
area according to the population formula above (this translates into visiting probably 
every household or every other household for smaller villages).  The enumerator would 
obtain two completed interviews from the first area, then move to the next area, etc. until 
finished. Field coordinators should discuss these strategies with enumerators before 
proceeding. 
 
Sampling Female and Male Respondents 
 Enumerators should try to achieve some balance of female and male respondents.  
Enumerators 3-5 should try to interview at least two men and two women during their 
day.   Enumerator 2 should try to interview at least one man and at least one woman.  
Field coordinators should work with enumerators to help ensure gender representation. 
 
At the End of the Day 
 Field coordinators will explain in detail the procedures they used for sampling 
households in each village and justify their reasons for doing so in the Field Note.  They 
will also report any difficulties they or their enumerators encountered along the way, and 
discuss what measures they took in response.  This information is extremely important 
for the Study Team because it allows us to cross-check the collected household data with 
the protocols used by field coordinators and enumerators to determine the quality of the 
information obtained by households in each village. 
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Appendix III: Frequency Distributions for Sustainability Indicators 
(dependent variables)  
 
 
Peru Results 
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Do You Believe the Water System Will Function Over the 
Next Five Years?
13%
76%
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Do You Believe the Water System will Continue to Function 
Over the Next Ten Years?
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Ghana Results 
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13.98%
86.02%
no yes
Do you believe the watsan committee should expand/improve the system?
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Appendix 4:  Model Results for Sustainability as Latent Variable - Peru 
 
 
FACTOR PERU 
HOUSEHOLD   
  Yrs. Connect 0.127
  Part. Index -0.01
  Contribution -0.004
  Meeting Attd/Awareness -0.039
  PCS -0.115
  HH members 0.035
  HH size 0.034
  Income  -0.131**
  Assets -0.027
  Age -0.001
  Social Capital  -.023**
  System – Good Construction 0.433***
  Knowledge How $ Spent 0.147*
  Treats water   
VILLAGE   
  Program 0.239
  Volta Region   
  Operator Experience  -0.054*
  Operator Trained 0.065
  Operators in village   
  Source – Dry Months 0.03
  Source - Distance   
  System – Storage Cracks 0.236
  System – No Leaks 0.208
  System - Mechanic distance   
  Population 0.000
  Village Size 0.001**
  Committee Experience -0.009
  Elected Committee -0.029
  Committee Trained 0.032
  Payment system - collections   
  Payment system - flat fee   
  Payment system - HH fee   
  Payment system - pay as fetch   
Model  SEM w/ RI 
Sample N 940
BIC-adjusted 5907
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